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ABSTRACT 
MARY JO MCGOWAN SHEPHERD. BCRA: before campaigning retain an attorney. 
An institutional study of campaign finance contribution limits on candidate emergence in 
the 50 United States.  (Under the direction of DR. MARTHA KROPF) 
 
This study looks at campaign finance statutes and their effect on candidate 
decisions in a novel way.  Using institutional theory as a backdrop, this study uses the 
language of the campaign finance statutes as measured with plain language utilities to 
gauge candidates’ participation and withdrawals from state legislative races.  The rules 
inherent in the campaign finance statutes may make it difficult for candidates to comply 
with the statutes and the language in which the statutes are written may make it more 
difficult for candidates to understand the statutes.  This need to comply and difficulty of 
understanding requires candidates to spend more time, effort, and learning in order to 
ensure they are following the law.  The effect of the language on the candidates’ 
decisions is tested in all 50 states using data from the National Institute on Money in 
State Politics.  The findings indicate difficulty for candidates across the states when 
confronted with contribution statutes.  Some candidates also withdrew from races more 
often when faced with complex candidacy requirement statutes.  Qualitative interviews 
indicated a possible difference in candidate perceptions.  Candidates differentiated 
between the candidacy stage and the campaign operation stage potentially explaining 
differences in study results. There is enough evidence of some effects on candidate 
decisions that it is clear more research should be conducted, perhaps using more state 
level variables to help better understand the relationship between rules and statutes and 
candidates decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Raymond La Raja jokes that the major federal campaign finance reform bill, 
BCRA, really stands for Before Campaigning Retain an Attorney (LaRaja, 2005).  Funny 
jokes aside it leads one to question the direction of campaign finance studies.  Campaign 
finance research looks at the institution of campaign finance studying its effects on many 
parts of the electoral process.  Looking at campaign finance from an institutional lens, 
this study analyzes whether campaign finance fails to meet its intended goals because the 
institution of campaign finance has become so complex.  Inherent in La Raja’s joke is the 
assumption that campaign finance has become complex and expensive, so much so, that 
one needs an attorney in order to run for office.  If this is even the subject of jokes, we 
need to understand if it has any validity.  Has it become that complicated to run for 
office?  What does it mean for a policy to be complex?  The goal of this dissertation is to 
look at campaign finance in this different way.  The dissertation seeks to analyze what it 
means for a policy to be complex and to study if campaign finance fits that definition.  
Finally, it takes that definition of complexity and analyzes it against candidates to 
determine if there is any effect of the statute on candidate’s decisions to run for office.  
The research question studied in this dissertation asks whether the complexity of 
campaign finance legislation influences candidates’ decisions to run for office.  It is 
hypothesized that complexity will affect candidates’ decisions via legislative constraints 
and misunderstanding of the statutes.  To study this question, this dissertation uses a 
novel way of measuring complexity using plain language tools.   
The dissertation uses institutional theory as it applies to candidates and examines 
two issues.  The first issue is whether rules (as a type of institution) might affect 
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candidates by constraining their behavior.  The second issue is whether candidates might 
fail to understand the rules because, as assumed here, candidates are boundedly rational 
and want to obey the campaign finance system.  It is also assumed that incumbents might 
want to impede challengers by making rules constraining.   
Campaign finance is an interesting policy in that it may have different effects 
when applied to either legislators or citizens.  Reading through the campaign finance 
literature there are many different treatments of campaign finance.  Some scholars study 
policy effects on voter turnout, war chests, and incumbency advantages.  The goal of this 
dissertation is to look at campaign finance using a complexity measure.   
 In order to analyze this question, first the paper looks at studies of institutional 
theory and details the study of the institutional design of campaign finance using a 
measure of complexity.  This Chapter 1 looks at what complexity theory is and how it 
will be used to study campaign finance.   
Chapter 2 delves into the title subject of campaign finance and relates this topic 
back to institutions.  Chapter Two also suggests a way in which the institution of 
campaign finance can be studied using complexity.  Chapter 3 details the dependent 
variable for this study – candidate decisions.  This chapter reviews the many reasons why 
candidates decide to run for office.  As seen below, this study contends that one factor is 
missing from this scholarship.   
This dissertation studies one component of complexity – language.  To do this 
plain language is used to gauge the complexity of campaign finance reform.  The use of 
plain language was tested using an experimental method laid out in Chapter 4 with results 
from this Plain Language study presented in Chapter 5.  This use of plain language to 
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measure the complexity of campaign finance is the main independent variable for the 
study.  In Chapter 6, the author details the method for using the complexity measure and 
regressing it against candidates in state legislative elections.  Chapter 7 lays out the 
findings and implications of this study.  Finally, conclusions and analysis are discussed in 
Chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER 1: INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND COMPLEXITY 
Institutional Theory lays out ways of analyzing institutions in order to understand 
how institutions affect legislation, other institutions, and actor’s behavior.  Scholars have 
different viewpoints on how to study institutions and even on what institutions are.  The 
purpose of this chapter is not to debate institutions, but rather to look at a specific parts of 
institutions such as rules, strategies, and norms.  Rules and their effect on candidate 
behavior are the main focus of institutions in this dissertation.  Specifically the 
dissertation studies how rules may or may not affect the decisions of candidates to run for 
office.  Strategies and norms also play a role in supporting the contention that campaign 
finance rules are complex.   
This chapter lays out how rules might affect candidates in two different ways.  
First rules might affect candidates by constraining the candidate’s behavior.  An 
assumption is made that candidates want to obey the law.  Although examples abound of 
corrupt politicians, candidates tend to want to obey the law in a boundedly rational way.  
Candidates who are uncertain of an outcome such as the possibility of ethics charges or 
reputational losses will be more likely to obey the rules.  This high probability of obeying 
the law makes it possible to create constraints in the law.  The second assumption is that 
incumbents have the willingness to create a complicated institution. We know that 
candidates seek reelection (Mayhew, 1974) thus a rational incumbent might create 
complex rules in order to stack the deck in their favor (Abrams & Settle, 2004).  The 
constraining effect of the rules on candidates’ behavior may ensure compliance because 
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candidates want to uphold the law.  Candidates are primed to comply with rules created 
by incumbent legislators.  
 Candidate misunderstanding of the rules is a second way the rules affect 
candidate behavior.  This chapter introduces the concept of complexity resulting in 
candidates’ misunderstanding of the rules.  If rules are complex, they may be difficult to 
understand and candidates may have to change their behavior in ways contrary to the 
laws intended goals in order to comply with the law.  This chapter will look at ways in 
which laws can be constraining or complex.  
1.1 Institutions 
Scholars have many different definitions of institutions that muddy the water and 
make it difficult to understand why a particular entity is considered an institution.  A 
foundational understanding of institutions is necessary for this analysis.  There is not a 
generally accepted definition of what constitutes an institution.  There are some generally 
accepted attributes of institutions across the economic and political studies of institutions.  
Regardless of definition, campaign finance is a type of institution.  It has the rules, 
strategies, and norms that are integral to being an institution.  In campaign finance the 
rules, strategies and norms set up the expectation that the institution will encourage 
participation in the electoral process because the rules are intended to lessen corruption 
and provide more openness.  This dissertation studies if, as a result of the rules, the 
opposite effect of less participation might be occurring.  This is done using a study of the 
campaign finance institution.  It is important to understand how campaign finance as an 
institution is structured to begin this study. 
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 One characteristic of institutions is rules.  Institutions have rules that modify 
actor’s behavior.  There is no agreed upon definition of what rules are and there are 
different varieties of rules.  March and Olsen (1984) define institutions as a “collection of 
interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations 
between roles and situations.  The process involves determining what the situation is, 
what role is being fulfilled, and what obligation of that role in that situation is” (March & 
Olsen, 1989, p. 21).  This definition tends more toward defining an institution as 
individual behavior or as simply a set of rules to follow.  Individual behavior is 
constrained by rules and routines based on what is considered appropriate to that situation 
(March & Olsen, 2004).   
Elinor Ostrom expands the definition of institutions to include “rules, norms and 
strategies adopted by individuals operating within or across organizations” (Ostrom, 
2007, p. 23).  She defines rules in two ways, rules-in-use and rules-in-form.  Rules-in-
form are those that are written down and utilized as the standard operating procedures, 
the regulations that individuals within an institution must follow.  Rules-in-use are the 
“do’s and don’ts you learn on the ground” (Ostrom, 2007, p. 23).  Either type of rule 
involves constraint of individual behavior.   
Campaign finance has many rules intended to constrain actor’s behavior in order to 
encourage a system in which more citizens want to participate.  The rules such as 
contribution limits are considered appropriate to the goal of increased participation.  
Contribution limit rules intend to level the playing field so that more candidates are able 
to participate.  The rules have formal structure with particular requirements such as 
monetary limits and restrictions on who can make contributions.  Campaign finance fits 
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this institutional definition because it has the formal features (Peters, 2012) such as goals 
that intend to make the system less corrupt and disclosure requirements that aim to open 
those participating in the system to public scrutiny.  The rules are also informal with the 
expectation that candidates will comply because they do not want to risk their electoral 
chances with an ethics investigation or reputational loss.   
Other aspects of institutions are strategies and norms.  Peters (2012) likens these 
to structural features and shared values that should have predictable ‘patterned 
interactions’ among individuals or groups of individuals.  These predictable patterns 
should have shared meaning and value.  Individuals or groups subscribe to these 
strategies to maintain order and accomplish tasks.  Ostrom’s strategies refer to 
“regularized plans that individuals make within the structure of incentives produced by 
rules, norms, and expectations of the likely behavior of others in a situation affected by 
relevant physical and material conditions” (Ostrom, 2007, p. 23).  Ostrom also defines 
institutions in terms of norms.  Norms are the “shared prescriptions that are to be 
enforced by participants themselves through internally and externally imposed costs and 
inducements” (Ostrom, 2007, p. 23).  These shared meanings and regularized plans 
support the assumption that candidates strategize that it is in their best interest to comply 
with campaign finance regulations.  Because they are uncertain about possible negative 
outcomes, candidates should want to uphold the rules and regulations of campaign 
finance statutes. 
These rules, norms, and strategies are particularly relevant for this dissertation 
because this paper is assuming strategizing by legislators –conscious or unconscious – to 
alter the behavior of others running for election by making legislation that is more 
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complex with which candidates must comply.  As noted above, the assumption is made 
that candidates’ norms revolve around mutual adherence to the statutes because of the 
external costs such as non-reelection or accusations of corruption if candidates fail to 
comply.  Thus, the opportunity exists for incumbents to create constraints using the 
campaign finance laws.  Such a constraint may be found in the language of campaign 
finance legislation.  Crawford and Ostrom define this ability to constrain as an 
institutional statement which combines rules, strategies and norms.  The institutional 
statement “refers to a shared linguistic constraint or opportunity that prescribes, permits 
or advises actions or outcomes for actors (both individual and corporate)” (Crawford & 
Ostrom, 1995, p. 583).  It is this linguistic constraint or opportunity used by legislators 
that may constrain the behavior of potential or actual challengers. 
1.2 Institutional Constraint 
This dissertation assumes that legislators will constrain if given the opportunity.  
The scholarly literature on constraint is fairly clear that actors do create rules to constrain.  
This section looks into the variety of ways in which constraint happens, focusing on how 
legislatures constrain the behavior of others.   
One question under consideration is whether or not institutional behavior can be 
constrained and if so how.  The institutional literature indicates that institutions not only 
can be constrained, they often are.  Institutional rules and procedures are put in place to 
constrain behavior.  In some way one institutional actor wishes to prevent another 
institutional actor from taking an action.  It may be that rules are cultural where 
Congressmen are usually polite when speaking from the floor or formal rules such as 
when and how to introduce a bill or amendment.  Regardless of type, the idea is to 
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prevent chaos and promote stability in an institution.  Without rules, actors would be able 
to run amok and do whatever pleased them.  Rules prevent this chaos and allow the work 
of the institution to ensue.   
Studying tools used to constrain is important to understand the implications of the 
constraint.  One tool for constraint is to implement administrative procedures that allow 
legislatures to tell bureaucrats exactly how to implement laws (McCubbins, Noll, & 
Weingast, 1987).  The legislatures can be very specific in order to reduce the probability 
that bureaucrats have discretion on policy implementation.  Legislatures might want to 
maintain control over policy even though bureaucrats are closer to the policy via 
implementation than legislators.  Issuing specific legislation minimizes the control that 
bureaucrats have.  Specifically McNollgast hypothesize much of administrative law is 
written for the purpose of helping elected politicians retain control of policymaking.  
Legislators use administrative law to retain control of public policy over bureaucrats 
(McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987). 
Legislators also make law in the other direction; they may make policy vague 
because they are uncertain about the potential outcomes (Shepsle & Weingast, 1994). In 
this scenario legislators are putting more of the costs of learning/understanding the 
legislation on the end users.  Legislators might not have all the necessary information, 
which Shepsle and Weingast call the ‘uncertainty postulate’, to make policy reach certain 
goals.  Therefore the policy might be vague in order to allow legislators to tweak it ex 
post.  The “legislators do not know the precise relationship between the instruments they 
select and the outcomes subsequently produced” (Shepsle & Weingast, 1994, p. 159).  
Legislators make policy with no real understanding of how it is going to turn out.  An 
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important question here is why?  What is the motivation of the legislators?  It is quite 
possibly accidental, but it could also be that legislators make policy with uncertain or 
ambiguous outcomes deliberately.  The cost of gaining the correct information in order to 
make effective policy might be too high.  The cost involves gaining the correct data on 
who is affected by the legislation, what are the intended and unintended outcomes of the 
legislation?  Unless a legislator takes the time to pay this price, the legislation will end up 
with uncertain outcomes that a legislator will attempt to control ex post through 
oversight.   
Shepsle and Weingast (1984) argue that rules matter because incentives may be 
insufficient to overcome the transaction costs of surmounting the rules.  In other words, it 
is too expensive to change the rules, therefore legislators stick with them (Shepsle & 
Weingast, 1984).  What if the stakes are so high that overcoming the transaction costs is 
worth the effort?  If the stakes are your job, your livelihood, and your reputation then you 
might think it worth the effort to manipulate the rules in order to win reelection.  
Endersby (1993) tests rules for methods and rules for conduct in Congressional 
committees based on Shepsle and Weingast’ disagreement with McKelvey and 
Ordeshook.  Endersby tests this idea and finds that rules “do affect outcomes of political 
choices.  If the majority players in a game wish to avoid a theoretical or equilibrium 
outcome and if they have the incentives and the resources to do so, they will” (Endersby, 
1993, p. 232). 
Another purposeful rationale for making the legislation vague is to ensure a 
certain outcome.  If the cost to the legislator for making effective policy is high in terms 
of collecting data or a large learning curve, what if the cost of effective policy also costs 
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him his job?  If a legislator makes effective campaign finance policy with which all 
citizens comprehend and comply, this might mean a legislator would face a challenger.  If 
a legislator could make policy ambiguous, it puts the transaction costs of learning the 
policy on the challenger.  This would be a rational choice for that legislator to make 
legislation that potentially increases the probability of his reelection.  In this case, the 
legislator can put the cost of learning to the challenging candidate.  The challenger pays 
the cost of figuring out the legislation if written vaguely.   
The constraining behavior of legislatures is not always short-term.  Macey (1992) 
focuses on long-term Congressional control of bureaucracies.  Politicians in Congress 
establish agencies that put measures in place that reduce the likelihood of future changes.  
The goal of legislators is to constrain the agency.  They do this using agency structure. 
For example, Congress might structure an agency in such way that the agency either 
covers one or many interest groups, thereby setting up competition between agencies for 
resources.  Legislators want to control the discretion and authority that bureaucrats have 
in order to maintain control for the long term.  The long term might entail the legislator 
being out of office, so control can be set up for the future and not only the present
1
.    
1.3 Transaction Costs 
The idea that constraints or rules may be adding to the misunderstanding of 
legislation by candidates is important to understand.  In order to study this 
misunderstanding it is important to define how the misunderstanding may contribute to 
changing a candidate’s behavior.  If a candidate fails to understand a part of the campaign 
                                                             
1 A good example of this has recently occurred in North Carolina.  For decades the NC Board of Elections 
(NC BOE) was run by Democrats.  Republicans used to have a saying to the effect that ‘Democrats make 
election rules to elect Democrats’.  The understanding was that the longevity of Democrats in power in NC 
was in part because Democrats ran the NC BOE. 
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finance rules, they must determine how the law works in order to ensure compliance.  
This learning adds to the transaction costs of running for office.  
The idea of transaction costs in campaign finance legislation is the increase in 
time, effort, and learning required ensuring compliance with campaign finance statutes.  
Costs are the assumed time spent by candidates to ensure they learn and understand the 
complex laws.  As discussed earlier, candidates will want to ensure they are in 
compliance with the laws in a boundedly rational way in order to minimize the risks of 
ethics complaints or reputational losses.  A former state legislative candidate remarked on 
the difficulty and skill required to fill out all the election forms.  “Someone just off the 
streets would find it [form requirements] nearly impossible. You have to be like a 
researcher to do this.  If you don’t do it right, you’ll get kicked off the ballot” 
(Communication1, 2014).   
The learning takes time away from campaigning.  The cost of learning or making 
one’s way up the learning curve is different for incumbents and challengers.  If you are 
an incumbent, you have already paid the transaction costs of learning how to run for 
office.  If you are a challenger, you have yet to pay this cost.  Potential candidates might 
not understand the complexity of the campaign finance system or rules until the 
candidates make the decision to run for office.  The cost of learning can be steep 
depending on the laws for your state.  Incumbents can write the law in such a way as to 
make it difficult to understand and comply with the law 
Candidates might exert more effort to expedite learning and ensure compliance by 
hiring a professional campaign consultant.  One former candidate for a state legislative 
position who is now a campaign consultant said his “current job is much easier because 
10 
 
there is no fear of public humiliation” (Communication6, 2014).  He also said that in his 
state they have a “hard time finding people to run because of this fear” 
(Communication6, 2014).  Candidates do not want to be humiliated through non-
compliance thus will exert extra effort to ensure they comply with the law.  This extra 
effort might require candidates to use more campaign funds to cover this cost resulting in 
fewer funds left for actual campaigning.  In states with more complex laws, higher 
transaction costs might lead to fewer candidates running for office.   
The transaction cost approach generally sees institutions as reducing transaction 
costs by reducing difficulties in decision-making and interactions.  “Transaction costs 
analysis can be used to design programs in ways that make changes away from the status 
quo more expensive in transaction terms, thus locking in the preferences of the designers” 
(Peters, 2012, p. 49).  Legislators can maintain the status quo, which in this analysis 
might be maintaining their legislative seats, by creating barriers to entry into the 
legislature.  The idea is that if it costs more to run for office because you have to hire a 
professional or use more time and money in order to understand the legislation, you may 
not run.  
1.4 Complexity of Legislation 
It is necessary to find a way to measure this complexity of legislation.  This 
dissertation suggests one way to measure this complexity is to use the language of the 
statute.  Measuring complexity of legislation using language is not new. Legislative 
complexity has been studied with respect to implementation of legislation, constraints on 
actors and complex policy ideas such as education.  However, to this author’s knowledge, 
complexity has not been studied with respect to how it might damage the purported goals 
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for a piece of legislation.  Does complexity reduce the effectiveness of laws if they 
cannot be understood by those to whom they apply?   
The various tools used are reviewed in this chapter and a complexity measure is 
introduced.  The discussion on institutional theory lays out two ways in which campaign 
finance rules might affect candidates’ behavior.  One is that candidates want to obey the 
law and therefore their behavior might be constrained, and the second is that candidates 
might misunderstand the legislation if it is complex.  This chapter discusses these two 
facets of candidate behavior in context of complex legislation. 
This study will look at the different ways scholars have grappled with the concept 
of complexity.  Even though the concept has evolved over time and people have a general 
idea of what it means, there does not appear to be consensus on what it actually means in 
operation.  A good definition of complexity would enable scholars another factor with 
which to analyze legislation and the policy process.  Throughout the literature there are a 
number of factors that scholars relate to complexity.  These include complex language as 
studied by Plain Language scholars; content including technical factors such as scientific 
and financial terminology; the steps in the decision making process of legislators creates 
a more complex piece of legislation and finally the number of required actions for 
fulfilling legislation goals creates a cost component to complexity.  These factors are all 
examined in this chapter, with the exception of Plain Language which is examined in 
Chapter 4.
2
  
                                                             
2 Chapter 4 presents the detailed conceptual framework for a plain language experiment in Chapter 5.   
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1.5 Complexity and Content 
Complexity is neither a well-defined nor well-examined area in terms of 
legislation reaching legislative goals.  There have been some studies of complexity in 
legislation, but many of those studies pertain to how legislators use complexity to control 
bureaucrats, who implement legislation; or judges who interpret it; and not upon ‘regular’ 
citizens who might be affected by the legislation.  The questions that this dissertation 
undertakes is how is legislation itself complex?  How does that complexity affect 
candidates’ decisions to run for office?   
This section discusses the first factor put forth in the previous section that 
candidates might misunderstand campaign finance policy.  It is important to understand 
why candidates might misunderstand legislation.  It might be that the policy is complex. 
This section looks at what it means linguistically for policies to be complex.   
The content of legislation is an obvious factor in affecting whether or not 
legislation is complex.  What is not so obvious is how to define what is or is not complex 
content.  Based on the literature this is fairly difficult to do because it is a subjective 
concept.  What is complex to one person may not be to another.  Some scholars have 
tried to put some meaning behind the idea of complex content.  Krepel (1986) does a 
convincing job of this.  Krepel examines education policies to understand the factors that 
affect whether or not a policy is complex.  Krepel wants to determine “how content 
characteristics and environmental conditions affect policy maker perceptions of 
complexity” and “what characteristics of policy proposals are perceived as being more or 
less complex” (Krepel, 1986 pp. 48).  The study done by Krepel used a national survey.  
The survey used three vignettes presented to the legislators and then asked them a series 
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of questions on the vignettes.  Each vignette contained a description of state legislation 
on education policy.  The state legislators were asked to analyze an education policy to 
see if the legislators judged it to be complex or not.  The first vignette contained policy 
that had simple content and inactive environment.  The second vignette had two forms; A 
– complex content and inactive environment and B – simple content and active 
environment.  The third vignette had both complex content and active environment.   
In this study, Krepel uses definitions of complexity culled together from previous 
studies.  The definitions fall into the three categories: content, environment, and content 
and environment together.  Content of legislation that is deemed complex contains 
“multiple subtopics, the use of technical, specialized concepts or language, and novelty” 
(Krepel 1986, pp. 48).  The other category, environment (or environmental conditions) is 
defined as legislation containing conflict, cost certainty, ambiguity, and availability of 
information” (Krepel, 1986, pp. 48).  The third category combines content and 
environment.  The study found that when analyzed alone, there was no difference 
between the effects of content or environment complexity characteristics on the policy 
proposals.  Krepel concludes that when legislators deem a policy proposal complex, it is a 
function of both content and environment together (his third category) and not just one 
variable alone.  The second finding of the study was that the perceived complexity of the 
policy proposals increased as both the content and environment characteristics increased 
in the vignettes.  Krepel concludes that the more content and environment characteristics, 
the more complex the policy will be.   
Hamm (1980) treats content differently and considers a description of what 
complex content looks like.  Hamm considers complex legislation to be longer than most 
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legislation.  Hamm analyzes various pieces of legislation and finds complex legislation 
requires extensive information, and professional staff to help the legislative committee 
members get the information that they require.  This extensive information creates bills 
that are longer.  Hamm measures this by counting the number of lines in a bill.  Hamm 
also measures the legislation’s scope of impact.  Hamm defines scope as “the number of 
people who would seem to be affected directly by a piece of legislation” (Hamm, 1980 p. 
38).  If a greater number of people are affected by the legislation then its scope is 
increased and it may be more complex.  A piece of legislation that only affects a small 
group of people or a small local area would be less complex than a piece of legislation 
that covers every American or has a large economic impact. 
Technical considerations included in the content of legislation are part of how 
(Gormley, 1986) rates various pieces of legislation as either complex or salient.  For 
Gormley a technically complex issue is one that raises factual questions that cannot be 
answered by generalists or laypersons (Gormley, 1986).  The question or problem would 
need to be answered by an expert.  Only an expert with in-depth knowledge of the 
regulations would be able to administer them.  Gormley’s technical considerations are 
important but are still subjective and related to the knowledge of the writer of the 
legislation.  Rinquist, Worsham, and Eisner (2003) define complexity as technical 
complexity and procedural complexity.  Technical complexity is the degree to which 
specialized technical knowledge is necessary to craft effective policy solutions or 
understand the policy area.  The technical experts would need to be able to understand the 
technical considerations of the law, but it is not clear if others (citizens) would 
understand them.  In order to analyze who is able to understand and possibly administer 
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regulations we need a more precise definition of technical considerations.  Procedural 
complexity is covered below in decision making.   
Sabatier and Whiteman (1985) see policy information as having technical factors.  
Technical factors are the contents of the proposed policy and how the policy may affect 
society at large (Sabatier & Whiteman, 1985).  These authors looked through legislation 
to determine which pieces of legislation had technical components and which did not.  
They defined a bill that has technical considerations as one that deals with scientific or 
engineering information and might have socioeconomic impacts beyond the local area 
(Sabatier & Whiteman, 1985, p. 417, FN 9).  Relatedly, a scientific factor “relates the 
results of an empirical investigation of specifically defined variables” (Mooney, 1992).  
Mooney investigated the written notes and correspondence of legislators to see what 
information they were gathering on a piece of legislation.  If they used empirical 
evidence it was considered hard science.   The impacts of the policy are similar to 
Hamm’s (1980) discussion of policy scope.  Complexity is not only the technical 
considerations but also the scope of the policy.  If the policy touches or affects a large 
part of the country or a large proportion of state residents then that policy may be more 
complex in order to encompass the diversity of needs of that population.  If a policy only 
affects a small segment and a homogenous segment of the population, it would be 
considered a simpler policy.  It is possible that campaign finance reform would fall into 
the less complex policy because it would only affect a small segment of the population 
that is considering running for office.  However, there is the possibility that the 
population would be larger if the policy were less complex.  In other words, if the policy 
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were easier to understand and comply with, then more folks might run for office, thus 
increasing the population covered by the legislation.   
Complexity involves more than just complex or technical information.  It also 
involves how that information is used in making policy.  The use of policy information or 
knowledge revolves around how decisions are made by legislators.  They chose which 
information to use and when.  In doing so, they are able to make policy affecting citizens’ 
lives that may cover a continuum from simple to complex policy.  Making these 
decisions involves gathering the information, and going through the policy process to 
make a decision.  Covered below are the areas of how legislators get the information 
needed, how legislators make decisions, and how those decisions affect citizens.  
As discussed above, complex policy is not limited to language.  Another aspect of 
complexity is policy complexity.  Policy complexity is not empirically tested in this 
dissertation but it is important to cover it here to clarify the differences between language 
and policy complexity.  Policy complexity has bearing on language complexity in that the 
process of making the policy may make the language more complex as shown below.   
Policy complexity generally refers to the steps in the policy process.  These steps 
are opportunities to add policy components.  These added components might add 
complexity to policies. A variety of factors might affect policy complexity such as the 
process steps and the constraints built into the system.  Politicians considering a complex 
issue often look to bureaucrats for expertise and bureaucrats may dominate the 
implementation of the policy (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006).  If politicians cannot even 
implement, without bureaucratic help, the regulations based on the law that they 
themselves wrote, how much more difficult for an average citizen trying to adhere to the 
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laws.  Average citizens have a tacit understanding of the laws but campaign finance is 
much more specific.  An everyday person would have three options to comply with the 
regulations.  One would be to spend a large amount of time and incur a large cost in order 
to gain a basic understanding of the complexities of a regulation.  Most everyday people 
would not have this time and would therefore resort to their second option - turn to an 
expert in order to avoid some of the burden and to ensure compliance with the regulation.  
The third option is to give up.  One candidate who was interviewed said that as a lawyer 
he felt he had a ‘leg up’ on his competition.  He said he “didn’t know the…code off the 
top of his head but if he needed to look something up it wouldn’t be hard.  If you were an 
average person you would need help” (Communication7, 2014).  Hiring a professional is 
a cost incurred, so either with or without an expert, this regulation has burdened the 
everyday person in some way.  In the same way, Congress is burdened with finding 
information from bureaucrats especially on complex issues.  The literature is clear that 
when Congress must seek informational help from bureaucrats, and Congress deems the 
bureaucrats as the experts this is when they try to put constraints on the bureaucrats 
(Bimber, 1991).  The important point here is that there is an information cost involved in 
creating this legislation.  One party has all the information and the other party does not 
and must seek it out, at a cost to them.  In the same way that citizens might bear the 
information cost of campaign finance regulations.  
Once legislators gather information they use it to make policy decisions.  Kingdon 
(1977) focuses on the actual decision steps that legislators take.  He is not focusing on the 
result of their decisions but on how they make the decisions on legislation.  This is the 
procedural complexity discussed by (Rinquist, Worsham, & Eisner, 2003).  This is 
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important because when legislators are going through the process of making decisions it 
can become more complicated according to Kingdon.  Legislators make a series of 
decision-rules, and at each rule is the potential for legislation to be created.  If a legislator 
applies a decision rule and says ‘yes’; this is the final product for this legislation and this 
is a relatively simple decision according to Kingdon.  But, when the decision rule is 
applied and the legislator says ‘no’; they are in essence is saying that they need more 
information because this legislation is complex.  Therefore, the number of decision steps 
that a legislator makes is part of what makes the legislation more complex.  Intuitively 
one can think of the types of legislation to which this may apply, from earmarks to 
comprehensive reform bills.  Earmarks, in this context, are not complex.  They barely 
have attention paid to them, they involve few decision steps (because they are not voted 
on individually) and rarely are controversial or debatable.  If one considers 
comprehensive pieces of legislation such the McCain-Feingold act, one can intuitively 
understand the complexity involved by asking how many steps did this take?  Kingdon is 
correct that the decision process reflects the complexity of the bill itself.   
Kingdon (1997) goes on to discuss policy dimensions.  In this discussion, 
Kingdon points out that Congressmen come to the decision process with attitudinal 
mechanisms and political actors, such as their party and constituency, that direct their 
decision making.  If the legislator follows their party, the relevance of the legislation is 
usually focused on government management decisions, if considering their constituency 
the relevance is usually on legislation regarding civil liberties.  The question here is what 
happens when a legislator looks to the party on a management decision such as campaign 
finance, but ends up unintentionally affecting his constituent’s civil rights – such as the 
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ability to participate in the political process?  The procedural justice literature touches on 
this idea also.  It contends that when citizens are not involved in making procedural 
regulations that those regulations lack legitimacy (Markell, 2006).  If citizens are deterred 
from participation in the legislative system, it also affects the legitimacy of the law.  Even 
if a law, such as campaign finance, aims to protect the electoral system; how can it work 
properly if citizens are prevented or deterred from participating in the system if it is too 
complex with which to comply? 
1.6 Legislative Constraints   
Earlier in this chapter, an assumption is made that incumbents might have a 
willingness to create a complicated institution.  This section details how legislators can 
do this by using language to create constraints on actors.   
Scholars have studied how legislatures use decisions to constrain actors, in 
particular, the bureaucracy.  These studies have used word count as a constraining factor 
in legislation.  This is relevant to a study of complexity because if legislation can be 
constraining to bureaucrats, it may also be a constraint on ‘regular’ citizens.  For 
example, Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler (2001) analyze states’ Medicaid laws to see if 
legislatures were able to put statutory constraints on the bureaucracy.  The authors posit 
that the legislature would do this when it does not trust the bureaucracy.  Huber et al. 
(2001) use the word count feature in the Microsoft Word program.  The researcher 
simply enters the text into MS word and then specifies ‘word count’.  Huber et al. argue 
that word count is a way to measure statutory constraint because the more words in a bill, 
the more detailed and thus constraining it is.  Huber et al. collected all the words related 
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to Medicaid across all 50 states in an effort to establish that word count is a valid measure 
of constraint.  They find: 
 Longer bills increase constraints on the agency.  When designing a new children's 
health initiative to be part of the Medicaid program, for example, it takes a great 
many more words for the legislature to specify who is to be covered, what sorts of 
enrollment techniques should be used, which procedures should be followed, and 
so on, than it does to simply ask the agency to "do something" without providing 
any additional instructions.  Long bills with lots of words tend to specify these 
details, while short bills do not.  More words imply more precise instructions to 
the agency, and thus less discretion (Huber, Shipan, & Pfahler, 2001, pp. 336-
337) 
Even though there are other factors involved in this analysis, the result is that the 
quantity of words may constrain bureaucrats (Huber et al, 2001).  If bureaucrats can be 
constrained by legislation, then regular citizens could also be constrained by legislation.   
While Huber et al. analyze bureaucrats; (Randazzo, Waterman, & Fine, 2006) and 
Randazzo (2008) examine judicial constraints.  They theorize that Congress writes 
legislation that is either vague or detailed.  If it is detailed then it would constrain the 
behavior of judges and they would have no leeway to interpret the law.  However, if the 
law is vague, this allows for little restraint on the judges and they can interpret the law as 
they want.  Randazzo et al. utilize word count but see word count as inadequate to 
measure constraint because of the “noise associated with a raw count and the 
considerable skewness of the measure” (Randazzo et al., 2006, p.1011).  They therefore 
take the natural log of each statute for their operationalization of statutory constraint.  
They find that there is evidence of judicial constraint found in the legislation that 
Congress passes.  This is important because it shows that legislation can constrain actors 
– in this case judges – therefore it is possible that if legislation can constrain or affect the 
behavior of judges, it could also affect the behavior of regular citizens. 
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Word count is an interesting way to measure complexity and it is referenced in the 
earlier literature as well (Krepel T. L., 1983) because the length of the legislation can 
signify technical difficulties of the legislation that need to be explained and new solutions 
that have to be spelled out.  It may also signify conflict if the different viewpoints 
debating the legislation have put incentives for their members in the bill.  Another 
problem with word count solutions is that it may not capture the essence of what makes a 
law or regulation complex.   
Word count is a key measure of complexity, but there are others.  Most analyses 
consider institutions in terms of how political elites are affected, but Kimball and Kropf 
(2005) examine voters.  Kimball and Kropf’s (2005) research on ballot design from the 
2002 presidential election brings to light another potential method for analyzing 
complexity. Although ballot design is very different from legislation it is the language 
function that the authors use here that is helpful.  The authors look at ballot design to 
figure out why there are under-recorded votes on the ballots.  The authors analyzed the 
graphical elements of the ballot design including location of the instructions, readability 
of the instructions, and layout of the candidates on the ballot, how the candidate’s names 
appear on the ballot etc. (Kimball & Kropf, 2005).  The authors create an overall index of 
ballot features that counts the number of simplifying or complicating features on each 
ballot.  “Readability describes the ease of processing the information content of written 
words” (Kimball & Kropf, 2005, p 513).  The grade level feature is a categorical variable 
so the authors coded it into low (4th-8th grade), medium (9th-11th) grade and high (12th 
grade and above).  This allows the variable to be added to the index.  The higher the score 
the more difficult it is to read the document (Kimball & Kropf, 2005).   
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This measure is relevant for campaign finance regulations because if they could 
be analyzed based on their readability it could be determined if they were difficult to 
read.  If found to be difficult it might be another factor that contributes to the complexity 
of campaign finance legislation.  Kimball and Kropf operationalized voting instructions 
using the Flesch-Kincaid measure and grade levels.  Using these same measures of grade 
level and readability could capture how complex the legislation is regarding everything 
from filing forms to contribution limits in campaign finance reform.  It may also be able 
to capture the technical aspects of the law.  For example, if the reading level of the 
regulation/law was on a graduate school level, it could mean that the regulation/law is 
extremely complex.  If the reading level of a regulation is on the eighth grade level it 
could signify a less complex law. 
1.7 Complexity and Campaign Finance Reform 
The literature is clear that the content of legislation is important to determine 
whether or not a piece of legislation is complex.  But it is the factors of that content that 
can really determine if legislation is complex.  These factors include scientific, 
engineering or financial factors, the scope of the policy including the socioeconomic 
impacts, the geographic impacts (whether it is national or local) and whether the 
legislation needs interpretation and/or help from an expert in order to be implemented.  
While many of these scholars look at the policy process and the inputs into legislation, 
this study purports to take their analyses of these inputs and apply it to the outputs – the 
legislation – and how that legislation affects citizens’ ability to participate in the system.  
The debate over campaign finance reform efforts examines how the reform affects 
elections, competition in elections and many other variables.  However, one variable has 
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not been adequately addressed by the literature so far.  Is campaign finance reform 
legislation so complex that it prevents those wishing to seek office from doing so?  It has 
been argued that reform will make the electoral system more democratic, but what if in 
fact the reform is so complex that it is a deterrent to people wanting to run for office?  
This research seeks to look at campaign finance reform legislation for complexity factors 
and see if those factors affect whether people decide to run for office.  A definition of 
complexity is vital to doing this.  The potential burden on a candidate is great if the 
legislation is complex.  They must spend time and money in their effort to run for office.  
Added to this is the additional burden of conforming to campaign finance regulations.  
Potentially they would have to seek expert help in order to navigate the regulations to 
ensure they are not breaking the law.  This research seeks to explore this question more 
fully by looking at campaign finance reform efforts in the states to first determine if they 
are complex and then to see if that complexity is a deterrent to candidate emergence.   
This dissertation hypothesizes that campaign finance reform has become so 
complex that ordinary citizens wanting to participate cannot because they do not 
understand all the regulations.  If they want to join in the system they must incur the cost 
involved with hiring professionals to help them run their campaign according to the 
regulations.  This extra cost can be a deterrent to non-wealthy citizens wanting to run for 
office.  An example of this is found by a quick check of North Carolina’s Board of 
Elections website on campaign finance.  Citizens wanting to run for office have to fill out 
a variety of forms (all with multipage instruction sheets) including 26 disclosure forms; 
20 miscellaneous forms; 9 certification forms and 11 public funding forms (NC 
Disclosure forms).  In order to complete all these forms correctly expert help would be 
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necessary.  In fact, some of the forms are to certify your experts!!  It is possible that the 
complexity of this situation has become a deterrent to the very goals of campaign finance.  
The complexity could lead to fewer candidates running for office and those candidates 
that do run being the incumbents who have the resources with which to navigate the 
campaign finance regulations.  This issue has not been studied but it is vital that this 
research is done.  If citizens cannot understand the laws meant to regulate this situation 
the democratization goals of campaign finance reform are in peril.  This research seeks to 
explore this question more fully by looking at campaign finance reform efforts in the 
states to first determine if they are complex and then to see if that complexity is a 
deterrent to candidate’s decisions.   
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
Campaign finance reform in the American states has been either a steady 
progression of independent legislation or a representation of legislation passed by the 
federal government.  Some of the same themes are covered in both the states’ and the 
federal government’s efforts to reform the campaign system.  This chapter reviews the 
campaign finance reform legislation in an effort to set the stage for the way in which this 
same legislation is studied in this dissertation. State campaign finance laws are studied in 
this dissertation as a way to maximize scholarly leverage.  States’ campaign finance laws 
vary which may provide insights about campaign finance reforms.  
A look at state campaign finance reform must look to the federal reforms because 
it is from the federal government that the states take many ideas and models of reform 
(Gross & Goidel, 2003).  From the Tillman Act of 1907 to the Bi-Partisan Campaign 
Finance Reform Act (BCRA) or McCain-Feingold bill of 2002, most campaign finance 
has come through the federal government.  The first laws were passed by Congress in the 
1880s in an effort to reform corrupt civil service practices such as soliciting campaign 
contributions in public buildings, or disallowing political assessments
3
 as a requirement 
for employment.  The Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 passed and states quickly 
followed suit, with New York, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania passing their own 
versions (Gross & Goidel, 2003).  While most of these acts dealt with civil service 
                                                             
3 Political assessments were required political donations given to candidates by public sector employees 
as a condition of employment. 
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reform, it was the Tillman Act of 1907 that prohibited corporations from contributing 
funds to candidates for federal office.  Again the states followed with 32 also outlawing 
this practice by 1932 (Gross & Goidel, 2003).    
David Schultz explains, “the role of money in politics at the state level is 
increasingly coming to resemble…federal campaigns and elections (Schultz, 2002, p. 
205)."  The question is how did states get to this point?  The literature on federal 
campaign finance reforms generally sets the reform movement into two phases.  The first 
is the post-Watergate era and second is the 1980s when the reform movement changed to 
encompass equalization efforts.  These same eras are found in the literature on state 
campaign finance reform efforts (Gross & Goidel, 2003) (Malbin & Gais, 1998).  The 
states had focused on regulating or restricting ‘big donors’ in the past but by the 1990’s 
were focused on equalizing political power.  By the time that the Bipartisan Campaign 
Finance Reform Act was passed in 2002 most states had similar types of policies that 
reflected the federal reform movement toward restricting or regulating special interests.  
Three other types of reform were also articulated: one - to reduce the costs of elections, 
two – reduce the importance of any single donor by keeping contribution limits low and 
three – force candidates to find contributions from a larger base number of donors (Gross 
& Goidel, 2003).   
The early campaign finance reform efforts in the post-Watergate era focused 
mainly on the candidate.  The goals of reform were to ensure that the atypical or unusual 
donation was avoided.  This was an effort to ensure that single, large donations from one 
contributor to one candidate were disallowed in order to avoid the possibility of 
corruption (Harshberger & Davis, 2001).  To do this, the early reforms focused on listing 
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all contributors over a certain amount to ensure that the candidate was pressured not to 
take large donations as these would be made public.  The reforms also disallowed 
anonymous contributions.  The candidates had to report all contributions and 
expenditures before and after both election cycles (primary and general election).  The 
focus in this early era was just on the candidate’s activities.  The reformers wanted to 
highlight where the donations were coming from and to whom they were going.  These 
are the early efforts at disclosure requirements.  There was no emphasis on interest 
groups, political parties or the like (Malbin & Gais, 1998).   
With increases in campaign spending and an increase in the number and variety of 
actors in campaigns, the reform effort shifted in the 1980’s.  Interest groups, lobbyists 
and Political Action Committees (PACs) were increasingly involved in campaign 
activities.  Instead of focusing on the unusual campaign contribution to an individual 
candidate, the reform focus shifted to regulating the normal, typical campaign behavior of 
all candidates (Malbin & Gais, 1998).  The reforms increased the reporting requirements 
of candidate’s campaigns and put in place more stringent contribution limits.  These 
limits were also expanded to include interest groups, political parties, and corporations.  
New restrictions were created to encompass new behaviors such as loans to candidates, 
transfers between campaigns, payoff of campaign debts, disclosure requirements for 
interest groups and so on (Malbin & Gais, 1998).  These new restrictions generally fell 
into three general goals.  The first goal is to reduce the cost of elections.  This is generally 
done by putting in place spending and contribution limits.  The second goal is to reduce 
the importance of a single contributor.  This is similar to the post-Watergate reforms but 
here we have the reduction in contribution limits to make sure that ‘fat cat’ donors are 
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limited.  The third goal is broaden the base on contributors so that any potential influence 
is dispersed (Gross & Goidel, 2003).   
The 1980’s reform was followed by numerous attempts to change and progress 
the reform on both the federal and state level.  Most of these attempts were unsuccessful 
although there were some small changes in various states.  Scott Harshberger and Edwin 
Davis (2001) recount the numerous attempts at introducing and passing campaign finance 
legislation throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s.  What are interesting in these attempts are 
the incremental changes and additions to legislation over this time period.  There were 
initial pieces of legislation that included bans or limits on PAC money, then an aggregate 
limit on PAC contributions.  There were pieces of legislation introduced and passed by 
Congress with the knowledge that President Bush would veto the legislation.  Ultimately, 
there was no major piece of legislation passed to change or overhaul the campaign 
finance system.  Thus, the status quo remains virtually unchanged until the passage of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (Harshberger & Davis, 2001) 
How the campaign finance regulations vary through the states is important to the 
understanding of how those reforms affect the elections within those states.   This 
understanding may lead us to find where policy reforms are having a positive or negative 
effect and point to appropriate policy solutions.  Today however, little consensus 
regarding the effects of campaign finance reform is found among scholars.   
So why should we look at the states instead of just looking at the federal 
government?  Thompson and Moncrief (1998) offer some insight into why the states 
should be studied.  First, they point out that more and more policy is devolving to the 
states making them more important decision makers in the policy arena.  State 
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legislatures are making important policy decisions therefore we should know more about 
how they are getting elected.  Second, states’ policies matter to their citizens and since 
the elections are often held every two years, therefore we should know more about the 
role campaign finance plays in their election.  Third, since the states copy much of the 
campaign finance regulations and policies from the federal government we should look to 
see if what has been learned at the federal level applies to the states. Because of these 
reasons the states are important actors when it comes to policy and elections therefore we 
need to know what is affecting the state elections (Thompson & Moncrief, 1998).  It also 
is the state’s responsibility for creating the rules and regulations governing the majority 
of elections, since federal law regulates federal candidates, such as those for president 
and Congress (Gross & Goidel, 2003).  State laws still govern all state and local elections 
and there are more of these elections than elections within states for federal candidates.  
According to Thompson and Moncrief (1998), there are thousands of state elections per 
year.  So the state election laws generally regulate more elections than federal election 
laws.   Because of the sheer number of elections, the general move to implement more 
policy in states and their traditional governance of the state electoral systems it is 
important to understand the factors affecting campaign finance reform in the states.   
Campaign finance reform theoretically consists of two major goals: the reduction 
of corruption or the appearance thereof in the political system and creating a system in 
which more citizens are able to participate.  This second goal is known throughout the 
literature as democratization.  Democratization entails more participation from citizens in 
the form of more people able to run for office and more people contributing to 
campaigns.  The reform efforts have used various tools to reach these two goals.  These 
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tools include contribution limits, spending limits, public finance of elections and 
disclosure requirements.  These tools have been examined for their effect on the goals of 
campaign finance reform.  This examination is detailed below.  The reader will note that 
while valuable strides have been made in this scholarship, no scholars have examined the 
unintended consequences of the statutes purportedly created to increase democracy. 
2.1 Reform Tools 
One of the reform tools used to meet the goals of campaign finance reform is 
campaign contribution limits.  The rationale is that if contribution size were limited, 
politicians would need to seek out a larger volume of smaller contributions in order to 
make up the monetary difference for their campaign coffers.  By seeking out more 
contributions, they would contact more potential contributors and thus more people 
would be contributing to campaigns. The idea is that more people contributing spreads 
out the democratic effect of the reform (Gross & Goidel, 2003).  Plus, contribution limits 
are intended to reduce overall spending by candidates by making fundraising more 
difficult (Eom & Gross, 2007).    
The public’s perception is that there is too much money in campaigns (Thompson 
& Moncrief, 1998).  Thompson and Moncrief’s (1998) analysis of contribution limits 
shows that the reasons for this perception vary from just the vast amount of money being 
collected, to the idea among the public that this money must be in return for some type of 
quid pro quo situation.  If political action committees (PACs) are giving a lot of the 
money then the public assumes that the PAC’s must be receiving something in return.  
Thus there is a perception of corruption even if the public cannot pinpoint it.  Thompson 
and Moncrief (1998) argue that much of this perception filters down from the national 
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stage and national corruption scandals until there is the assumption of corruption at the 
state and local level.  Contribution limits are enacted as an attempt to try to reduce the 
amount of money in campaigns with the thought that if there are fewer contributions, 
there will be less corruption or the appearance thereof.  The other potential advantage of 
campaign finance is to reduce the appearance of impropriety on the part of politicians 
accepting ‘big’ donations from a small group of donors.  If they can no longer contribute 
the ‘big’ donations, then the appearance of impropriety is minimized, and the system is 
more open, the people trust the system more and therefore it is more democratic.  
 Eom and Gross (2007) analyze the democratization goal of campaign reforms to 
increase the number of contributors.  They analyze campaign donations in 58 
gubernatorial election cycles in 42 states over the 1990-2000 time period.  Because of the 
variation in state data and collection methods for the data and because most states only 
require data to be collected over a certain threshold; the authors are only looking at 
contributions and contributors over the threshold amounts.  Furthermore, the authors 
differentiate between types of contributors by defining particularistic and universalistic 
donors. Particularistic donors are those that want to influence a particular or narrowly 
defined policy, while universalistic donors want to influence policy on a more broad or 
ideological basis.  Eom and Gross created these categories based on data from the 
National Institute on Money in State Politics that allowed them to “categorize 
contributors as individuals, parties, ideology/single issue, labor union or corporation 
(Eom & Gross, 2007, p 701).”  The authors find that the contribution limits tend to result 
in a lower average dollar amount per contributor and this finding is carried through no 
matter the type of contributor.  However the authors also point out that there was no 
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evidence to support the idea that there would be an increase in the number of 
universalistic donors. So even though there was a decrease in the dollar amount of the 
contributions there was not an increase in the number of universalistic donors and a 
decrease in particularistic donors (Eom & Gross, 2007).  Still the authors think that the 
democratization goal is upheld because with a decrease in the dollar amount of the 
contributions – which was one of the reform goals – this will lead to the possibility of an 
increase in the number of contributors in the future.  One could also argue the opposite 
that the evidence showing no increase in the universalistic donors could mean that the 
reform failed to increase the number of donors; in reality therefore; there may be no 
democratization effect because more citizens did not participate in the process. 
As Eom and Gross find that the average dollar amount is reduced, their work does 
not indicate that the number of donors is increased, nor do they look at the number of 
candidates running.  This is covered more comprehensively in Chapter 3 on candidate 
decisions.  However, it is important to note that some scholars have found that more 
challengers are likely to emerge when contribution limits are in place (Hamm & Hogan, 
2008) supporting the idea that the reforms do democratize the system.  Hamm and Hogan 
use an index of campaign restrictions in their analysis.  This additive index sums the 
number of sources from which candidates can receive contributions.  Other studies also 
indicate that with contribution limits in place more candidates would positively decide to 
run (Maisel & Stone, 1997) while other studies concluded that the race itself would be 
more competitive (Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo, 2006).   
Other studies find that contribution limits neither increase the number of 
candidates nor the quantity or amount of contributions (Green & Krasno, 1988; Abrams 
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& Settle, 2004; Eom & Gross, 2007).  No doubt the debate will continue.  This 
dissertation pursues a different theoretical angle of measuring contribution limits.  Instead 
of creating an index or conducting a survey of candidates the language of contribution 
legislation is used to create a measure of complexity.  This method is used to determine 
the candidate participation rate in all 50 states.   
Another proposed reform of campaign finance is to reduce spending in 
campaigns.  Reduced spending would allow for more challengers to enter the race while 
also ameliorating the public’s view that there is too much money in elections.  The intent 
of spending limits is to hamper incumbents from outspending challengers by creating a 
level playing field or equal opportunity for both candidate types.  The scholarship on 
spending limits is mixed because there are so many factors that could affect spending.  
Hogan (2000) analyzes campaign spending factors in the states by examining campaign 
data for candidates from both parties facing an opposition in the general election in 27 
states in 1994
4
.  The candidate level factors that affected spending relate to whether the 
seat is held by an incumbent or if it is an open seat.  As Hogan states most of these types 
of seats attract more campaign money because donors want their money to go to someone 
with a fairly good chance of winning.  The district level factors such as primary 
competition increases spending simply because the candidate has to compete in at least 
two election cycles; therefore, we should expect an increase in spending.  The same can 
be said of partisan competition.  Where candidate’s parties are closely matched, spending 
by the candidates will increase in their effort to win.  Hogan concludes that the spending 
levels are affected by the reform laws, but the spending is also affected largely by 
                                                             
4 With the exception of five states from other years.  See Hogan (2000) for more complete information. 
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candidate characteristics (challenger/incumbent) and district level factors (primary 
competition, partisan competition).  Hogan ultimately finds that campaign finance laws 
are only moderately successful at limiting spending by candidates (Hogan, 2000).  
Gross, Goidel and Shields (2002) also find a varied outcome when they studied 
candidate campaign spending limits in gubernatorial elections from 1978-1997.  The goal 
of the spending limits was to create parity among candidates.  Spending limits worked in 
some cases but it depended on candidate type, partisanship and the level of the 
restrictions.  They also find that the limits do not affect challenger spending but that an 
increase in limits will increase incumbent spending.  So there was no real parity created 
between the candidates (Gross et al. 2002).   If the goal was to increase the fund raising 
burden on challengers, this too failed to restrict spending.  The authors failed to find 
evidence that a spending limit inhibited incumbent or challenger spending and in fact the 
limits could actually create greater disparity between the candidates.  So here also the 
burden is increased on the candidates but yet has little effect on the actual goal of the 
legislation.  Hogan’s (2001) analysis would agree with Gross, Goidel and Shields because 
he finds that war chests, or the amount of money saved ahead of an election cycle for 
campaign reelection accounts, are a deterrent to challengers.  Hogan appraised the 
candidate level information on over 1300 incumbents from eight states for a presidential 
and mid-term election
5
.  Even if the deterrent effect of war chests is reduced by the 
attractiveness of the seat, it still shows that money can inhibit challengers from running 
for office.  So while one of the goals of campaign finance reform is to reduce the amount 
                                                             
5 The states were Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon and Tennessee.  
He used the election years 1994 and 1996 for all states except Massachusetts where 1996 and 1998 were 
used. 
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of money in elections, the results appear mixed with scholars finding such a variation in 
factors as to make an overall assessment of the results unclear.  Spending limits do seem 
to have some effect on the electoral process however, it is not conclusive yet as to 
whether these effects would create a more level playing field and induce more candidates 
to join the electoral process.   
Spending limits have also had limited success because of court cases in which 
campaign spending is seen as free speech (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976).   Because of the 
court’s rulings however, spending limits cannot be mandatory but are often voluntary and 
are tied to an agreement by the candidate to accept public financing.  Therefore many 
states have turned to public financing.  If the candidate accepts the public financing, then 
he or she agrees to limit his or her spending during the electoral cycles (Gross & Goidel, 
2003).  Some scholars (Bardwell, 2003; LaRaja, 2008) find that public financing can 
often act as an incentive or an aid for candidates to run for office.  La Raja surveyed 
candidates in local elections in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island to analyze 
what made the candidates likely to move from local to state elections.  He posits that the 
funding of a campaign is often a serious obstacle for potential candidates considering a 
run.  He found candidates, who run in races where the fundraising obstacle is in place-
either, because the candidate dislikes fundraising or who do not have access to funding, 
benefit from public financing.  Furthermore, La Raja also found that candidates who have 
a high level of political ambition tend to benefit from public funding because they are 
more willing to take advantage of the funds.  La Raja’s contention is that public funding 
may be a valuable reform tool because it is likely to help change the skill set found in 
candidates by allowing candidates who are not good at fundraising to have a chance at 
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running for office.  Overall, public financing is one option that does seem to reduce 
barriers to run for office.  However, these programs must remain optional as a result of 
various court decisions and therefore their effectiveness is limited.  As an aid to 
candidates, Bardwell (2003) found that challengers who had access to public financing 
benefitted from its use because they were able to spend less than candidates who did not 
have access to public financing
6
.   
Public disclosure of both contributions and expenditures is the least controversial 
of the reform efforts.  Even though there are wide variations in how the data are 
collected, most states require reporting of the data in some way.  The disclosure 
requirement was intended to increase political accountability and transparency in the 
electoral process.  This openness should allow for any corruption or any contributions 
from questionable sources to be investigated or at least disclosed to the public prior to the 
election.  There is however, little apparent evidence that this is the case.  Gross and 
Goidel (2003) discuss that they previously found
7
 no evidence that elections are more 
competitive or that there is less corruption.  They surmise that as voters learn more about 
how and from where contributions are obtained, they are less engaged and elections are 
less competitive (Gross & Goidel, 2003).  This seems to be a case where sometimes too 
                                                             
6
 According to the National Conference on State Legislatures 25 states have public financing of elections 
(NCSL). Public financing (PF) is not included in this dissertation analysis because in order to qualify for it in 
states with partial public financing, you have to raise funds (just like other non-PF candidates) in order to 
get the PF.  Looking on the data on NCSL.org only one state (ME) has clean elections in which the 
candidates do not have to raise any money to qualify.  The rest of the states have qualifications to get the 
PF.  Omitting PF is justified for this analysis because candidates with PF would still have to go through the 
same processes to raise money as candidates without PF.  Public financing should be included in future 
analysis.   
7 The authors cite their previous work in Gross, Goidel and Shields, Money Matters (Goidel, Gross, & 
Shields, 1999). 
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much information can be a bad thing because the public is disgusted the more they learn 
about how much money is in campaigns. 
As seen above, the goals of the reform have been to make the campaign process 
more democratic and to increase participation in the electoral process - both by reducing 
barriers for challengers and broadening the base of contributors.  The reforms aimed at 
reducing corruption in campaign finance want to make it more open and accountable.  By 
making the system more transparent the reforms allow the public to see where the money 
comes from and goes to.  The goal of this transparency is to increase the public’s 
confidence in the system and thus increase its democratic nature.  Contribution limits are 
intended to have the dual effect of limiting the amount of money in campaigns thus 
allowing a more level playing field for challengers; and limiting the amount of “big” 
donors and spreading the contributions to a wider base in order to allow for more, smaller 
contributors to participate (Eom & Gross, 2007). Public financing should allow for more 
participation by challengers by decreasing the deterrent of incumbent war chests.  
Ultimately, all of the reforms were aimed at increasing the number of candidates by 
decreasing barriers, decreasing corruption by increasing transparency, and making the 
system more democratic by spreading the accessibility of the campaign process to more 
citizens.   
Clearly, no reform has become the silver bullet with which to reform campaign 
finance.  Studying which factors are preventing them from being as effective as possible 
is important to reach the goals of the reforms.  La Raja (Malbin, Corrado, & La Raja, 
2005)points out that the laws themselves have become complicated and the campaign 
finance regulations have become a barrier in themselves.  While La Raja was looking at 
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the Bi-Partisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, much of his assessment can also be 
applied to the states because the states’ legislation is modeled on the national legislation 
(Malbin, Corrado, & La Raja, 2005).  While scholars have explored the effects of money 
in the system, scholars have yet to explore the complexity problem as applied to 
campaign finance.  This dissertation studies whether the state campaign finance 
legislation has become so complex that candidates cannot understand it and it thus 
becomes a barrier in the form of increased transaction costs in running for office.  
As La Raja jokes (Malbin, Corrado, & La Raja, 2005), BCRA has come to mean 
Before Campaigning Retain an Attorney.  This may be a joke, but it illustrates why the 
question of complexity on the effectiveness of reform are important to study.  Scholars 
and policymakers alike are beginning to realize the ways in which the complexity of 
legislation affects legislative outcomes. 
This dissertation studies only the contribution limits on campaign finance reforms 
in an effort to study these limits in a different context.  Rather than looking at 
contribution limits in terms of how many incumbents versus challengers or voter turnout, 
it is important to understand if the contribution legislation is itself a barrier to entry for 
candidates seeking office.  The goals of the contribution limits were to lower the bar to 
allow more entry into the political process by evening the playing field in such a way that 
average citizens would be able to participate.   
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: CANDIDATE DECISIONS 
The theory tested in this dissertation is whether institutional rules-in-use affect 
behavior. The research assumes that prospective candidates do not tacitly know the 
“rules-in-use” but instead, must learn them. If the “rules-in-use” are too complex, then 
the average citizen may not run for office. For many years, scholars have been studying 
the question of why candidates emerge or do not emerge—that is, why they run for 
office.  If we are to understand the theoretical implications of complexity in “rules in use” 
empirically, we have to look for alternative reasons why candidates emerge and do not. 
This chapter explores the previous literature on prospective candidate decision making. 
Studying other factors in candidate emergence allows use of these factors as control 
variables in the study. 
It is difficult to determine what factors contribute to candidate’s decisions to run 
for office.  A number of studies have looked at a wide variety of factors and yet there 
does not seem to be any agreement on exactly what factors affect candidates consistently.  
This chapter examines many factors and the effect they have on candidates’ decisions to 
run for office.  This is important because this dissertation studies the complexity of 
campaign finance legislation, a factor not found extensively in the candidate emergence 
literature.   
  It is important to note some of the limitations on this literature.  First, some 
scholars study U.S. congressional elections and some look at state legislative elections.  
This study looks at state legislative elections.  The factors reviewed here affect both state 
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legislative and US congressional elections similarly unless noted.  Second, scholars use 
different categories for the various factors affecting candidate emergence.  Some scholars 
focus on district and candidate factors; while others focus on strategic, political, 
institutional, personal, and contextual factors affecting candidate decisions.  Grouping 
these factors into strategic, political/institutional, and personal categories is useful 
because it conforms to much of the candidate emergence literature, so this dissertation 
will follow that pattern as we explicate the various factors.   
Finally, when dealing with candidate emergence we are just beginning to 
understand what Fox and Lawless (2005) call ‘nascent’ candidate ambition.  Most studies 
look at more developed or ‘progressive’ ambition by looking at how challengers react to 
incumbents in various races (Kazee, 1983; Maisel & Stone, 1997; Stone, Maisel, & 
Maestas, 2004).  While Fox and Lawless are on the right path for the future, the literature 
bears scrutiny on both nascent and progressive candidates because it gives us an 
overview of the various factors that could affect any stage of the candidate’s decision, 
whether it is nascent or somewhat developed.  These limitations contribute to the various 
and sometimes confusing or conflicting factors affecting candidate decisions.   
3.1 Strategic Factors 
Strategic factors are those factors such as a candidate’s chances of winning an 
election, contribution limits, and incumbent’s quality and strength based on which a 
candidate may make a decision regarding running for office.  One of the biggest strategic 
factors is the probability that a challenger will win an election (Maisel & Stone, 1997).  
The rationale here is that candidates are strategic and make rational decisions (Levine & 
Hyde, 1977; Black, 1972; Maestas & Rugeley, 2008; Stone, Maisel, & Maestas, 2004) 
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based on whether or not there is a chance for them to win an election.  Maisel and Stone 
found that when an incumbent held a seat, a challenger was more likely to account for 
this in their decision to run for office.  Hogan (2004) found the similar results.  An 
incumbent’s level of support in the previous election was a deterrent for challengers 
seeking that office.  Most scholars in this area seem to be asking the same question that 
Kazee (1983) asks whether the chances of winning are high enough to justify the effort 
required.  Can the challenger win against an incumbent when we know the advantages 
that incumbents have to stay in office?  These advantages can be many.  Incumbents have 
access to media coverage in their home district or state, at the US Congress level they 
have free mailing privileges and may get support from the party.  Challengers have 
almost none of these advantages, thus giving the incumbents strength against challengers.  
Kazee questioned potential challengers if the incumbent announced they were not 
running for office, would that influence the challenger’s decision to run for office.  Kazee 
found that just the perception of incumbent strength was enough to deter challengers 
from seeking office (Kazee, 1983). 
While the argument of incumbent deterrence is logical, it is not quite as simple as 
we may think.  There are other factors playing into this deterrence effect.  One 
contributing factor is the strength or weakness of the incumbent.  Another factor is which 
election cycle scholars are studying.  Are scholars looking at the general election or the 
primary?  Lazarus (2008) looks at both of these types of elections and finds generally that 
when the incumbent does poorly in the previous primary and/or general election there 
will be more challengers both from the incumbent party and the out-party.  Interestingly 
he also finds that when the out-party does not have an experienced challenger running for 
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office, this party will have more amateur candidates challenging the incumbent (Lazarus, 
2008).  Maisel and Stone (1997) find also that a challenger’s decision to run is more 
likely to be affected by their chance of winning their own party’s nomination in the 
primary than by their chance of winning the general election.  Therefore, the primary 
election is an important factor also. 
What is it about the incumbent that is the biggest deterrent for challengers seeking 
a seat?  As noted above Lazarus finds deterrence may depend on which election cycle we 
are looking.  Another possibility is the so-called ‘war chest’ of the incumbent.  The war 
chest is the amount of money the incumbent has saved from previous elections or from 
campaign contributions while in office.  Hogan (2001) finds that the size of the war chest 
has a negative impact on the probability that a challenge will occur in both the primary 
and general election cycle.  Contributing to the war chest deterrent is the possibility that 
states that have campaign finance laws that restrict contribution limits may also affect 
challenger emergence positively (Hogan, 2004).  The idea here is that if incumbents were 
unhindered by contribution limits it lowers the deterrent or risk to challengers.  Maestas 
& Rugeley (2008) find similarly when assessing the experience of incumbents over 
challengers.  They find that the advantage depends on what type of incumbent one is.  If 
you are a statewide office holder or federal candidate, you may have an advantage in 
raising funds when compared to ambitious amateurs.   
  If the campaign finance laws governing contributions restrict an incumbent, then 
this would level the playing field.  By creating a level playing field there is less of a risk 
and more ability for challengers to compete with incumbents.  This lowered risk plays 
directly into their calculus of whether or not it is worth the risk to run for office.  
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Hogan (2001) also finds that as the attractiveness of the state legislative seat 
diminishes, the effect of the war chest paradoxically increases.  This means that the war 
chest has a bigger effect when there is a seat for which no one wants to run.  This could 
be that the war chest is adding onto some other deterrent effect.  Hogan does not discuss 
what makes a seat more or less attractive, so we are not sure.  We do know that war 
chests are primarily effective as deterrents in state legislative seats and not US 
congressional seats (Hogan, 2001). 
Hogan notes that generally, the American people understand that if a member of 
Congress does not vote in accordance with their constituent’s wishes, they may lose their 
office.  This theoretically should provide an opportunity for a challenger to attempt to 
take over the seat.  Despite the conventional wisdom, however, this does not appear to be 
the case. Hogan (2004) looked at the incumbent’s responsiveness to policy demands.  He 
found that when the incumbent’s policy voting was in line with what his constituents 
wanted, he got a higher percentage of the votes than incumbents that did not vote in line 
with constituents.  However, he does not find this helps or hurts a challenger.  He only 
found that it affected the vote total for the incumbent.  Whereas policy responsiveness 
matters, it apparently does not matter (or help) for challengers seeking that office.  
Challengers may put less emphasis on voting responsiveness when considering a run for 
office. 
3.2 Political and Institutional Factors 
Strategic factors have a direct impact on the political factors of a candidate’s 
decision.  When a candidate is looking at their prospects within their district strategically, 
they also must consider the political factors such as partisan balance in the district.  If 
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balanced in their favor they may have a higher probability of winning than otherwise.  
Hogan (2004) finds that when the district partisan balance factor favors the incumbent 
that it is a deterrent to challenger emergence.  When the partisanship is changing or has 
changed however, Hogan (2004) finds that challengers will emerge at that point.   Hogan 
also finds that the population within the district is also a factor
8
.  When the population is 
larger, it may make the campaign more expensive and acts as a deterrent to challengers.  
If candidates have to expend more campaign resources to reach a larger population, this 
would increase the cost of the campaign.  These costs then become the deterrent to 
challenger emergence.   
Concerning the structure of the institution in which one desires office, the 
professionalism of the legislature is another factor that some scholars think plays into the 
challenger’s decisions.  Legislature professionalism refers generally to the time 
legislators spend in session, the amount they are paid, term limits, amenities or perks of 
office, level of political knowledge and political experience of the legislators.  States that 
provide higher salaries, more amenities, and staff are considered to have a more 
professional legislature.  States that do not provide these benefits for their legislators are 
considered less professional.  Hogan looks at the professionalism of the legislature and 
finds that where states have a more professional legislature it is a strong influence on 
challenger emergence (Hogan, 2004).  He finds that there will be more challengers 
emerging with more legislative professionalism, but the strength of the challengers will 
                                                             
8 Hogan says, “When larger districts contain a greater number of potential candidates, they also have 
more voters" p1287.  This paper’s author assumes Hogan means that some districts have more voters 
than others and not that the population is actually different.  The author does not currently know if 
populations can differ in state districts.  The only other explanation for this is that some districts Hogan 
looks at are state senate districts vs. state house districts. 
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decrease.  Because the legislative seat become more “enticing” more challengers emerge 
but they are not necessarily the strongest candidates (Hogan, 2004, p. 1293).  Maestas et 
al. (2006) similarly find that professionalism of the legislature helps develop skills and 
qualities necessary for candidates to run for higher office.  Squire and Powell argue that 
developing a higher quality potential candidate pool enables more challenger emergence 
(Squire, 1989; Powell, 2000).  Simply having a larger pool of qualified candidates allows 
more of those candidates to challenge incumbents.  Allowing a larger pool of candidates 
to grow, makes possible better representation in the long run as your pool of candidates 
are better able to grapple with running for office (Maestas, Fulton, Maisel, & Stone, 
2006).  
Term limits increase the probability that state legislators will run for their state’s 
US House seat whether they are the incumbent or the challenger.  However, this effect is 
lessened for the challenger compared to the incumbent (Powell, 2000).  Term limits are a 
negative when considering legislative professionalism.  The idea here is that states would 
want legislators to stay in office, gain experience, and thus become more professional.  
By limiting this ability, states may end up having a less professional legislature.  We see 
from the above discussion that a more professional legislature encourages challenger 
emergence.  We would expect that term limits would decrease professionalism and thus 
decrease challenger emergence.  Powell (2000) however, finds the opposite that term 
limits “have a stimulating effect on the decision of state legislators to run for the House” 
(Powell, 2000, p656).  It is possible that the effect is based on leaving one seat (the State 
Legislature) to try for a higher seat (the US House), whereas other studies have looked at 
challenger emergence for the same level of seats.  
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3.3 Personal Factors 
Whereas political, institutional, and strategic factors are beyond the reach of the 
candidate’s influence, personal factors are those that affect the candidate’s person in his 
or her life or family.  These include such factors as income, displacement
9
, the length of 
sessions, ability to campaign, and candidate quality.  The income factor can be especially 
difficult to overcome.  This factor can affect candidate’s decisions in two ways.  The first 
is where the legislator salary is low.  If the legislature is not professional and has 
relatively low salaries for the legislators then leaving or taking time off from a lucrative 
business or profession may put an undue cost of running and serving as a legislator.  
Candidates have to make this choice prior to deciding to run.  On the other hand serving 
in the legislature may be a stepping stone to higher office or even the first step in a 
candidate’s desire for a political career.  They then may not care about the salary but see 
holding the office as a long-term benefit.    The second effect of legislator’s salaries is 
when the legislator’s salary is higher, then the legislature is seen as more professional.  
This line of scholarship positions salary not as a personal factor, but more of an 
institutional factor affecting candidates. The thinking on this factor is that higher salaries 
and more professionalism would serve as an incentive for more challengers to enter the 
race.  Added to the income effect is the displacement factor.  The displacement factor is 
the necessity of maintaining two households while in the legislature.  Legislators are 
required to have a residence in the district or state from which they are elected.  Most 
legislators also need a place to stay or live while in session.  For the state legislatures, this 
effect can vary by the amount of time spent in session.  If states have a more professional 
                                                             
9 Displacement according to Maisel and Stone means having to keep a second house in the state capital. 
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legislature that meets every year, the displacement costs will be higher than in states 
where the legislature meets every other year or for only a few weeks at a time.  While we 
would expect that the income and displacement effects would be high on the list of 
factors affecting candidate emergence, scholars have not found evidence for this.  Maisel 
and Stone (1997) examined these two factors and only found minimal evidence that they 
affected candidate emergence decisions.  They found that the strategic factors were much 
stronger in decision making than these two personal factors.  
Other personal factors are also tied to the cost of running for office.  These 
include the probability of negative advertising in a campaign.  If you are running against 
a strong candidate, and the incumbent has a large war chest then they will be able to run 
negative ads against your campaign.  This can cause the increasing costs to your 
campaign as you must respond to these ads.  Again, Maisel and Stone (1997) find that 
these personal factors are minor when compared to the strategic factors.  As mentioned 
earlier in this dissertation a qualitative candidate interview with a state legislative 
candidate brought up the personal cost of negative campaigning.  He said that in his 
current role as a campaign consultant, it was hard to find people to run for office because 
they were “afraid to take the risk of being out front, of the humiliation.  Business owners 
in particular don’t want to lose business” of the reputational loss associated with negative 
attacks (Communication6, 2014).  Some potential candidates seem to be very worried 
about losing their personal reputation which could then hurt their business reputation.   
Candidate quality is another important factor for candidate emergence.  Candidate 
quality is lumped into one category.  Generally, it means some combination of campaign 
experience, oratorical skills, organizational skills and physical or telegenic appeal.  The 
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problem with these types of factors is that it is not clear if the skills or qualities are a 
factor in candidate emergence or if candidates emerge, gain experience and then develop 
these skills and qualities.  The expectation is that candidates with higher levels of 
qualities would be able to raise more money for their campaigns and thus be able to 
challenge incumbents more successfully.  Squire studies these personal factors and finds 
that where we would expect to see higher qualified challengers against incumbents, we 
tend to see weaker challengers against incumbents and stronger challenger quality against 
open seats (Squire, 1995).  Even Squire notes that these factors are harder to understand 
and quantify than originally thought.  Stone, Maisel, and Maestas (2004) find that 
candidate quality has similar effects.  Incumbent candidate quality deters strong 
challengers and low quality incumbents stimulate other potential candidates to run.   
Throughout the study of candidate emergence and looking at the factors there 
always seems to be some factor, some element missing in the analysis.  Some more 
recent studies have noticed this factor and have looked for it to describe the desire to run 
for office.  It is called alternately progressive ambition (Maestas, Fulton, Maisel, & 
Stone, 2006) or nascent ambition (Fox & Lawless, 2005).  Maestas et al. describe 
progressive ambition as preceding any evaluation of a campaign or seat.  Progressive 
ambition would come before evaluating any seat as a potential prospect.  They evaluate 
progressive ambition by asking state legislators if they expect to run for the US House in 
the future.  Maestas et al. look at the expected utility of winning an office, but they say 
that this expected utility model is flawed because it does not take into account the long 
term costs and benefit of running for office.  When you consider long term benefits and 
long-term costs you get progressive ambition that the authors think must be present to run 
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in the first place.  Every candidate must have some form of progressive ambition; 
otherwise, the costs would be too high in the short term (Maestas et al., 2006).  
This idea of measuring ambition is also considered by Fox and Lawless (2005) 
(Fox & Lawless, 2004) who look not at state legislators but at a potential pool of 
candidates.  They created a survey using a sample of individuals selected from 
professions that historically have seen politicians emerge.  These professions include law, 
business, education and political/community activism (Fox & Lawless, 2005, p 647).  
Fox and Lawless (2005) look at these actors prior to this emergence process to look at the 
nascent candidates’ decisions.  They wanted to see what factors affected the likelihood 
that potential candidates would ever enter a race.  The authors surveyed these folks to 
gauge their nascent political ambition or the embryonic or potential interest in seeking 
office that precedes the actual decision to enter a specific political contest.  This study 
used a survey of what Fox & Lawless describe as ‘successful individuals’ (p648) who 
form part of a potential candidate pool.  The authors use this sample as a way of 
broadening the base of potential office holders – meaning that instead of looking at just 
potential candidates for state legislature or city council; they are looking at a broad 
spectrum of potential candidates from which most expressed candidates come.   
Fox and Lawless find numerous factors contribute to nascent candidates such as 
“a general sense of efficacy…exerts the greatest relative impact on nascent ambition” 
(2005, p. 652).  When individuals feel qualified to run they are more likely to decide to 
investigate the possibility of running for office.  Another major factor is a politicized 
upbringing such as family members had previously run for office, politics had been a part 
of family life and discussions, or individuals had run for office in high school.  This 
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earlier exposure to politics contributed to their decisions to run for office in the future.  
Minority status tended to make the potential candidates less likely to run for office 
possibly because they “lack the key ingredients that foster ambition” (2005, p654), they 
self-assess as “not at all qualified” or lacked “encouragement from their parents to enter 
politics” (2005, p. 654).  Fox and Lawless agree that more work needs to be done to 
“flesh out more thoroughly the role of nascent ambition in the candidate emergence 
process” (Fox & Lawless, p655).  Part of this study does this.  By qualitatively 
interviewing candidates this dissertation develops a better idea of what factors contribute 
to their decisions, but with the hypothesis that complex campaign finance laws may be a 
barrier to running for office.   
Because the idea that campaign finance laws might deter candidates from running 
for office it is important to understand if this ever occurs to individuals who may or may 
not have run for office.  Interviews of eight potential and actual candidates were 
conducted in the Spring of 2014 to ascertain factors that did affect their decisions to run 
for office and to investigate whether or not campaign finance laws entered the 
candidate’s calculations.  Of the eight individuals interviewed, six were men and two 
women.  Five had previously run for office, three had not.  The answers the individuals 
gave regarding reasons to run or not to run for office coincided with much of the 
literature on the subject.  Answers given for why the individual ran for office, ranged 
from the strategic to personal.  When the respondents were asked if they would run those 
that said they would not gave reasons such as the system is too political, they did not 
want to risk losing their reputation or jobs, and they did not like asking for money.  When 
asked about the logistics of running for office such as filing, and getting the information 
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on how to run; respondents said they got information from previously experienced 
candidates, the state boards of elections/registrars, campaign consultants.  This question 
often led into a discussion of the nuts-and-bolts of running for office.  Two candidates 
commented on the difficulty of the process, one respondent going so far as to say 
“someone just off the streets would find it impossible [to run].  They will not be able to 
fill out the forms.  They would need to be researchers to do this” (Communication1, 
2014)
10
.  Another candidate stated that his profession as a lawyer gave him a ‘leg up’ on 
other candidates and “I don’t know the code off the top of my head, but the average 
person would need help” (Communication7, 2014).  It is clear from these interviews that 
campaign regulations are on the minds of individuals.  It might not be the main issue they 
think about, but it is an issue that might concern them when considering a candidacy. 
This review of the literature looks at numerous factors that affect candidate 
decisions.  It is clear from this review that the question of what factors affect candidate 
decisions is far from settled.  The decisions may be different for incumbents vs. 
challengers, the office for which the candidate is running, the costs involved in the 
decision making and so on.  So many factors can come into play in making the decision 
to run for office.  It is important to study these factors ongoing to ensure that the electoral 
system is open for participation.   
                                                             
10 Also cited in Chapter 2.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4. PLAIN LANGUAGE, READABILITY, AND COMPREHENSION 
The basis of this dissertation is that the complexity of the campaign finance 
statutes affects candidate decisions.  As detailed in Chapter 1, transaction costs may add 
to the burden of candidates seeking election.  In order to determine how this might occur 
this chapter and the next lay out the method of measuring complexity using plain 
language and an experiment in which this method was tested.    
The debate over clarity in writing and comprehension of language stretches over 
time but in the past twenty years has taken on a new dimension in the form of the debate 
over the use of “Plain Language”.  The proponents of this movement argue that language 
must be understood if it is to be language at all, otherwise it is just letters or words strung 
together.  The overarching question in this dissertation is whether the complexity of 
campaign finance legislation affects candidate willingness to run for office. This chapter 
lays the groundwork to demonstrate that language can be difficult to understand or it 
could be easy.  Necessarily, then, this study focuses on the so-called “Plain-Language” 
movement.   
This chapter shows how the study of the Plain Language movement relates to the 
complexity of laws. First, it will examine how scholars conceptualize and operationalize 
“Plain Language”, and then shift examine empirical studies of plain language.  Whatever 
the outcome of the debate over the use of Plain Language, its use is really all about how 
readable a document is.  This chapter will look over the readability measures to see what 
they are and how effective they have been.  It is important to see where and how plain 
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language has been implemented and if differences in outcomes are evident.  
Unfortunately, the empirical work on this level is scanty, but this chapter looks at what 
has been done so far and where research needs to go in the future.  What does all of this 
mean to Campaign Finance Reform?  This chapter will end with a discussion on the 
effects Plain Language could have on CFR.  Ultimately, the reader will see that not only 
can readability of language vary, and thus, the degree of readability in statutes and rules 
can differ. In other words, empirically speaking, readability is an important explanatory 
variable when it comes to institutional “rules-in-form” (Ostrom, 2007) and therefore 
society’s “tacit understanding” of rules.  
4.1 What is Plain Language? 
Plain Language is a movement by scholars of different fields to make the 
transmission of information easier and more successful for end users.  It involves 
changing various written media such as documents, pamphlets, charts, graphs, and 
articles into more easily understood documents so that the user/reader can use the 
information contained in the media more quickly and effectively.  One of the most 
prominent advocates for Plain Language is Dr. Joseph Kimble who became an early 
cheerleader for the effort and maintains the Plain Language website 
(www.plainlanguage.gov).  The website’s definition for Plain Language is 
“communication your audience can understand the first time they read or hear it.  Written 
material is plain if your audience can find what they need, understand what they find, and 
use what they find to meet their needs (www.plainlanguage.gov).”  While this definition 
is clear, one of the problems with the Plain Language movement is that it lacks a 
consensus definition.  Others see Plain Language as “reader-friendly language – designed 
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to increase the individual’s understanding of the text.  It serves as a portal through which 
consumers can access and understand…information” (Stableford & Mettger, 2007, p. 79).  
The differing views between Kimble and others refers more to the usability of the 
information.  Kimble advocates a usability of the language while others such as 
Stableford and Mettger advocate understanding.  
Plain Language has developed into different realms of reading also.  Today it 
relates to different types of readability such as “prose literacy, document literacy [how 
documents are structured] and quantitative literacy [the ability to read charts/graphs] 
(Root & Stableford, 1999).  Even the US government has gotten in on the Plain Language 
movement when in 1998 President Bill Clinton directed agency officials to use plain 
writing in ‘‘all new documents, other than regulations, that explain how to obtain a 
benefit or service or how to comply with a requirement you administer or enforce’’ 
(Senate C. o., 2009, p. 3). 
Many Plain Language scholars seek to test documents to see how readable and 
comprehensible the documents are.  One of the main measures of Plain Language today 
is readability and its companion, grade level scores.  The question for the field is which 
readability/grade score to use?  There are over forty different formulas for testing the 
readability of a document (Root & Stableford, 1999).  These formulas are mostly based 
or have grown from one of the original works of scholarship advocating for testing 
readability in documents.    
Rudolf Flesch’s (1948) article on readability seems to be one of the first to look at 
readability formulas.   Flesch’s readability formula used a very simple measure of 
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average sentence length in number of words, number of affixes,
11
 and number of 
references to people to test the readability of a document.  According to Flesch, this first 
formula tended to have an overreliance on sentence length, and failed to capture 
conversational writing (Flesch, 1948).  The number of affixes were hard for researchers 
to determine and the references to people were unclear and not understood.  Flesch 
created a new formula to overcome this problem.  He used a very simple measure of 
average sentence length in words, average word length in syllables, number of references 
to ‘personal words’ (words with natural gender, pronouns except neutral, and the words 
“people” and “folks”).  A new element the average percentage of “personal sentences” 
was added to correct the conversational writing measurement problem.  Flesch finds that 
his new formula is a more useable measure of readability in that it is easier to interpret 
with a scoring system of 0-100.  The Flesch Reading Ease is an indirect test of word 
complexity via number of syllables per word and sentence complexity via number of 
words per sentence.   
Working about the same time as Flesch was Edward Fry (1968).  Fry’s 1968 
article updated his own 1948 readability formula for books, used mostly by international 
scholars, but is not applicable for US standards and grade levels because the grade levels 
do not correspond with US grade levels (Fry, 1968).   A validity problem is presented 
where the formula has a issue of not corresponding to grade levels that may vary across 
time and areas.  As Fry puts it “[a readability measure] is complicated by trying to 
determine grade level when grade level won’t stand still and when subjective judgments 
are about as good a standard as can be found.”  Fry randomly selects three one-hundred-
                                                             
11 By affixes, the authors refer to suffixes, prefixes attached to the root of the word. 
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word passages from a book or an article.  The researcher plots the average number of 
syllables and average number of words per sentence on a graph to determine the area of 
readability level.   A researcher could choose more passages per book if they find a large 
amount of variability in the passages (Fry, 1968).  Fry’s contribution here is not only 
based on the fact that he uses a formula and compares books but also that he is trying to 
work out the inherent problem of grade level.  He compares the various readability 
formulas available in the 1960s to his own and uses this information to create a graph of 
readability.   
Another important contributor to the developing readability scholarship was 
Harry McLaughlin (1969) who created the SMOG Grading score
12
.  This score computes 
the grade level necessary to comprehend a particular piece of writing.  This reading score 
eliminates some of the steps of the Flesch and Fry formulas by creating a multiplicative 
term in the formula.  McLaughlin multiplies word and sentence length together therefore 
a researcher does not have to add up word length (counting syllables) and sentence length 
(counting words) if one just counts out a number of sentences and then counts the number 
of syllables in those sentences.  McLaughlin was able to simplify the process of 
calculating readability for scholars.  This figure is widely used in the health care field 
(Ley & Florio, 1996) which we will see below is one of the biggest proponents of Plain 
Language.   
Whichever of the readability formulas used, the primary focus of readability 
formulas is on reading prose and not on the graphs and charts in some document.  
Mosenthal & Kirsch (1998) have created a measure of document complexity that looks at 
                                                             
12 SMOG is sometimes called the Simple Measure of Gobbledygook, but McLaughlin himself credited the 
name to a reference to an earlier FOG index (1969).   
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how charts and graphs are presented.  Mosenthal and Kirsch argue that the very way the 
material is organized can have an effect on its readability.  They analyze both the 
‘structure’ and the ‘density’ of a document and use these two criteria to create an 
interesting scale of complexity.  This scale is based on chart complexity [a simple chart 
gets one point, a nested chart four points] where more chart components equals a higher 
complexity score.  They then add to the document complexity scale a score for the 
number of labels and items within a document.  The authors contend that the more labels 
and items found in a document make it more difficult to read.  Labels include chart titles 
and subtitles, and items are the data points or lines within a chart.  The complexity score 
allows authors to understand how easy or difficult their document will be to read and to 
comprehend.  Mosenthal and Kirsch think that reading needs to be broken into two 
components, 1 – reading to comprehend and 2 – reading to do.  Charts and graphs often 
fall into the reading to do category because they often contain information such as bus 
schedules, calorie charts and other useful information (Mosenthal & Kirsch, 1998).  Their 
research adds an important component to the readability literature because so often end 
users see information in graphic formats whether it is nutrition information, 
transportation schedules or other information key to day-to-day life. 
Today computer programs do much of this readability testing.  This in itself 
creates another problem as scholars contend that there is much variability in computer 
generated readability scores and little agreement on what the ‘grade level’ scores mean 
(Root & Stableford, 1999).  In an effort to standardize the meaning of grade levels Root 
and Stableford (1999) generally consider items that are 4
th
-6
th
 grade “easy-to-read”; 7
th
-
8
th
 grade “average reading”; and 9
th
 grade or higher they consider “difficult-to-read” 
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items.  Originally these scores were used to measure children’s books, which caused 
some scholars to contend that using grade levels targets reading abilities at schoolchildren 
instead of end-users (Redish, 2000).  In creating such scales, it also means that materials 
and people are categorized into grade level scales.  Do we really want to consider 9
th
 
grade reading difficult?  The grade levels seem too constricting and lack the flexibility of 
a readability score.  
Limiting the flexibility into just three broad categories seems to limit the 
usefulness of these type of scales.  The readability ratings, according to some scholars, 
have been discredited due to the wide range of ways readability can be calculated 
(Petelin, 2010).  Readability scores also only test those factors in writing that can be 
counted i.e. sentences, words, and syllables.  Usability measures are the recommended 
way to measure comprehension. In these tests users read material while researchers 
document the effort (Redish, 2000).  This is a more qualitative measure of readability, 
and one that requires human intervention to measure.  
For this dissertation, a type of usability test was used as described in the methods 
section of this chapter.  Users or students were given a reading and were asked questions 
not only about comprehension but also about how they read the statute.  For example, 
students were asked how many times they referred back to the reading, or how clear they 
thought it was.  In this way, this part of this study measures not only grade reading level, 
but also how difficult or easy it was to understand the campaign finance statute.  In the 
campaign finance analysis chapters (6 & 7) the grade level scores are used to analyze the 
campaign finance legislation.  While it is not the same as using a usability test, using 
grade level scores is still more intuitive for most end users than understanding readability 
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scores
13
.  Furthermore using grade reading levels is a convenience test based on the 
results of this plain language study.  The plain language study tests comprehension of the 
campaign finance statutes using the usability measures described above.  The campaign 
finance statutes were measured differently as described in Chapter 6. 
The readability measures, grade reading level measures, or usability measures are 
all intended to be used to test documents to determine how difficult or easy to read they 
are and how or if users will be able to comprehend the documents.  Once able to say a 
document is on a 9
th
 grade reading level, we understand that anyone who has completed 
the 9
th
 grade should easily be able to understand this document.  Readabilty scores on the 
other hand can range from 0-100.  If one scholar uses a readability score and their 
document rates a 45 it is not clear what this means.  It becomes especially unclear if 
another scholar uses a different readability score and comes up with a 67.  There is little 
measurement validity here.  Scholars cannot measure the same documents using different 
measures and come up with the same rating.  This is why grade-reading levels are more 
intuitive, and arguably, more reliable, but also why usability measures are more valid.  
Even grade-reading levels may have different calculations behind them.   
4.2 The Advantages/Disadvantages of Plain Language Use 
Advocates and opponents of plain language continue debating many aspects of 
plain language including the measurement issue.  Another issue debated is the rationale 
of plain language.  Some scholars are advocates of its use, while others are against using 
plain language.   
                                                             
13 The use of readability versus grade level scores is an empirical question that is not adequately 
addressed in the plain language literature.  The use of either is not tested in this dissertation.  However, 
both measures were evaluated using factor analysis.  See Chapter 6 for details.  
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One reason for not using plain language is the cost issue.  Converting to plain 
language may be an added expense for businesses or law firms.  Frooman (1981) argues 
that legalese is used because it is convenient and cheaper to use than converting to Plain 
Language.  Converting contracts to Plain Language would require lawyers to change their 
current computer forms and purchase new ones.  The old ones are set in the legalese 
language and to buy new ones would cost more money.  By changing the wording, 
lawyers would be taking a risk that the new contracts would be contested in court.  
Therefore, there is no incentive to change to new Plain Language forms and formats.  
Frooman also argues that using legalese is useful to lawyers because it keeps them in 
business as they are the only ones who understand it.  Frooman is not alone, Crow (1988) 
points out that corporations also – even those who want to use Plain Language – find 
themselves thwarted by the cost savings of official form letters that have been prewritten 
and used for years to good effect.  Why spend the money rewriting these letters when 
doing so may create a “backlog of correspondence” and or an increase in the number of 
customer service calls (Crow, 1988)? 
Plain Language also may not be as effective as the advocates assert.  The general 
argument here is that laws are laws despite the language in which they are written and the 
laws will be enforced based on their understanding to the court system, not based on how 
well users can understand the law.  Scheibal (1986) contends that Plain Language (or 
Plain English Laws, PELs, as he calls them) are useful but bring up several issues 
including how the Plain English within the law is interpreted.  Scheibal contends that 
PELs are applicable in much the same way any other law is applicable.  If it is 
ambiguous, whoever drafts the law must either rewrite it or explain the law.  This would 
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not change in the case of using Plain Language.  The application of the law does not 
change; it is perhaps only the “affected” parties’ understanding of the laws that changes.  
Extending this point, Assy argues that making the law comprehensible to those affected 
by it is an impossible task because no law could possibly take into account the diversity 
of individuals subject to the law (Assy, 2011).  In other words, so many different types of 
people are affected by laws so how can a legislatures write the laws so that every 
potential person affected by it can use it without needing a lawyer to interpret the law?  
She further argues that there is a difference between linguistic and legal clarity which is 
needed in the law (Assy, 2011). 
Another reason for opposition to plain language is that the structure of the 
legislation framework may be so different as to have uncertain outcomes (Leete, 1981) 
He cites as an example the plain Language legislation passed in New York and New 
Jersey.  New York used an ‘open format’ statute simply stating that contracts and 
regulations should be written in a “clear and coherent manner”.  New Jersey’s Plain 
Language statutes were more structured and less flexible.  New Jersey specified for 
example that consumer contracts be readable according to a specific readability test and 
not be longer than a certain number of words (depending on contract type).  Leete points 
out that an open format might be preferable except that it is subjective to different 
interpretations of what is clear and coherent.  He notes New Jersey’s statute creates the 
question of whether or not there is any assurance that a contract will conform to the law 
until it is tested in court.  Leete concludes that instead of passing statutes on Plain 
Language it would probably be better to allow the market to determine if Plain Language 
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will ultimately be feasible or not.  He points out that companies that use Plain Language 
are seeing improved business and perhaps this trend will continue (Leete, 1981)
14
. 
Others however see the plain language movement as an impediment to writing 
proper legislation.  Hunt concludes that the “language of our legislation cannot be 
reduced to baby talk for consumption” (Hunt, 2002, p. 44).  Hunt argues that language 
does matter; especially in legislation which needs to be very precise, clear, and technical 
so that those who must implement it can understand its meanings and interpretations.  It 
cannot be reduced to common language (Hunt, 2002).  He recommends that legislation be 
passed using legal language, but the regulations and/or administrative rules should be 
written in plain language.   
Not everyone is skeptical about Plain Language use.  Both the medical and law 
fields are working to simplify language in their respective fields.  The medical field is 
working to simplify both technical terms and instructions to patients in order to clarify 
meaning and ensure care to citizens who are illiterate or have low literacy proficiency.  
As we will see below these fields have taken the lead on using Plain Language for 
readability and comprehension. 
Some lawyers favor using Plain Language in legal writing in order to make legal 
statutes or legislation more accessible to everyday people.  By doing this people will be 
more aware of legal proceedings and understand their rights.  Richard Wydick (1978) 
points out that the legal profession is incorporating Plain Language into their teaching 
curriculum.  This is especially the case for jury instructions (as discussed later) and 
general legal writing.  Sullivan (2001) points out that legal language targets a very 
                                                             
14 Leete (1981) cites Givens, The Plain English Law 50 NY St. B. J.  1978 
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specific audience.  She does not advocate writing statutes so that everyone can read them, 
she advocates writing the statutes for the most affected person that is going to use that 
statute.  For example if a statute involving jury instructions is most likely going to be 
read by a judge, then it should be written in legal language.  If the jury foreman is going 
to read the statute, Plain Language should be the format. 
Arguing in the same legal genre, Assy (2011) argues that even though some 
legislation and statutes have no need for translation into plain language, in other cases 
using plain language provides three benefits.  These include the ability of individuals to 
engage in their own legal affairs and to reduce its costs.  Assy argues that even though 
individuals might still need lawyers, allowing the law to be written more clearly provides 
an avenue on which both lawyers and their clients can better understand the law (Assy, 
2011).  If they can understand it better, litigation will be less expensive because there will 
be fewer errors in decision making, clients will be more empowered, and better protected 
from abuse. “The true value of plain English lies in its potential to enable clients to 
maximize the benefits of legal service” (Assy, 2011).  The third benefit is reducing the 
“incidence of litigation” because users understand the law better and are more able to 
uphold the law (Assy, 2011).   
As discussed further in Chapter 6, the contention of this dissertation coincides 
with plain language that is easier to use.  If language is more complex it may make it less 
accessible to users, in this case, candidates, who need to understand the law in order to 
comply with the law.  The reduced time to comprehend the law and increased compliance 
with the law; reduces costs to candidates of hiring more lawyers or staff and, as defined 
in this dissertation, reduces the transaction costs of compliance.   
64 
 
4.3 Plain Language Empirical Studies 
Testing Plain Language empirically is not easy.  Studies have ranged from a test 
of readability/grade level to tests of comprehension.  The readability tests while valid 
lack the ability to show that increased readability improved comprehension or outcomes 
by the end users.  Comprehension studies are moving in this direction.  Both types of 
studies are included below because it is necessary to see where we have been and where 
the research needs to go.   
The health care field in particular seems inclined to use readability measures in 
order to ensure that patients understand their treatment options, understand public health 
issues, and are clear on medical information.  For example, Rudd et al. (2004) studied the 
impact of public health communications to the average adult in the United Kingdom and 
Canada using the National Adult Literacy Survey conducted in the US in 1992.  They 
found considerable differences in what the average adult could read and understand and 
the type of language found in public health communications.  The authors conducted a 
case study using new water resource authority regulations that were in the process of 
being rewritten.  They subjected both the new and old regulations to a literacy test to 
determine how easy or difficult the regulations were to read and understand.  The original 
text scored a readability of 14 and the subsequent revised text scored 8.5 – a significant 
improvement as readability scores improve as they drop to lower grade level reading 
abilities.  After further revision, they reduced the communication to a 6.7 (Rudd et al., 
2004).  
One of the most interesting uses of Plain Language is found in a study done of 
medical Decision Aids (DAs) given to men facing prostate cancer.  The study did a 
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formative evaluation
15
 of a DA given to these men.  The researchers used a focus group 
first and then gave a survey to a sample of men recently diagnosed with prostate cancer.  
The authors gave the group a booklet regarding treatment options that had been revised 
with Plain Language guidelines.  They compared these focus groups to historical data on 
the basis of factors such as knowledge of treatment options and knowledge of side 
effects.  The researchers found that the respondents found the revised DAs useful but the 
effects were not that different from the historical data on these factors.  The researchers 
found gains in the “potential to improve on earlier gains in patient knowledge” (Holmes-
Rovner, et al., 2005, p. 10).   They suggest that using Plain Language is “central to 
quality [of care], cost containment, safety and patients’ involvement in decisions.  They 
suggest that without attention to literacy, the move toward increased patient participation 
in health care decisions will exacerbate disparities in access and outcomes (Holmes-
Rovner, et al., 2005, p. 10). 
The Plain Language movement has much support and discussion about the 
movement, but the empirical evidence that Plain Language documents actually improve 
use and understanding is scanty.  Scholars need to know if Plain Language really makes 
documents and other media more readable and does this readability have an effect on 
outcomes – legal, medical or otherwise.  Masson and Waldron (1994), test the question of 
whether or not contracts created in legal language and then converted to Plain Language 
increase the comprehension for the average reader and what changes in the document are 
most effective for comprehension.  Masson and Waldron’s study used legal documents 
that were most likely to be read by the general public.  These included a mortgage 
                                                             
15 A formative evaluation is an evaluation done at the onset of a program to determine how a program 
should be formed or implemented.  
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agreement, an agreement for property sale, a bank loan document and a lease renewal 
document.  The authors then drafted each of these documents into three different versions 
which were tested against the original.   
1. The first revision removed archaic terms such as hereinafter and 
heretofore.  
2. In the second version [The Plain Language version] “extremely long 
sentences were broken up into shorter sentences and difficult words were replaced 
with simpler terms.  References to contracting parties (i.e. mortgagee and 
mortgagor) were replaced with personal pronouns “you” and “I” (p. 71).”   
3. The third revision replaced legalese terms (mortgagor/mortgagee) with 
simple words or they defined these terms in the text (Masson & Waldron, 1994).   
 
Masson and Waldron tested the effects of Plain Language on two variables: the 
speed of reading and comprehension.  The reading time results indicated that the 
respondents were able to increase their reading speeds on the legal-terms-defined 
document.  This change was statistically significant.  The authors conclude that because 
the legal terms were removed or defined, the document was easier to read thus resulting 
in the faster times (Masson & Waldron, 1994).  
On the comprehension tasks, the subjects were tested in two different ways.  They 
were asked to paraphrase the document and to answer questions about the document.  On 
the paraphrase task, the use of Plain Language [versions 2 & 3] resulted in a significant 
increase in the ability of the subjects to paraphrase the documents. In addition, when the 
respondents paraphrased the first version (archaic terms removed) of the document the 
responses were more complete than when the respondents paraphrased the original 
version of the document (Masson & Waldron, 1994). 
The “question answering” task was also used to test comprehension.  The author’s 
analysis concludes “the use of Plain Language improved the accuracy of decisions [on 
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the questions].” Looking at the cases “in which a response was made, the percentage of 
correct responses…across the original and archaic terms removed versions was 69% 
correct; across the plain language and legal-terms-defined version it was 84% (Masson & 
Waldron, 1994, p76-77).” 
It is clear from Masson and Waldron’s assessment that Plain Language improves 
the reading comprehension of the documents.  Their study is also generalizable because it 
uses documents that average people would be likely to encounter
16
.  It is also notable that 
the authors do not use readability or grade level assessments of the documents.   Unlike 
other studies, they did not simply measure the “readability” but tested empirically for 
comprehension.  While readability and grade level ratings have their uses, at the end of 
the day, we want to ensure that people are able to comprehend what they read.   
Masson and Waldron’s use of a legal-terms-defined version (version 3) is 
interesting because legalese is an important target of Plain Language.  It is also very 
important in jury instructions.  These instructions to juries--if not clear--could endanger a 
defendant’s freedom.  Severence et al. (1984) look at jury instructions for clarification.  
This study is not intentionally using Plain Language methods in testing jury instructions, 
but as a matter of fact it is what they are doing.   
This study tests standard versus revised jury instructions to see if jurors 
understand them.  For a sample they use previous jurors and current citizens on jury duty.  
The subjects are shown a mock trial produced to simulate reality as closely as possible.  
Once the ‘trial’ is over, subjects were given a version of the jury instructions.  One 
version was the normal pattern jury instructions and the second version was the revised 
                                                             
16 The study used clerical staff from the University of Victoria and city residents taking courses through a 
university extension program.  Whether or not these people are ‘average’ is debatable. 
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jury instructions.  After getting the instructions, each of the two groups was then divided 
and randomly assigned into one of two groups – a deliberate group and a non-deliberate 
group.  The deliberate group was allowed to begin deliberations for up to thirty minutes. 
After deliberating, this group received a questionnaire regarding the instructions to test 
for comprehension.  The second, non-deliberation group, was given the questionnaire 
immediately after viewing the trial In addition to the questionnaire, the authors asked all 
jurors to give their definitions for terms such as ‘reasonable doubt’ and ‘intent’ 
(Severence, Greene, & Loftus, 1984). 
Concerning the comprehension of the jury instructions, “jurors who heard the 
revised instructions tended to make fewer errors [on the questionnaire] than jurors who 
heard pattern instructions,” with the difference in means statistically significant at the .05 
level (Severence et al, 1984, p 218).  The jurors who deliberated who received revised 
instructions were found to have fewer errors on the questionnaire than those jurors who 
received the pattern instructions.  So the authors find that when accompanied by an 
opportunity to deliberate, the revised instructions did improve comprehension on average.   
The authors also asked the subjects to rate the instructions on a 1 (not at all 
effective) -5 (effective) scale.  They found that the ex-jurors were less likely to benefit 
from the revised instructions versus the pattern instructions.  The current jurors reported 
that the revised instructions more effective than the pattern instructions.  As the authors 
point out, this could be indicative of the higher level of education among ex-jurors (14.6 
years) versus current jurors (13.8); or it could be indicative of self-selection among the 
ex-jurors (Severence, Greene, & Loftus, 1984). 
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As a final test, the subjects were asked to paraphrase the meaning of the legal 
terms “reasonable doubt”, “intent” and “prior convictions”.  The authors found a higher 
number of correct paraphrases on the revised instructions than incorrect, especially for 
those groups who were allowed to deliberate (Severence et al, 1984).  Using 
questionnaires and paraphrase testing in both of the above cases seems to show that 
revising the language of documents/media helps to improve the comprehension of the 
respondents.   
Government reports also show the effects of Plain Language.   The Senate Report 
on the Plain Writing Act of 2009 gives some details of the effects of the law.  The US 
Dept of Veterans Affairs rewrote selected form letters in plain writing and tracked the 
effects.  One unit sent out the standard letter and another unit sent out a letter in plain 
language.  More people responded to the plain language letter than the standard letter 
(45% vs. 29%). They also found that all of the responses to the plain language letter were 
complete, while 18% of responses to the standard letter were not.  The report also found 
reduced customer service phone calls (1100 reduced to 200) regarding the letter (Senate 
U. , 2009).      
4.4 Conclusion 
We can take from this look at the Plain Language literature that there is a 
desirability to using Plain Language in some situations.  What this literature lacks is 
empiricism.  There is very little literature showing that the use of Plain Language is 
effective in increasing comprehension and effectiveness of documents.  While this is the 
case, there is certainly plenty of evidence that readability of documents increases when 
Plain Language is used.  Readability does not translate into effectiveness.  The two 
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studies above by Severence et al (1984) and the Masson and Waldron (1994) study on 
legal documents both show positive signs of effectiveness when using Plain Language.  
However, two studies are not enough to show effects on policy outcomes when using 
Plain Language.  The study of Plain Language needs to move in this direction in order to 
maintain momentum.  The following chapter does just this.  An experiment using 
campaign finance statutes translated into plain language is tested using a utility measure.  
The experiment should show which version of a statute – the original or the plain 
language version- citizens are better able to comprehend.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. CAMPAIGN FINANCE STATUTES AND COMPLEXITY 
 
Policymakers have reformed campaign finance laws to increase participation 
levels in the electoral process in order to increase the numbers of people contributing to 
candidates, but also to increase the numbers of people wanting to run for office.  This 
study contends that these reform laws and statutes may actually be a deterrent to the 
reform goal because the laws are so complex that everyday people are unable to 
comprehend them and therefore cannot comply with the law without incurring a 
significant cost of time and money spent on resources such as lawyers, accountants and 
other professional campaign staffers.  Complexity is measured in this chapter using the 
language in which the laws are written.  This study tests the complexity of the legal 
language by rewriting the North Carolina statutes using Plain Language and comparing 
the comprehension of both.  
This chapter relates the results of an experiment testing the written language of 
two versions of the law for comprehension by the readers/users of the law.  This study 
utilizes a survey/questionnaire given to undergraduate students after reading the 
randomly assigned original or plain language version of the law.  The results indicate that 
reading statutes written in plain language resulted in a higher comprehension of campaign 
finance laws on average compared to individuals who read the current version of the law.  
This finding is important because candidates, especially first-time candidates, running for 
office may have difficulty comprehending the statutes. 
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Allowing more citizens to participate in the electoral system through running for 
office or contributing to campaigns is an important democratizing goal of campaign 
finance reform laws.  In the past, the campaign finance system allowed candidates to 
collect large donations from a small number of contributors.  Democratization reduces 
the amount of contributions in an effort to push candidates to collect smaller donations 
from a larger base of support.  This democratization effort also aimed to reduce the 
perception of corruption and payoffs where big donors allegedly gave money to 
candidates in return for votes.  These anti-corruption efforts focus on engendering the 
trust of citizens in the system.   
In the case of campaign finance legislation itself, those statutes may have become 
so complex and embroiled in legalese that they are actually a deterrent to those wishing 
to run for public office.  If the statutes are difficult to read and difficult with which to 
comply, they may fail to uphold the democratization goal of Campaign Finance Reform.  
The complexity of the law may also impose a cost on candidates running for office.  In 
particular, novice candidates without campaign organizations may find the complexity 
costs add to the start-up costs of beginning a campaign.  Having to hire staffers in order 
to comply with complex regulations is expensive and may be beyond the means of 
everyday citizens.   
The component of complexity studied here is the written language of the statute.  
The Plain Language movement advocates creating documents that are easy to read and 
comprehend, yet as pointed out in the previous chapter, few scholars have systematically 
studied such a contention.  This study asks if rewriting North Carolina’s general statute 
73 
 
on campaign contributions in Plain Language makes it easier to read and understand the 
statute.   
Using plain language protocols, this study rewrote the NC campaign finance 
statute to create a more readable version of the law.  The protocols for rewriting 
documents in plain language include changing legal terms such as ‘notwithstanding’ to 
‘with the exception of’ to make it easier for everyday people to understand.  It also 
recommends exchanging multisyllabic words with shorter ones, shortening sentences to 
10 words or fewer and changing legal names such as ‘mortgagee’ with personal pronouns 
‘you’ and ‘he/she’ (Masson & Waldron, 1994; Rudd, Kaphingst, Colton, Gregoire, & 
Hyde, 2004).  Readability and grade reading level are the most common tools of the Plain 
Language School to test language for comprehension (Root & Stableford, 1999; Flesch, 
1948; McLaughlin, 1969).  
Testing using readability or grade reading levels are common today utilizing the 
number of syllables per word, the number of words per sentence, and the number of 
sentences (Root & Stableford, 1999; Flesch, 1948; McLaughlin, 1969).  While plain 
language scholars debate if such tests of readability are valid, a simple readability test 
lacks the ability to show an actual connection between readability of the statute and 
comprehension level of the reader/user.  To avoid this validity problem as discussed in 
the previous chapter, this study used a comprehension test using both versions of the 
statutes.  The reworded statute and the original were randomly assigned to individuals.  It 
was expected that those who read the plain language statutes would have a higher score 
on a test of their knowledge of the law than those who read the original statute.  This 
study also added usability tests to see how students used the statute.  This was done by 
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asking students how clear they thought the statutes were, how many times they needed to 
refer to the statute and how closely they read the statute.  
5.1 Statutes 
The statutes chosen for this study were the North Carolina general statutes on 
election contributions (North Carolina General Statutes Ch. 22, § 163 278.13) .  Choosing 
the contribution limits section of the election statutes was important because this section 
is pertinent to anyone ever wanting to run for office.  If you run for office, you have to 
know this information, or have a close advisor who knows it for you.  The contribution 
limits were also chosen because this legislation is one of the major reform tools used to 
meet the goals of campaign finance reform.  The reform rationale is that if contribution 
size were limited, politicians would need to seek out a larger volume of smaller 
contributions in order to make up the monetary difference for their campaign coffers.  By 
seeking out more contributions, they would contact more potential contributors and thus 
more people would be contributing to campaigns.  The idea is that more people 
contributing spreads out the democratic effect of the reform (Gross & Goidel, 2003).  In 
addition, contribution limits are intended to reduce overall spending by candidates by 
making fundraising more difficult (Eom & Gross, 2007).  When campaign finance 
statutes are more restrictive they favor challengers and not incumbents (Hogan, 2004).  
However, Hogan’s analysis fails to include the start-up costs of running for the first time 
or as a novice - including a knowledge buildup, hiring campaign staffers and aides. 
Limiting contributions is one of the main tools of campaign finance reform 
because the public’s perception is that there is too much money in campaigns.  Thompson 
and Moncrief’s (1998) analysis of contribution limits shows that the reasons for this 
75 
 
perception vary from just the vast amount of money being collected, to the idea among 
the public that this money must be contributed in hopes of a quid pro quo situation.  
Enactment of contribution limits is an attempt to try to reduce the amount of money in 
campaigns with the thought that if there are fewer contributions, there will be less 
corruption or the appearance thereof.  The other potential advantage of campaign finance 
is to reduce the appearance of impropriety on the part of politicians accepting ‘big’ 
donations from a small group of donors (Gross & Goidel, 2003).  If they can no longer 
contribute the ‘big’ donations, then there is less appearance of impropriety and the system 
is more open, the people trust the system more and therefore it is more democratic.  
 If the goal is to increase the number of contributors and as a result increase the 
net contributions, a candidate must know the law on how much he/she may accept and 
how much a person may contribute to a campaign.  In order to find campaign finance 
information a candidate in North Carolina would first need to look at the statutes to find 
this information.  If you were a lawyer running for office, or a seasoned politician, this 
may not be difficult.  However, if you are new to politics and are an average citizen, then 
it could be difficult to find and understand this information.  The present study seeks to 
test if an average citizen would be able to comprehend the original statute (when he or 
she located it) or if they would be better able to understand a plain language statute. 
5.2 Research Design 
To test this hypothesis the study randomly assigned respondents to read one of the 
two versions of the contribution statutes.  One version is the original statute and the 
second version is the same statute rewritten in plain language.  The author rewrote the 
original statute into plain language using the plain language protocols.  The 
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rewritten/plain language version was submitted to a plain language listserve by Dr. 
Deborah Bosley, at the time of this writing, a retired member of the English Department 
of UNC-Charlotte.  She is a plain language expert.  Comments on the rewritten version 
were solicited from the Listserve and incorporated into the plain language version of the 
statute.  
After reading the statutes, the study respondents answered a questionnaire 
pertaining to knowledge and understanding of Campaign Finance statutes in NC.  If 
rewriting North Carolina’s general statutes on Campaign Contributions in Plain Language 
increases the comprehension level of the reader this should be an indicator that the 
statutes themselves may be complex and a potential deterrent to the goals of Campaign 
Finance Reform legislation.  This study analyzes the research question of whether 
rewriting NC’s general statute on Campaign Contributions in Plain Language will 
increase the comprehension level of the reader. 
H1:  The statute rewritten in Plain Language should increase level of 
comprehension for the reader. 
An experimental design tests this research question.  The experiment consisted of 
a questionnaire (see Appendix A) given to respondents after reading the statutes.  The 
questions pertained to knowledge and understanding of Campaign Finance statutes in 
NC.  The test should ascertain the level of understanding of the statutes after exposure.  
While a pre/post-test design was considered in order to test the level of comprehension 
before and after the reading; a post-test only design is most useful in this case because 
using a pre-test/post-test design may create a situation where the respondent ‘learns’ by 
reading questions prior to reading the selection.  If they read the questions, the 
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respondents may get clues as to what information is most important prior to reading the 
selection.  Further, little benefit is gained by giving a pre-test.  The questionnaire was not 
a test and to replicate conditions in reality, respondents could look back at the material as 
many times as needed.  This is one of the independent variables measuring how 
respondents reacted to the material.  Having a treatment and a control group allowed 
analysis of the different comprehension levels rather than evaluating ‘learning’. Using 
random assignment of subjects assigns those who may have some exposure to the law 
evenly between the treatment and control groups.  This establishes internal validity for 
the idea that the simpler statutes lead to higher comprehension levels even if the level of 
respondent comprehension before the test is unknown.  This study uses a post-test only 
design to avoid the learning problem.   
Respondents were given one of two versions of the statutes (see Appendix B).  
The first version is the statute in its original form and the second is the statute rewritten in 
plain language.  Subjects were randomly assigned one of the statute versions to create 
control and treatment groups.  Once the respondents read one of the statutes, they 
answered the same statute questionnaire.  The comprehension questions are specific to 
the statute on Contribution Limits.  The usability questions were described above.  The 
contribution information queried is not general knowledge information, but is 
information typically only known either by candidates or campaign staff.  
A pilot survey was given to a section of the Introduction to American 
Government courses in the Spring 2011.  This test was expected to ascertain any 
technical or logistical problems with the survey and to determine the general response 
level in the classroom.  A technical problem was found with the collection of the 
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materials after the students had taken the survey.  The original statute was printed on 
white paper and the plain language statute was printed on yellow paper in order to ensure 
that the surveys and responses were collected correctly.  Taking this precaution helped 
some but not enough and there was potential for a mix-up especially doing this with a 
larger sample size.  In the fall 2011 survey, an item was added in order to differentiate 
between the original and plain language versions to ensure that the correct survey was 
being tabulated.  The pilot study indicated no other changes in the design. 
A convenience sample of university undergraduates was chosen for the Fall 2011 
survey.  Studying actual candidates might add to the external validity of the study, but the 
point of the study is to test those everyday citizens who may run for office.  If we 
sampled state legislators for example, they would have already successfully completed at 
least one campaign and we assume would have ‘learned’ at least some part of the 
campaign finance statutes.  A sample of individuals without previous campaign 
experience to ensure objectivity to the material is ideal.  University undergraduates would 
not be expected to know this information.  Even undergraduates who may have worked 
on campaigns would not be expected to have previous access to this information, since 
we assume that students work on campaigns is generally limited to phone banking and 
GOTV efforts.  Any students working on campaigns would have little access to technical 
campaign information
17
.  The respondents chosen for the experiment were undergraduate 
students in the introductory political science, criminal justice, or economics courses at 
UNC-Charlotte in the Fall 2011 semester.  To ensure internal validity, even though 
                                                             
17 The random assignment of students to treatment and control groups also ensures that in the unlikely 
case students have been exposed to the law, they are equally likely to be in the treatment and control 
groups. 
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students were randomly assigned, control questions were included such as items related 
to campaign experience or knowledge.  The total enrollment in the surveyed classes was 
1600 which given our responses of 679
18
 gives a response rate of 42%.  However, it is 
clear that not every student was in attendance on the survey date so if we estimate that 
80% of the 1600 students were in class on the survey dates, this would give us a sample 
size of 1280 and a response rate of 53%.   
Collection of data for the testing of the hypothesis came from the survey 
instrument using examination scantrons normally utilized on exams in these introductory 
classes.  Because students in introductory classes should be familiar with the scantrons, 
this should alleviate any testing confusion for the survey. The comprehension grade 
variable ranged from 0-100 and is based on the answers to the survey questions found in 
Appendix A (see Question 1-8).  The scantrons were run through the university’s optical 
scanner, which is a proven technique for accurate grading.  Using the optical scanner 
should reduce human error in tabulating the grades.  The comprehension grade scores are 
the dependent variable and are interval in nature because they are percentages of those 
questions correctly answered.  There were twenty-three questions on the questionnaire 
but only eight of them were comprehension questions.  The rest were control variable 
questions.  
The main independent variable– the statutes – is expected to explain the 
differences in the comprehension grade scores.  The statute variable is dichotomous with 
the original statute coded as 0, and the plain language statute coded as 1.  Other 
                                                             
18 Out of 679 responses we had 47 responses with missing data.  Of these 47, 6 cases involved students 
who failed to answer the last page of the survey (questions 17-23).  After analysis these cases all appear 
random.  The other missing cases occurred when students failed to identify which statute they had read.  
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independent variables in the model are designed to take into account how well the 
students read the statutes.  These variables include a self-report of how closely the 
respondents read the statute, whether or not the respondents thought the statute was clear 
when they read it, and how many times they had to refer back to the statute to answer the 
questions (see Appendix A for the wording of these questions).  Knowing how familiar 
the respondents were with campaign finance law was important for the study, so the 
analysis controls for factors that measure familiarity as well.  These variables examine if 
the students have ever considered running for office, worked on a campaign, if anyone in 
their family had ever run for office, or if anyone in their family was a lawyer.  Control 
variables were included for gender, race, ethnicity, age, class standing (freshmen, 
sophomore, junior, senior), married, and level of family education.   
Because of the percentage nature of the dependent variable Generalized Linear 
Model (GLM) regression was used to test the hypothesis.  The student’s percentages are 
bounded by 0 and 100 and thus GLM is the most appropriate regression tool.   
The expected results of this experiment and regression are that there will be a 
statistically significant relationship between the student’s comprehension scores and 
which version of the statute read.  If a statistically significant relationship is found, it 
should show that the less complex statutes are easier to understand and comprehend than 
the more complex statutes.  If this relationship is not found, it could be because some 
other explanatory variable has been left out or that the hypothesis is incorrect.   
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5.3 Results 
In the experiment, 338 students read the original statute and 294 read the plain 
language version.  There were 47 cases with missing data that were excluded from the 
analysis. 
In Figure 5.1, we see that for the different versions of the statute it is clear that 
when students read the plain language statute more students reported reading it very 
closely than those who read the original statute.  More students reported reading the 
original statute somewhat or not very closely (302) combined than those in the same 
categories who read the plain language statute (251).  Looking at the categories where 
students reported not reading the statute or reported not reading it closely the differences 
in the original statute (140) and plain language statute (90) are more evident.  From the 
descriptive statistics here, it is clear that when students were presented with the original 
statute they chose not to read it at all or not very closely when compared to the plain 
language statute. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: How closely do you feel you read the reading? 
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For the variable in which students reported how clear they thought the reading 
was, similar results to the closely read variable are found.  Students who read the Plain 
Language version of the statute reported more Very Clear responses (71) than those 
students who read the original statute (47).  Those who read the original statute reported 
more Somewhat Unclear and Very Unclear responses (111) than those reading the Plain 
Language statute (62).  These descriptive again indicate that those students reading the 
Plain Language statute reported more clarity than those students who read the original 
version. 
 
    
Figure 5.2: How clear did you think the readings were? 
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read the plain language statute less closely.  This relationship is statistically significant at 
the .05 level.  This indicates that students had to read the statute more closely in order to 
score higher on the survey.  The crux of this dissertation is that candidates would have to 
spend more time learning the campaign finance legislation if it is complex and thus might 
be deterred from running for office.  This current analysis seems to indicate that students 
took extra time to be able to do better.  Students had read the statute more closely which 
translates into more time spent reading the statute in order to score better.  This 
significance allows us to reject the null hypothesis with 95% confidence that students had 
to read the statute more closely to score better.   
As a control for perceived clarity, students were asked to rate the statute for 
clarity (from “very unclear” to “very clear”).  As the rating increased, students had a 14% 
change in the log odds on average.  This relationship makes intuitive sense but is not 
statistically significant.  It is also an indicator of the effort required to comprehend the 
statute.  As the statute was rated with higher clarity, students did better on the questions.  
From the previous Figure 5.2, students rated the plain language statute as more clear than 
the original statute.   
Another relationship that is interesting is the number of times a student reported 
referring back to the reading.  Students reading either statute reported referring back to 
the statute similarly in the first two categories (less than 1 and 1-3 times).  As the number 
of times students referred back to the reading increased to greater than six, the initial 
reporting shifts dramatically.  When reporting from the last three categories is summed 
(4-6, 7-9, >9 times) 53 students who read the plain language statute reported needing to 
refer back to the statute compared to 91 of those who read the original statute.  Based on 
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the GLM model results in Table 5.1, as students reported referencing the statute more 
often they had a 16% change in the log odds on the questionnaire on average.  In order to 
score higher, students had to refer back to the statute more often.  Students had to make 
the effort to go back and check the statute to ensure they got the answer correct.  While 
this relationship is not statistically significant at the .05 level
19
, it indicates effort on the 
part of the respondents to ensure they understood the statute.  Going back to reread the 
statute indicates that it was unclear or hard to comprehend the first time the students read 
it.   
 
 
Figure 5.3: While answering this questionnaire, about how many times did you refer back 
to the reading? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
19 Although not technically statistically significant, the z-score of .059 indicates it almost is.   
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Table 5.1: Campaign finance statutes and plain language    
 
 
Students were asked other control questions such as had they ever worked on a 
campaign (yes =1, no =2) and had anyone in their family ever run for office (yes=1, 
no=2).  For both of these questions the relationship indicates that when they had not 
worked on a campaign nor considered running they scored worse on the questionnaire.  
Experience was clearly not a factor in this analysis.  Students who had no experience did 
worse on the questionnaire as was expected, but by a not statistically significant amount.   
Students were also asked if they ever considered running for office (yes=1, no=2).  
This analysis indicates that when students reported that they had not considered running, 
they did 16% worse on the questions than if they had considered running.  This brings up 
an interesting issue as to whether or not the consideration of running for office was 
Student Grade Coefficient
OIM 
Stand.Error Stat.Sign
Orignal  (0)  or Pla in Language (1) Reading 0.036 0.070 0.609
How closely did you read the s tatute? 0.287 0.135 0.033*
How clear did you feel  the s tatute was? 0.141 0.098 0.15
Ever cons idered run -0.166 0.213 0.435
Ever worked on campaign -0.051 0.303 0.866
Anyone in fami ly ever run for office? -0.068 0.346 0.844
Anyone in fami ly a  lawyer? 0.058 0.281 0.837
How many times  referred to reading? 0.159 0.084 0.059
Age -0.043 0.111 0.696
Class  Standing -0.033 0.093 0.722
Gender 0.093 0.171 0.587
Hispanic -0.171 0.176 0.329
Race/Ethnici ty -0.057 0.075 0.448
Married -0.100 0.189 0.597
Highest level  of education in your fami ly? 0.039 0.091 0.669
n=584
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affected by which statute the students read.  This analysis will be done at a later time as it 
is beyond the scope of this current dissertation.   
 
    
Figure 5.4: Distribution of student scores for both plain language and original statute 
reading. 
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control variables measuring statute clarity, referrals back to the reading and how closely 
the respondents read the statute, are substantively important as an indicator of how 
challenging it is to run for office, especially for novices.  However, this study also makes 
an important contribution because it is the first one that this author is aware of that 
compares the comprehendability of plain language to legal text in a real law.  While plain 
language scholars have long contended that plain language is easier to read, this is one of 
the first studies to test the contention on an issue of such importance as elections.  The 
most important issue here is that the wording of the statutes could pose complications and 
problems for individuals running for office, especially for the first time.   
Campaign finance statutes are an important regulator of elections in the United 
States and campaign finance reform efforts have targeted increasing participation as one 
of its main goals.  Therefore, if the statutes are difficult to comprehend, this may limit the 
ability of everyday citizens to participate in the electoral system.  If a candidate cannot 
comprehend the statutes that govern his ability to run for office, he may decide not to run 
at all or may have difficulty with compliance.  In order to look at this question this study 
rewrote campaign contribution statutes using plain language.  Based on the above results, 
it is clear that when the students read the original contribution limits statute they scored 
worse on the comprehension questionnaire than when they read the plain language 
version.  This experiment shows that plain language statutes may be easier for the 
average citizen to understand.   
The implications of this study are clear.  If it is more difficult for the average 
citizen to understand the campaign finance contribution statutes as they are written today, 
the statutes themselves may be a deterrent to average citizens running for office.  Further 
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research on this topic should explore how this complexity may increase the costs of 
running for election.  For example, a citizen may need to hire an attorney, accountant, 
and other professionals in order to comply with the law.  This additional cost is an added 
burden of running and campaigning that average citizens may find too difficult to pay.  If 
this is the case, one of the original goals of campaign finance reform – the increased 
participation of more people in the system - is in jeopardy.   
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6.  METHODS 
This dissertation tests the theory that the complexity of campaign finance 
regulations may be a deterrent to citizens running for office.  Campaign finance law may 
have the effect of adding transaction costs and constraints via complexity to the 
institution of campaign finance.  This constraining effect may drive an increase in the 
costs of running for office.  The increase in cost refers to the increase in time, effort, and 
learning required running for office.  The increase in costs may dissuade candidates from 
running.  This paper tests part of this theory as it applies to candidate decisions.  
Campaign finance laws increase the regulation of campaigns for good reason.  The law 
intends to minimize corruption and mitigate the influence of big donors.  The expected 
outcome of the reforms is increased confidence and hence participation in the electoral 
process.  Participation is essential for the health of the democratic process.  This chapter 
details the methods for testing the opposite effect that candidates might be deterred from 
running or might withdraw from a race due to the complexity of the legislation.   
6.1 Research Question 
Legislative complexity may influence how candidates make decisions.  The 
research question for this dissertation studies whether or not the complexity of campaign 
finance legislation impacts candidate’s decisions to run for office.  If this is the case, 
fewer candidates should run for office in states that have more complex campaign finance 
laws, and more candidates should withdraw from running in those same states.  To 
determine if there is any effect on candidate’s decisions, this paper analyzes two 
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dependent variables created from candidate data.  These two variables are the Candidate 
Participation Rate (CPR) and the Candidate Withdrawal Rate (CWR).  It is important to 
understand the effects of campaign finance legislation on potential candidates.  So in 
addition to the quantitative analysis, a qualitative study of candidates is also 
implemented.   
6.2 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is the subject about which we can generalize.  Units of 
analysis may be different from the units of observation (Lewis-Beck, 2004).  In this 
study, although we observe candidates individually we cannot generalize about their 
individual behavior.  Thus, the unit of analysis is candidate/state/year because this study 
will allow inferences about candidates in each state for a given year based on those 
candidates exposure to contribution limits in that state .  Inferences cannot be made 
regarding individual candidate’s decisions because the data are not on the individual 
level. 
6.3 Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses test the theory that complex campaign finance law may 
exist in some states and this complexity is leading to fewer candidates running for office 
in those states. 
H1: In states where the legislation is more complex, the Candidate Participation Rate 
(CPR) will be lower than in states with less complex statutes.  
 
H2: In states where legislation is more complex, the Candidate Withdrawal Rate (CWR) 
will be higher than in states with less complex statutes.  
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6.4 Dependent Variables: Candidate Participation Rate (CPR) and Candidate 
Withdrawal Rate (CWR) 
 
As noted in previous chapters of this current work, it is difficult to determine what 
factors contribute to candidate’s decisions to run for office.  A number of studies have 
looked at a wide variety of factors and yet there does not seem to be any agreement on 
exactly what factors affect candidates consistently.  This dissertation looks at state 
legislative elections.  This dissertation takes the approach that institutions and rules may 
affect behavior of candidates.   
There are two dependent variables in this dissertation.  The data for these 
dependent variables come from the National Institute on Money in State Politics 
(www.followthemoney.org).  The data stretches from 1996 through 2012.  Using these 
data across sixteen years allows us to look at the effect of the law on the rates of 
candidates over time.  The Institute serves as a repository for state level electoral data 
collected from the states.  During the data collection for the number of candidates for 
each state candidate withdrawals were also found and collected.  From this data, the two 
dependent variables are created.  As noted in a previous chapter, state legislative 
elections are used in this analysis because there are more of them, allowing measurement 
of the effect of campaign finance laws over a wider swath of the election process.  Data 
from both House and Senate elections were collected and then aggregated to form both 
the Candidate Participation Rate and the Candidate Withdrawal Rate.   
The first dependent variable is the Candidate Participation Rate (CPR).  This data 
in its original form was count data i.e. the total number (count) of candidates running in 
each state legislative election per year.  Using these data as a count is not intuitive, so the 
data is transformed into percentages.  Two percentages are created from the total 
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candidate count data.  The first variable is the total candidates as a percent of the total 
number of seats up for election in the current state/year.  The candidate count data is the 
total just prior to the primary election.  The National Institute on Money in State Politics 
collects candidate data from campaign finance reports filed through the states.  These 
reports are updated throughout an election cycle.  The last year of this study is 2012 
ensuring that any reporting would be complete.  The data was collected for both the 
primary and general elections.  However, the goal for this analysis is to study the effects 
of the law as candidates begin their election process.  To do this, primary candidacies are 
used.  The total of candidates who file to run as a percentage of the total seats up for 
election creates a percentage that would be higher than 100%.  For example, in the 
Florida state legislative races for 2000 there were 386 total candidates and 141 total seats.  
This gives a percentage of 2.73 that when divided by 100 produces the CPR of .027.   
This percentage allows us to see the CPR based on the number of seats that were 
actually up for grabs in the election that is a more intuitive measure of running for office.  
The second variable is the CPR for the number of permanent seats in the chamber in that 
state/year.  The permanent seats in the chamber is the number of seats legislated to exist 
by chamber.  The number of permanent seats in the chamber gives a more stable analysis 
over time because the number of permanent seats does not change from year to year, 
whereas the number of seats up for election does at least for house seats.  However, the 
CPR for the number of seats up for election may be more intuitive because it seems more 
likely the measure candidates would look at when deciding whether or not to run for 
office.  These two variables allow comparison of any effective differences between the 
seats that are actually available for election, and the number of permanent seats in the 
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chamber.  The figures below show the two variables before and after transformation into 
percentages.   
 
  
Figure 6.1:  Histograms of the dependent variable Candidate Participation Rate (CPR) 
before transformation 
 
   
Figure 6.2: Histograms of transformed CPR as percentage of total seats up for election 
and percent of permanent chamber seats 
 
 
A second dependent variable is the Candidate Withdrawal Rate (CWR) for each 
state legislative election from 2006-2012.  This rate measures candidates who filed for 
office and then at some point prior to the primary withdrew.  The data were collected 
from the National Institute on Money in State Politics under the candidates section for 
each state/year.  The website gives the aggregate information on candidates’ status 
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(Follow The Money).  The CWR should indicate an interest, willingness, and ambition to 
run for office because the candidate actually signed up, paid the registration fee, and was 
a viable candidate.  The candidate for some reason then withdrew from the race.  There is 
no data on why a candidate would withdraw from the race.  We only know that the 
candidates did withdraw
20
.  In considering withdrawals, the logic here is that the 
candidates may withdraw because they found the process too cumbersome to run.  The 
CWR is also a percent of candidates and creates three new variables: the percent of 
withdrawals out of total candidates, the percent of withdrawals of total seats up for 
election and the percent of withdrawals of permanent chamber seats.   
 
 
Figure 6.3: The dependent variable Candidate Withdrawal Rate (CWR) 
  
 
                                                             
20 At the author’s request, North Carolina’s Board of Elections searched for the hard copies of the 
withdrawals to see if some reason for the withdrawals could be gleaned.  Unfortunately, North Carolina 
does not keep any data on the withdrawals.   
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Figure 6.4: Withdrawals as percentages of total candidates, total seats up for election, and 
permanent chamber seats 
 
6.5 Qualitative Component of Dependent Variable 
In order to build the theory on candidate decisions and to investigate other 
possible factors affecting candidate’s decisions to run or not to run for office, 
investigative interviews were compiled.  The interviews questioned individuals from 
various states regarding their motivations to run for political office.  Including qualitative 
interviews adds to the internal validity of this study by substantively asking individuals 
who may be considering running for office or have run for office about their experiences 
(Kirk & Miller, 1986).  This approach allows the investigator to understand if potential 
candidates have ever considered the logistics or costs of running for office.  It is 
important to understand if the theory applies in real life.  Have potential candidates ever 
been deterred from running due to the complexity of the campaign finance system?  Have 
potential candidates ever considered this?  Knowing if they have or have not adds depth 
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to this study by allowing the researcher to realistically understand the situation facing 
potential candidates.  It also allows researchers to determine if all controls have been 
included into the model.  
Individuals were contacted from states with different types of legislatures such as 
professional, citizen or hybrid legislatures.  The methodology for contacting individuals 
is via email to set up a telephone interview.  Individuals were found to do the survey by 
initiating contact with various political actors via Facebook or emails.  The purposive 
sample will include potential and actual candidates from states with both complex and 
not-complex campaign finance statutes.  States must also have a variety of legislature 
types i.e. professional, citizen, or hybrid. The sampling method involves contacting 
potential candidates in these states and asking them qualitative questions on why they 
chose to or chose not to run for office.  They were also asked about their political 
background and upbringing, the logistics of running for office and any factors that 
influenced their decision to run either negatively or positively.  The interviews were free 
flowing and to allow the individuals to bring up any issues or concerns regarding running 
for office.  The point of the interviews being mainly to assess whether individuals had 
ever considered the legislation or regulations in their contemplation of running for office.  
6.6 Independent Variable: Complexity of Campaign Finance Reform Statutes  
The literature on campaign finance reform efforts examines campaign factors to 
see how the reform affects elections, competition in elections, and war chests, and 
contributions.  However, one variable has not been adequately addressed by the literature 
so far.  That variable revolves around how campaign finance legislation affects a 
candidate’s decision to run for office.  There are generally two schools of thought on 
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campaign finance related to contribution limits (Hogan, 2004), although both involve low 
contribution limits.  On one hand, low contribution limits might make it easy for the 
incumbent to raise money since they have experience doing so and harder for the 
challenger to compete.  The other says low contribution limits puts both challengers and 
incumbents on an equal playing field and makes it more likely that challengers will 
emerge.  Hogan (2004) finds for the second effect that if campaign finance laws are 
strong, it should be an incentive for challengers to run because the incumbent is 
hampered or prevented from gaining the upper hand, by the laws.  However, Hogan’s 
study is done with twenty-five states over four years and three election cycles.  It also 
looks at how likely it is for a challenger to run against an incumbent using a dichotomous 
variable for the primary and general elections.  Hogan’s independent variable is an 
additive index from 1-5 indicating the number of restrictions on contributions.  For 
example, if a state restricts only labor unions from contributing, then that state has a score 
of one on the scale.  This dissertation takes a different and much wider approach to the 
question of how campaign finance laws affect candidate decisions.  First, this dissertation 
looks at all 50 states over 16 years and measures the institutional factor of complexity in 
the law.  It is not just the restrictions on who may contribute to one’s campaign that may 
constrain an individual’s choice to run for office.  It may also be the transaction costs 
inherent in understanding the policy.  By measuring the overall complexity of the law, 
this dissertation incorporates many factors such as transaction costs, contribution limits, 
and candidacy requirements to measure the full effect of what a candidate faces when 
making the decision to run for office.  
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The electoral costs of complying with the laws stems first from an understanding 
of the law.  This dissertation will not directly calculate the cost of running for a state 
legislative office but rather look at the transaction cost inherent in the complexity of the 
law.  In states where campaign laws are more complex, we should see a lower CPR.  The 
inherent time cost involved in understanding and complying with the law is reflected in 
complexity.  If individuals have difficulty understanding the legislation because it is 
complex, this may lead to a situation in which fewer candidates run for office.  
Understanding if the complexity of the law had an effect on candidates decisions to run 
for office is imperative.   It allows us to measure each state’s statutes in a consistent 
manner.   
Campaign finance reform must be examined where candidates make their 
decisions.  Campaign finance reform has become so complex that ordinary citizens 
wanting to participate may not do so because they do not understand all the regulations.  
If they want to join in the system, they must incur the cost involved with hiring 
professionals to help them run their campaign according to the regulations.  This extra 
cost can be a deterrent to non-wealthy citizens wanting to run for office.  Complexity 
could lead to fewer candidates running for office and those candidates that do run being 
the incumbents who have the resources and knowledge with which to navigate the 
campaign finance regulations.  This issue has not yet been studied, but it is vital that this 
research is done.  If citizens cannot understand the laws meant to regulate this situation 
the democratization goals of campaign finance reform are in peril.  This research seeks to 
explore this question more fully by looking at campaign finance reform efforts in the 
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states to first determine if they are complex and then to see if that complexity is a 
deterrent to the CPR.   
Campaign finance reform in this paper will refer to at any state legislation that 
pertains to pre-bank candidate contributions.  Any regulation that affects a candidate 
prior to them depositing the contribution in the bank is considered in this study.  Other 
post-bank legislation concerning treasurer qualifications, committee organization, 
reporting requirements, and disposal of leftover funds are not considered.  Considering 
only the pre-bank regulations measures a candidate’s situation just as they are deciding to 
become a candidate or not.  Once they move to organization, and reporting, the candidate 
has already made a more firm decision to run for office.  By measuring only pre-bank 
regulations this study captures the first type of information a candidate would need to 
know (Maisel & Stone, 1997).  It is the first hurdle the candidate needs to clear.  Author 
evaluation of campaign finance regulations in all 50 states indicates that pre-bank 
legislation is also found in almost every state except those which have no limitations on 
donations.  Because some states have no limitations on contributions this presents a 
validity issue.   If only states with contribution limits are studied, bias is introduced 
where only states with some potential complexity are studied.  This would exclude states 
that have no complexity or no contribution limits.  Including only those states with 
contribution limits would measure only those states with some complexity.  To 
circumvent the problem in which some states have no contribution limits, contribution 
definitions were also collected from each state.  These definitions should be written in the 
same form and style as the contribution statutes and therefore can serve as a validity 
check for the study.  The contribution statutes and campaign finance definitions as 
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measured by the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level and word counts are included in graphs at 
the end of this chapter.   
The pre-bank contribution limits are the current limits set by these state 
legislatures.  In most states, this legislation does not change very often allowing testing of 
the effects over several years.  The static nature of the legislation is ensured by 
comparing across databases.  The contribution statutes were collected using each states’ 
statute repository.  Each state differently stores their statutes so a comprehensive search 
was done to gather all the contribution legislation for each state.  This first wave of data 
collection included everything pre and post-bank related to contributions.   In order to 
ensure that the same information was collected from each state, a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet was created to record each statute section for each part of the contribution 
statutes.  For example, the chapter and section was recorded for each state pertaining to 
contribution limits, loans, anonymous contributions, corporate and labor union 
contributions, treasurers, reporting and disclosure requirements, and definitions.  Only 
those sections corresponding with the pre-bank contributions were used in this analysis.  
As noted above only the pre-bank contribution data (hereafter ‘contribution legislation’) 
is collected because this is the main part of the law that will touch all candidates when 
deciding to run for office.  The contribution data from each states’ statutes is compared to 
summary files from the National Conference on State Legislatures (NCSL), containing all 
the contribution statutes and numbers for the past nine years.  The statutes are compared 
to the NCSL database to ensure that no major changes to the legislation occurred during 
the 1996-2012 period.  No major changes in legislation were found.   
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This study will also look at legislation pertaining to requirements for candidacy 
such as age, residency, filing procedures, and filing to run for office.  Looking at this 
legislation gives a well-rounded vision of what a candidate faces when deciding to run for 
office including all the requirements, filing paperwork, fees, and obligations.   Advisory 
opinions or rules or rulings by ethics boards are not part of the complexity measure of the 
legislation.  These should be considered in future research if states issue them.  They are 
omitted here for convenience but also because some states may be like North Carolina, 
which does not issue advisory opinions or rules but rather work closely with legislators to 
write the laws obviating the need for advisory opinions (Strach, 2012).   
The contribution definitions collected were those definitions pertinent to the 
campaign finance sections in each states’ statutes.  For example, states have definitions of 
polling places, ballots etc. which are not pertinent to candidate decisions.  Most states 
have separate definition sections just pertaining to campaign finance.  These definitions 
include terms such as candidate, contribution, and loans which are pertinent definitions a 
candidate would need to understand before running for office.  These definitions are also 
included in this study because some states do not have contribution requirements as noted 
above.  Because this presents a validity issue where only those states with contribution 
statutes – and hence some complexity – would be studied.   
This paper uses contribution statutes, candidacy requirements, and contribution 
definitions from all 50 states to test for complexity.  Using the contribution statutes from 
all 50 states allows for variability of the data.  Using the statute from only one state 
would not allow for any variability because most statutes do not vary much over time.  
Using all 50 states’ statutes allows study of the effects of the legislation on candidate 
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decisions in a variety of settings.  Each state has different treatments of candidates and 
various types of legislation.  Data were collected from 1996-2012 because these were the 
available years and collecting from these years ensures we have at minimum seven 
election cycles over the 16 years.  
Each state’s contribution, definitions, and candidacy requirement statutes were 
run through a plain language online utility to measure complexity.  Complexity is 
measured based on language components.   These components include the Flesch-
Kincaid Grade Reading level that gives us a measure of what US grade level should be 
able to comprehend the legislation (Online-Utility.org).  The utility also gives a Flesch 
Reading Ease score, word count, and syllable-per-word count.  The readability measures 
are all continuous variables; the other variables are count variables.  The process for 
measuring complexity involves copying and pasting the contribution legislation, 
definitions and candidacy requirements into the online utility.  The online utility 
calculates all the complexity or plain language factors.   
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Figure 6.5: Campaign finance contribution statutes measured by Flesch-Kincaid Grade  
Level and number of words. 
 
 
The online utility gives thirteen complexity or plain language factors such as 
those described above.  This presents a possible issue of multicollinearity where each 
variable is measuring the same underlying factor.  To determine if this is the case or not, 
factor analysis of the plain language variables was included in this study.  Factor analysis 
is appropriate here because this study tests the assumption that there is an underlying 
concept of complexity inherent in the language of the campaign finance statutes.   After 
running the factor analysis it was clear that the thirteen plain language indices were 
measuring the same underlying concept.   The factor analysis retained three factors with 
an eigenvalue >0.  These three factors have highly loaded factor scores indicating that 
they are measuring the same thing that the variables are measuring (Fabrigar & Wegener, 
2012; Stata Corp, 2011).   
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As a robustness check a regression and Variance Inflation Factor were run.  This 
indicated a very high level of multicollinearity between the plain language measures.  To 
ensure that this multicollinearity does not provide unreliable estimates, this study 
includes only two of the plain language measures.  These two measures are the Flesch-
Kincaid reading index which measures US grade level needed to understand the 
legislation, and the word count.  Both of these indices are used in plain language studies 
and studies of constraining legislation.  They were chosen for the study because of their 
broad theoretical impact in previous studies.   
6.7 Control Variables 
Control variables include political as well as economic variables.  The political 
control variables include a dummy variable for chamber type.  The chamber type dummy 
is included in the model to restructure the data for only one year per state.   The chamber 
dummy is coded so that House =1 and Senate =0.  This variable allows analysis of the 
effects of complexity on the CPR and CWR are different for the House and Senate 
chambers.   
Other factors might affect candidate’s decisions to run for office including such 
political factors as the professionalism of the legislature.  The professionalism measures 
are legislator salary and the number of staffers.  Professionalism of the legislature is 
thought to be a fairly strong determinant of whether or not an individual decides to seek 
office (Hogan, 2004).  Salary data were collected from the NCSL website for each year.  
The salary data is the base salary data not including per diems, or voucher and 
unvouchered expenses.    
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Number of staffers data were also collected from the NCSL data.  The staffer data 
only contained the number of staffers for three of the years (1996, 2003, and 2009) in the 
model.  Because staff data is not available for each year of the study, the number of 
staffers were interpolated and extrapolated
21
 for each of the missing study years.   
Institutional or strategic factors also play a role in candidate’s decisions to run.  
Strategic factors are those factors, on the basis of which, a candidate may make a 
decision regarding running for office.  The rationale here is that candidates are strategic 
and make rational decisions (Levine & Hyde, 1977) (Black, 1972) based on whether or 
not there is a chance for them to win an election.  Maisel and Stone (1997) found that 
when an incumbent held a seat, a challenger was more likely to account for this in their 
decision to run for office.  Hogan (2004) found the similar results.  Kazee found that just 
the perception of incumbent strength was enough to deter challengers from seeking office 
(1983).  There are many strategic and institutional reasons why a candidate might decide 
to run for office.  Incumbent data
22
 were collected from the National Institute on Money 
in State Politics (Follow The Money) for all 50 states from 1996-2012.   
6.8 Economic Control Variables 
Control variables used include measures for contextual, political, strategic and 
institutional factors.  The contextual variables for this study include economic variables 
such as the Gross State Product from 1996-2012, per capita personal income by state 
(PCPI) and unemployment rate for the same years.  These three variables should give an 
                                                             
21
 Data were interpolated for the years 1997-2002 and 2004- 2008.  Data were extrapolated for 2010-
2012 
22 Originally data on challengers, incumbents and open seats were included in the analysis.  However, 
challengers would be included in the total number of candidates and so was not used as a separate 
variable.  Open seats would also be included in the creation of the CPR and CWR based on seats in the 
legislatures for each states.  This variable also was eliminated from the analysis.  
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indication of how each state’s economy and citizens fared economically during this time 
period.  The variables are on the state level because the candidate withdrawals are also 
aggregated on the state level.  It is possible that individuals sometimes make choices to 
run for office based on their economic situation.  Economic factors are rarely used in 
candidate decisions studies but were recommended by Maisel and Stone (Maisel & 
Stone, 1997).  The GSP and PCPI variables were both collected from the US Department 
of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis databases.  The BEA data uses data 
measured from the NAICS from 1997 onward.  The unemployment data is from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics for each of the study years.   
6.9 Methods 
This study uses percentages of candidates and candidate withdrawals to create 
rates with which to measure participation in elections.  The CPR is the participation rate 
in elections.  It is a percentage of the number of candidates per total seats up for election 
and permanent chamber seats.  The CWR is the number of withdrawals as a percentage of 
the total number of candidates, as a percentage of the total number of seats up for election 
and as a percentage of the permanent seats in the chamber.  Because theoretically these 
percentages could be unbounded on the upper level, a Tobit regression model is used.  
Although it is unlikely that there would be an infinite number of candidates running for a 
seat, there is no true limit to that number.  Since it could be greater than 100% using the 
Tobit model allows for an uncensored regression model (Long, 1997) which ensures that 
the data is not censored on the upper level.   
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6.10 Fixed Effects 
This model includes data from 1996-2012. This indicates the possibility of serial 
autocorrelation.  If this were the case, finding errors in one time-period correlated with 
errors in another time-period would be expected.  To correct for this a fixed effects model 
for time is appropriate.  It is not appropriate to use a fixed effects model for the state in 
this analysis because the main independent variable for complexity was only measured 
one time for each state.  This model includes a variable to lag the year to control for serial 
autocorrelation.  As a robustness check the analysis was run twice using clustered 
standard errors for both the state and the year.  While the regression results were similar, 
the standard errors when clustered for the state were higher.  Therefore, the clustered 
standard errors for the year were used for the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7.  ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The models presented here measure the hypotheses that as the complexity of 
legislation increases, the percentage of candidates will decrease and the percentage of 
withdrawals will increase.  This model is measured using Tobit Model for limited 
dependent variables.  This is the appropriate statistical method to use for percentage or 
proportional dependent variables which may be uncensored on the upper level (Long, 
1997).  The analysis is divided into two parts.  In the first model, the percentage of 
candidates or the CPR is tested with both candidates as a percentage of the total seats up 
for election and the permanent chamber seats.  Each percentage is regressed by the two 
plain language measures - the Flesch-Kincaid grade level and the word count measure.  
In Model 2, the percentage of withdrawals or the Candidate Withdrawal Rate (CWR) is 
regressed using the same methods except adding in the number of withdrawals as a 
percentage of total candidates.  Each model analyzes three different types of legislation: 
the campaign finance contribution statutes, the campaign finance definition statutes, and 
the candidacy requirement statutes.  
7.1 Model 1:  Complexity and the Candidate Participation Rate 
The Candidate Participation Rate (CPR) is a percentage of the total number of 
candidates running in a race.  Because it is important to analyze this correctly, the total 
number of candidates variable was transformed into two percentages.  The first is the 
total number of candidates divided by the total number of seats up for election.  This 
percentage measures the percentage of candidates as it increases or decreases depending 
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on the number of seats that are up for election.  The second percentage is the total number 
of candidates running divided by the permanent seats in the chamber.  Because the total 
number of candidates is almost always going to be bigger than the total number of seats 
or the permanent seats in the chamber this measure did not work as a simple proportion.  
The CPR is transformed into a percentage as described in Chapter 6.   
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Table 7.1: Plain language complexity effects on Candidate Participation Rate (CPR)
23
 
 
 
Total number of candidates (CPR) was hypothesized to decrease in states with 
more complex legislation.  When the contribution statutes were more complex across the 
50 states, there was a modest decrease on average regardless of whether the contribution 
statutes were measured by word count or by the Flesch-Kincaid grade level.  As the 
                                                             
23 In Chapter 7 tables the yellow highlighted variables indicate statistically significant relationships in the 
hypothesized direction, grey in the opposite direction. 
Total Seats 
up for Grabs Robust 
St. Err.
Permanent 
Chamber 
Seats
Robust 
St. Err.
Contribution Limits
Word Count per 1000 words -0.0002 0.000 -0.0003 0.000
Flesch-Kincaid -0.0002 * 0.000 -0.0002 ** 0.000
Definitions
Word Count per 1000 words 0.0002 * 0.000 -0.0003 ** 0.000
Flesch-Kincaid -0.0001 ** 0.000 -0.0002 ** 0.000
Candidacy Requirements
Word Count per 1000 words 0.0001 0.000 0.0004 0.000
Flesch-Kincaid 0.0002 ** 0.000 0.0002 ** 0.000
Gross State Product (in 100 thous.) 0.0001 0.001 -0.0024 0.002
Unemployment 0.0009 * 0.000 0.0011 ** 0.000
Per Capita Personal Income 
(in10,000s) -0.0002 0.005 0.0017 ** 0.006
Number of Staffers 0.0000 0.000 -0.0001 0.001
Legislator Salary 0.0000 ** 0.000 0.0001 ** 0.000
Number of Incumbents 0.0000 ** 0.000 0.0000 ** 0.000
House=1, Senate =0 0.0009 * 0.000 0.0076 ** 0.000
Term Limits 0.0021 ** 0.001 0.0026 ** 0.001
constant 0.0194 ** 0.003 0.0094 ** 0.003
n=684
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Year
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
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number of words increased (per 1000) the number of candidates decreased .0002% for 
either the total seats up for election and .0003% for the permanent seats in the chamber.  
Although this relationship is in the hypothesized direction, it is not statistically 
significant.  When the contribution statutes were measured using the Flesch-Kincaid 
grade level the decrease in the CPR for both total seats permanent chamber seats was 
.0002% on average.  They are statistically significant at the .05 and .01 levels 
respectively.  These two significant measures indicate that when the contribution statutes 
are more complex and measured by the Flesch Kincaid grade level, fewer candidates run 
for office on average.  All four of the contribution statute variables saw decreases in the 
CPR indicating that a more robust relationship might exist between the complexity of 
contribution statutes and the number of candidates running for office.  This is a 
relationship that ought to be further investigated.  It is possible that candidates running 
for office would have to understand the contribution regulations and this deters them.  As 
theoretically discussed in Chapter 4, the Flesch-Kincaid model is more likely the best 
measure of complexity since it is measuring what individuals read rather than just the 
number of words.  
The CPR was hypothesized to decrease also when the candidacy requirements 
were more complex.  Logically as candidates navigated the statutes to determine what 
they needed to do when running for office, the learning required might deter some 
candidates from running.  On average, when measured by word count an average increase 
was found of .0001% and .0004% for the total seats in the chamber and the permanent 
chamber seats respectively.  This increase in the number of candidates instead of a 
decrease was opposite of the hypothesized direction but was not statistically significant.  
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 The results for the Flesch-Kincaid grade level were statistically significant at the 
.01 level of the CPR as a percentage of seats up for election and permanent chamber 
seats.  This indicates that as the candidacy requirements were on a higher grade reading 
level, more candidates signed up to run for office.  When the candidacy requirements 
were on a higher grade reading level the CPR based on the total seats up for election and 
permanent chamber seats increased .0002%.  This relationship is opposite the 
hypothesized direction.  It is not clear why this relationship is opposite to the 
hypothesized direction but clearly more study is warranted.  It is possible that candidates 
are not required to understand the law but just required to fill out forms provided by 
secretaries of state or registrars offices.  However, based on one candidate interview, the 
candidate felt that the requirements were extremely hard to understand and, as noted 
previously, would be hard for a novice to navigate (Communication1, 2014).   
Campaign finance definition statutes were included in the model as a validity 
check but were hypothesized to have a similar effects to either the contribution statutes or 
candidacy requirements on the CPR.  It is hypothesized that the CPR would decrease if 
the definition statutes were complex.  For three of the four variables tested, decreases 
were seen in the CPR.  When the number of words increased in the definition statutes the 
percentage of candidates increased .0002 for the CPR and total seats up for election on 
average but decreased .0003% for the CPR and permanent chamber seats.  This 
relationship was statistically significant at the .01 level.  It is not clear why the 
relationships are in opposing directions.   
When the definition statutes are measured using the Flesch-Kincaid grade level 
there is a statistically significant decrease.  When measured as a percentage of total seats 
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up for election, there is an average decrease of .0001%.  Measuring using total candidates 
as a percentage of permanent chamber seats there is an average decrease of .0002%.  
Both of these measures are statistically significant at the .01 level, allowing rejection of 
the null hypothesis with 99% confidence.  The Flesch-Kincaid variable indicates that as 
the grade reading level increased for the definition statutes, the number of candidates 
decreased.  This supports the hypothesis that when the statute is more complex, fewer 
candidates will run for office.  At issue here however, is that the definitions were only 
included as a check on validity and it seems unlikely that candidates actually look to the 
definitions to determine if or how to run a campaign.  Perhaps this is incorrect thinking 
and candidates look to the definitions to find information they need to know.   
7.2 Political Effects on CPR 
The number of staffers and legislator salary are proxies for professionalism of the 
legislature.  The hypothesized result would indicate that a more professional legislature 
would attract more candidates to run for office.  In these models, the number of staffers 
had little (-.0000% to -.0001%) to no effect on the average percent of candidates running.  
The only statistically significant relationship was found in legislator’s salary.  As the 
average salary increased CPR for total seats and permanent chamber seats increased 
.0000% and .0001% and this relationship was statistically significant at the .01 level.  
This relationship coincides with Hogan (2004) who also finds similarly that legislative 
professionalism increases the probability of challengers emerging.   
The literature varies on the effects that various types of candidates such as 
incumbents or challengers have on the CPR (Hogan, 2004; Kazee, 1983; Maisel & Stone, 
1997).  In general, the models presented here found that when the number of incumbents 
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increased, the CPR decreased on average for the total seats up for election and permanent 
chamber seats
24
.  Both of these relationships were statistically significant at the .01 level 
indicating that incumbents is an important variable deterring candidates from running for 
office. 
The chamber type variable is a dummy variable where the House =1 and the 
Senate =0.  These data seem to indicate that when the chamber type is the House there is 
.0009% higher CPR on average for the total seats up for election and a .008% higher CPR 
for permanent seats in the chamber.  Both of these findings are statistically significant at 
the .05 and .01 level respectively.  This allows rejection of the null with 95% and 99% 
certainty for this relationship.  Caution is warranted here though, because the data were 
not analyzed separately by chamber type.   
The term limits variable is a dummy indicating if term limits are in place (1) or no 
term limits (0).  When we look at the CPR it is .002% - .003% higher for total seats up 
for election and permanent chamber seats respectively than when term limits are not in 
place.  Both of these relationships are statistically significant at the .01 level allowing us 
to reject the null with 99% confidence.  This relationship is also intuitive, when term 
limits are in place the chance for more candidates to participate presents itself as 
evidenced here.   
                                                             
24 Some literature indicates an effect on candidate decisions by the presence of challengers and open 
seats.  These two variables were omitted in this analysis.  Challengers were omitted because challengers 
would be included in the total candidate rate.  Open seats were omitted because these seats would be 
included as part of the total seats or permanent chamber seats. Regardless, a model was run with open 
seats included.  Unless noted in the text, there were no significant differences. 
115 
 
7.3 Economic Effects on CPR 
Economic data has rarely been used when analyzing campaign finance legislation.  
Including economic factors here is a novel way to see how the economy might affect 
candidate’s decisions to run for office.  Because it is so novel, caution regarding the 
results is important.  It is expected that when the economic indicators show that the 
economy is improving, fewer candidate should want to run for office.  This is expected 
because it is hypothesized that individuals should want to run for office when they want 
to fix problems.  If there are no (or few) economic problems, they should not want to run, 
but rather take advantage of the economic opportunities available.  In this analysis, it is 
expected that as the Gross State Product (GSP) increases we should see a decrease in the 
CPR.  When the GSP increased, there was a increase in the CPR for the total seats up for 
election.  This result showed a .0005% increase in the CPR for total seats up for election 
which opposite the expected result, but was not statistically significant.  Similarly, an 
increase in the GSP indicates an average decrease in the CPR when looking at permanent 
chamber seats of .0024%.  However, these results are also not statistically significant.  
Caution should be taken with these results as stated previously because of the novel use 
of economic data and because the results are in the opposite directions. 
The unemployment (state level) data is interesting.  The hypothesis states that 
when the economy is doing better, fewer individuals should run for office.  In the case of 
unemployment, as the rate of unemployed individuals increases, there should be an 
increase in the number of individuals running for office.  This hypothesis is supported by 
this analysis.  For both the total seats up for election and the permanent chamber seats 
models, when the unemployment rate increases, there is an average increase in the CPR.  
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For the CPR for total seats up for election the average increase is .0009%.  The CPR for 
permanent chamber seats indicates an average increase of .0011%.  This increase is also 
statistically significant at the .05 and .01 levels respectively.  This finding makes intuitive 
sense, that when unemployment increases, more candidates run for office (Lewis-Beck & 
Stegmaier, 2000).  
It is hypothesized that when the Per Capita Personal Income (PCPI) variable 
increases we should see a decrease in the CPR.  As individuals feel more comfortable 
with their economic outlook, there are fewer problems to solve economically and they 
should be less likely to run for office.  When measured for total seats up for election, the 
relationship indicates an average decrease of .0024% which is in the hypothesized 
direction, but statistically insignificant.  As the PCPI increases, the CPR as a percentage 
of permanent chamber seats increases on average in a statistically significant (.01 level) 
relationship.  This average increase is .0168% for the CPR for permanent chamber seats.  
These findings are confusing in light of the opposing relationships.  This obviously 
warrants more study.  Similar findings are noted in the next model as well.  This might 
indicate a problem with heteroskedasticity in the economic variables
25
.   
These three economic variables as noted are novel measures of CPR and should 
be taken with extreme caution.  However, because the direction of these findings is varied 
and often different from the hypothesis, it is important to continue studying the economic 
effects on CPR.    
                                                             
25 Testing for heteroskedasticity found some evidence of the problem with the economic variables.  
Eliminating the economic variables from the model however did not totally eliminate the problem.  The 
model also used robust standard errors to help alleviate heteroskedasticity.  More testing will need to 
continue on this issue.  The similar opposing findings for the total seats vs. permanent chamber seats and 
the income variable were found in the next model also.  
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7.4 Model 2. Complexity and Candidate Withdrawals 
The hypothesized relationship in this second model posits that in the 50 United 
States where the legislation is more complex, more candidates withdraw their candidacy 
for office.  It is expected that when the number of words increases or the Flesch-Kincaid 
grade level increases more candidates would withdraw from the races.  The null 
hypothesis is that there would be no change or no increase in the number of withdrawals 
as the legislation increases in complexity.  The legislation is measured three ways using 
the contribution statutes, the campaign finance definitions, and the candidacy requirement 
statutes.  Each type of legislation is then measured using the two plain language 
measurements – either the Flesch-Kincaid grade level or the word count.  
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Table 7.2: Plain language complexity effects on Candidate Withdrawal Rate (CWR)    
 
 
Table 7.2:
26
 shows mixed results for the different independent variables.  Looking 
at the complexity of contribution statutes measured by the Flesch-Kincaid grade level, we 
see that as the grade level increased the CWR for all three models on average increases 
.002-.046%.  This measure is statistically significant at the .01 level allowing rejection of 
the null with 99% certainty.   
These data indicate that as the grade reading level increased for the contribution 
statutes it is expected that more candidates would withdraw from their race.  This 
                                                             
26 All yellow highlighted coefficients are in the hypothesized direction, grey in opposite direction. 
Total 
Candidates Robust 
St. Err.
Total Seats
Robust 
St. Err.
Permanent 
Chamber 
Seats
Robust 
St. Err.
Contribution Limits
Word Count per 1000 words -0.0033 0.002 -0.0083 0.006 -0.0107 0.006
Flesch-Kincaid 0.0020 ** 0.001 0.0046 ** 0.002 0.0038 ** 0.001
Definitions
Word Count per 1000 words -0.0048 ** 0.001 -0.0124 ** 0.004 -0.0112 ** 0.003
Flesch-Kincaid -0.0005 0.000 -0.0013 0.001 -0.0012 0.001
Candidacy Requirements
Word Count per 1000 words 0.0038 * 0.002 0.0105 * 0.004 0.0093 ** 0.003
Flesch-Kincaid -0.0017 ** 0.001 -0.0036 * 0.001 -0.0031 * 0.001
Gross State Product (in 100 
thous.) 0.0003 0.011 0.0009 0.029 0.0001 0.001
Unemployment -0.0009 0.002 -0.0022 0.004 -0.0008 -0.001
Per Capita Personal Income 
(in10,000s) -0.0072 0.038 -0.0177 0.102 -0.0132 -0.132
Number of Staffers 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.000
Legislator Salary 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.000
Number of Incumbents 0.0001 * 0.000 0.0001 0.000 0.0001 0.000
House=1, Senate =0 0.0039 0.003 0.0103 0.009 0.0174 * 0.007
Term Limits 0.0247 ** 0.005 0.0620 ** 0.013 0.0596 ** 0.011
constant 0.0046 0.019 0.0083 0.050 -0.0041 0.044
n=681
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Year
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
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analysis supports the main contention of this dissertation.  When faced with the challenge 
of maneuvering through the campaign finance process more candidates might withdraw 
from the race.  The costs of learning may be too high on average to justify the time and 
effort of working through the process.  
The contribution statutes as measured by word count have the opposite 
relationship.  Here the data indicate that as the number of words in the statute increase, 
there is a decrease in the CWR.  However, none of the three models are statistically 
significant.  As discussed earlier, the word count measure is a less intuitive measure of 
complexity because it only counts the number of words in the statute whereas the Flesch-
Kincaid is a more robust measure of what candidates would be able to understand.   
Candidacy requirements as measured by the Flesch-Kincaid indicate a 
relationship opposite to the hypothesized direction.  As hypothesized, when the grade 
reading level increases, an increase in the CWR is expected as candidates withdraw from 
the race.  In this analysis, as the grade reading level increases, the CWR declined on 
average .001-.003% (for all three measures).  The relationships for total seats and 
permanent chamber seats were statistically significant at the .05 level and for total 
candidates is statistically significant at the .01 level.  This relationship is opposite the 
expected hypothesized direction.   
When the number of words for the candidacy requirements was measured, the 
results were quite different.  The CWR for total candidates increased on average and was 
statistically significant at the .05 level.  Similar results were found for the CWR for total 
seats and permanent chamber seats.  As the word count increased these two variables 
indicate an expected increase (.01 and .009% respectively) in the CWR.  These two 
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relationships were significant at the .01 level allowing rejection of the null with 99% 
confidence.  Taking the opposing results for Flesch-Kincaid grade level and the word 
count analysis together with the previous analysis that word count may not be the most 
potent measure of complexity, these findings should be taken with utmost caution.  It is 
unclear why the two measures of candidacy requirements would have opposite effects 
and this will have to be studied in more depth most especially because candidacy 
requirements are something that every candidate will need to know.  There is the 
possibility of multicollinearity given the opposite findings.  However, robust standard 
errors (clustered by year) were used and the models were also run separately with similar 
findings
27
.  
The campaign finance definitions as measured by word count are statistically 
significant at the .01 level.  This indicates that as the statute definitions had more words, 
on average the number of withdrawals decreased.  Even though this is statistically 
significant, as noted above the definitions were only included as a validity check and as 
less important part of the statute it is unlikely that candidates will read them.  The 
campaign finance definitions as measured by the Flesch-Kincaid grade level also indicate 
that as the grade level increased the number of withdrawals decreased on average.  This 
relationship is not statistically significant.   
7.5 Control Variables 
The political variables included in the model represent professionalism of the 
legislature and other variables expected to have an effect on candidate decisions.  The 
salary and number of staffers are indicators of professionalism of the legislature.  As the 
                                                             
27 Results of these separate models are in the Appendix.  
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number of staffers increased, there was an expected average increase of .000% in the 
CWR for total candidates, total seats, or permanent chamber seats.  The indication here is 
that when candidates perceived a higher level of professionalism in the legislature that 
they were more likely to withdraw from the race.  This relationship was not statistically 
significant.  The legislative salary relationship has the same effect and is statistically 
insignificant for all the models.  As the legislative salary increased, the CWR for all three 
measures increased (.000%).  Considering that salary and staffers are indicators of 
professionalism and this analysis finds this relationship in opposite of the expected 
directions, these variables bears further analysis.   
When candidates face incumbents, there is an expectation that the number of 
withdrawals would increase.  This result is found when looking at the CWR for all three 
variables.  If the number of incumbents increased, the CWR is expected to increase by 
.000 - .0001% on average.  It may be that candidates when seeing a large number of 
candidates many of whom are incumbents chose to withdraw.
28
  Only the relationship 
between incumbents and the total number of candidates is statistically significant at the 
.05 level indicating that when the incumbents increase the CWR is expected to increase 
as a percentage of total candidates.   
Whether or not the candidate was running for the House or Senate appears to have 
some effect on candidate withdrawals.  The Chamber Type variable is a dummy variable 
where the House is coded as 1 and the Senate as 0.  In this analysis, when the Chamber 
                                                             
28 Some literature indicates an effect on candidate decisions by the presence of challengers and open 
seats.  These two variables were omitted in this analysis.  Challengers were omitted because challengers 
would be included in the total candidate rate.  Open seats were omitted because these seats would be 
included as part of the total seats or permanent chamber seats.  A model was tested with open seats 
included.  There were no differences in the results.   
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type is the House (1), it appears that candidate withdrawals are expected to be higher on 
average.  The CWR for all three variables is .003 - .01% higher on average.  Only the 
permanent chamber seats relationship is statistically significant at the .05 level.  There is 
the possibility that this indicates the House is an easier seat for which to run.  If we see 
fewer candidates withdrawing in House races than Senate, it would indicate that potential 
candidates see these races as easier.  The Senate districts in the states are larger so the 
costs might be higher to run for those seats versus the House districts.  Logically the costs 
would be amplified by the larger sized districts.  The data is available to further 
investigate this piece of the puzzle that will be done in subsequent analysis. 
The term limit variable is coded for 1 if term limits are in place, and 0 if no term 
limits are in place.  This variable is statistically significant at the .01 level indicating that 
when term limits are in place more candidates are expected to withdraw from races on 
average than when there are no term limits in place.  This makes sense as we would 
expect to see more candidates withdrawing when they see the barrier of term limits.  We 
would assume however, that most candidates would realize this barrier is in place before 
contemplating a run for office.   
Economic variables have not been studied often in connection with candidate 
decisions and campaign finance, so including them here allows visibility into how the 
economy affects individuals and their decisions to run for office.  There is no statistically 
significant effect of the GSP on candidates’ decisions to withdraw.  As the GSP grew the 
CWR decreased from .001-.009% for total candidates, total seats, and permanent 
chamber seats on average.  This indicates that as the economy grew candidates were 
more likely to stay in their races.   
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The unemployment rate is expected to have the effect of increasing withdrawals 
with the rationale being that as more people are out of work they may find the cost of 
running for office too high.  This analysis mainly finds no evidence of this relationship.  
When unemployment rates are increasing more candidates are withdrawing from races 
for the total candidates (.0003%).  For the total seats up for election, there was an 
expected decrease in the CWR of .002% and the permanent chamber seats of .0008% on 
average.  These relationships are not significant for any of the models.   
As Per Capita Personal Income increased the CWR for total seats and permanent 
chamber seats decreased on average .01%.  There is an increase in the CWR for total 
candidates of .05%.  None of these findings are statistically significant.  Because of the 
lack of significance and the slight changes in the CWR it is best to be very cautious about 
these findings.  Altogether it is likely that unemployment and PCPI, which are more 
personal economic indicators, show that the economy does have a role to play on 
individuals choices to run for office.  
7.6 Qualitative Analysis 
 In order to add to the internal validity of the study (Kirk & Miller, 1986) and to 
build the theory that complexity might deter people from running qualitative interviews 
were completed on eight former or potential candidates from around the country.  
Respondents were asked about their political background, and general interest in politics.  
Respondents were also asked if and why they would run for office or run again.  No 
respondent considered running again with enthusiasm.  Most of the responses contained 
some element of hesitancy such as the dislike of asking people for contributions.  This 
was an issue with two of the eight respondents.  Time commitment was a problem with 
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half of the respondents but with variation.  Some respondents said time away from their 
job would cause an income loss, while others said time away from family was more of an 
issue.  Another respondent who is now a campaign consultant talked about the difficulty 
of finding people to run for office because of the fear of losing their reputation.  He spoke 
in particular of business owners who would be unwilling to run for fear of losing 
business.   
 Respondents were asked to describe the process of running for office.  This 
question was left purposely vague in order allow respondents to answer how they chose.  
Respondents spoke of getting on the ballot and raising money as the top issues.  Most 
respondents had help from either their state/local party or an experienced politician 
within their party.  One respondent had help from a candidate school, another had help 
from campaign consultants. 
 Regarding the logistics of running, none of the respondents explicitly said that the 
complexity of the campaign finance system was a deterrent to running.  However, three 
of the respondents referred indirectly to this idea.  One respondent stated that running for 
office in his state would require people to be researchers and someone off the street 
would not be able to do it (Communication1, 2014).  This respondent was discussing the 
process of filing for office that requires petitions.  Another respondent said that being a 
lawyer gave him the “sense that he had a leg up” in running for office, and “while he 
didn’t know the [election/campaign] code off the top of his head, he would be able to find 
it and use it if needed.  The average person would need help” (Communication7, 2014).  
These responses indicate some candidates had difficulty figuring out the process of 
running for office.   
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7.7 Conclusions 
 Table 7.3 below summarizes the study findings in a format that highlights each 
legislation type for easier review.  The yellow highlighted results are in the hypothesized 
direction. The grey highlighted results are opposite the hypothesized direction.   
Table 7.3: Summary of findings 
 
Looking first at the Candidate Participation Rate (CPR) in the left column, 
consistent results are found using the Flesch-Kincaid measure for both contribution limits 
and definitions.  Two of these relationships are statistically significant in the 
hypothesized direction.  Regardless of how the word count was used, it was only 
statistically significant in the hypothesized direction in one relationship - for the 
campaign finance definitions.   
Contribution Limits Contribution Limits
Flesch-
Kincaid
Word 
Count
Flesch-
Kincaid
Word 
Count
Total Candidates pos neg
Total Seats Up neg neg Total Seats Up pos neg
Permanent Chamber Seats neg neg Permanent Chamber Seats pos neg
Candidacy Requirements Candidacy Requirements
Flesch-
Kincaid
Word 
Count
Flesch-
Kincaid
Word 
Count
Total Candidates neg pos
Total Seats Up pos pos Total Seats Up neg pos
Permanent Chamber Seats pos pos Permanent Chamber Seats neg pos
Camp. Fin. Definitions Camp. Fin. Definitions
Flesch-
Kincaid
Word 
Count
Flesch-
Kincaid
Word 
Count
Total Candidates neg neg
Total Seats Up neg pos Total Seats Up neg neg
Permanent Chamber Seats neg neg Permanent Chamber Seats neg neg
Candidacy Participation Rate (CPR) Candidacy Withdrawal Rate (CWR)
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All the coefficients for contribution limits and definitions show declines in the 
CPR on average.  When the contribution limits and definitions are more complex, it is 
expected that fewer candidates will run for office on average.  This is consistent with the 
main contention of this dissertation that fewer candidates will run when statutes are 
complex. It seems clear that these language variables which are intended to measure 
complexity of legislation do generally show that when the statutes are complex, the 
percentage of candidates decreases.  However, much caution is warranted given the 
novelty of these measures and the lack of statistical significance in all the models.  These 
findings are somewhat consistent with what the qualitative interviews found.  Candidates 
were hesitant to run for office for a variety of reasons, but collecting money was one of 
the main reasons.  It is not the contention of this study that candidates equate asking 
people for money with complexity of contribution statutes.  This study posits that when 
faced with contribution requirements, candidates want to comply but might have 
difficulty understanding the statutes if they are complex.  The Flesch-Kincaid 
contribution findings indicate that when the statutes are more difficult, fewer candidates 
are expected to run for office on average.  Furthermore, potential candidates when 
interviewed stated that because they were experienced they would have an easier time 
understanding how to run for office (Communication1, 2014; Communication6, 2014; 
Communication7, 2014).  Average citizens running for office for the first time may have 
more difficulty in understanding the statutes and complying with them. 
The same results are not found for candidacy requirements.  These coefficients 
are positive indicating that as the candidacy requirements were more complex, more 
candidates ran for office.  This is contrary to the hypothesis that fewer candidates would 
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run.  This relationship is unclear.  Based on the candidate interviews, when the 
respondents spoke about the logistics of running they seemed to indicate that it was 
difficult, they were hesitant to run, or unwilling to put themselves through the process.  It 
was only if the opportunity arose or life circumstances made it possible that candidates 
voiced a desire to run again. There was no sense that the candidates were eager to run 
again.  This lack of enthusiasm was pointed at the process and it is this process that gives 
a hint of possibly why candidacy requirements were opposite the hypothesized direction.  
During the interviews, the candidates seemed to equate the process more with the 
fundraising and campaigning than with the actual candidacy filing.  Perhaps they see 
candidacy filing as easier, whereas the contributions and campaigning were more 
difficult.  
Table 7.3 summarizes the results from Model 2 in the right-hand column.  The 
Candidate Withdrawal Rate (CWR) anticipated increases in the percentage of 
withdrawals with corresponding increases in the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Reading level of 
the legislation and the statute word count.  The contribution limits results were in the 
hypothesized direction (an increase) and all were statistically significant. These results 
show with an increase in the Flesch-Kincaid grade reading level, an average increase in 
the CWR appear only for the contribution statutes.  This is important because one of the 
main contentions of this dissertation is that contribution statutes may be constraining or 
difficult to understand for candidates.  Combined with supported findings for the CPR in 
Model 1, the contribution limits may be a factor both in reducing the number of 
candidates running for office and increasing the number of withdrawals.   
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Candidacy requirements measured by word count are all statistically significant 
and in the correct direction, whereas the Flesch-Kincaid results are also statistically 
significant but in the opposite direction.  As discussed earlier, it is possible that this is 
something that candidates would actually need to understand in order to run for office, so 
it might be more likely to reflect reality.  Candidates would need to understand the basic 
requirements to run for office and as misunderstanding these may cause candidate 
disqualification or reputational harm.  It is not clear why these two relationships are in the 
opposite directions.  Further research and testing is needed.  The campaign finance 
definition statutes, either measured with the Flesch-Kincaid or the word count, are 
contrary to hypothesized expectations.   
Both of these models add a novel way with which to measure candidate decisions 
to run for office.  By using complexity measured via grade reading level and word count, 
this study is able to add to the literature on campaign finance and candidate decisions.   
Even though the results are not straightforward, there is some support for this 
dissertation’s contention that complexity – as measured by grade reading level and word 
count- do contribute to candidate decisions.  With more research, this picture will become 
clearer.  Clarity on this issue is very important to uphold the goals of campaign finance 
reform and to democracy in general.  One of the goals of campaign finance is to increase 
participation in the electoral system.  Clearly, if the statutes are constraining and difficult 
to understand this goal might be in jeopardy.  It is important that campaign finance 
statutes remain accessible to those candidates they are intended to help.   
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation studies the research question whether or not the complexity of 
campaign finance legislation influences candidates’ decisions to run for office.  It is 
hypothesized that complexity will affect candidates’ decisions via legislative constraints 
and misunderstanding of the statutes.  To study this question, this dissertation uses a 
novel way of measuring complexity using plain language tools.   
Theoretically, the dissertation uses institutional theory as it applies to candidates 
and examines two issues.  The first issue is whether rules (as a type of institution) might 
affect candidates by constraining their behavior.  The second issue is whether candidates 
might fail to understand the rules because the rules have become so complicated that the 
learning required to comply is cumbersome and costly.  It is assumed that candidates are 
boundedly rational and want to obey the campaign finance system.  It is also assumed 
that incumbents might want to impede challengers by making rules constraining.   
8.1 Institutional Theory and Complexity 
Institutions have rules that modify actors behavior.  While there are many 
conceptions of what rules are, this dissertation focuses on Ostrom’s (2007) rules-in-use 
and rules-in-form.  Ostrom’s rules description undergirds the theory that rules written by 
legislators, rules-in-form, might be misunderstood or used by legislators to constrain 
candidates - rules-in-use.  Campaign finance has many rules, such as contribution limits, 
intended to constrain actors behavior in order to encourage a system in which more 
citizens want to participate.  If potential candidates are subject to contribution 
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restrictions, this is supposed to level the playing field and encourage more citizens to 
participate in the system.  The ability of legislators to write these laws affords them the 
ability to create rules that are constraining to potential candidates.  This dissertation 
assumes that legislators will constrain if given the opportunity.   
The constraints of learning are defined in terms of transaction costs.  The idea that 
constraints or rules may be adding to the misunderstanding of legislation by candidates is 
important to understand.  In order to study this misunderstanding it is important to define 
how the misunderstanding may contribute to changing a candidate’s behavior.  If a 
candidate fails to understand a part of the campaign finance rules, they must determine 
how the law works in order to ensure compliance.  This learning adds to the transaction 
costs of running for office.  The idea of transaction costs in campaign finance legislation 
is the increase in time, effort, and learning required ensuring compliance with campaign 
finance statutes.   
8.2 Complexity and Plain Language in Campaign Finance Statutes in NC 
It is important to understand if statutes are complex and would require candidate 
learning in order to comply.  Complexity of legislation is tested in this dissertation using 
a plain language tool.  Plain language is writing in such a way so that the user is able to 
understand and use the information gleaned in a purposeful way.  To test whether or not 
legislation is complex, this dissertation first uses a plain language tool on the NC general 
statute for campaign contribution limits.   
To test for complexity an experiment was run to test respondent’s ability to 
understand NC campaign finance contribution limits.  The results indicate that reading 
statutes written in plain language resulted in a higher comprehension of campaign finance 
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laws on average compared to individuals who read the current version of the law.  This 
finding is important because candidates, especially first-time candidates, running for 
office may have difficulty comprehending the statutes.  Respondents were also asked how 
they used the statute.  The respondents who read the plain language statute found it easier 
to understand and use based on how many times they referred back to the statute, their 
rating of how clear it was, and how closely they read the statute. 
This ease of understanding and higher comprehension of a plain language statute 
is an indicator that the original statute may indeed by difficult to understand.  This 
difficulty of understanding is central to this dissertation’s research.  It is assumed that 
potential candidates will want to obey the law in a boundedly rational way.  They want to 
comply but may not fully understand the law’s requirements if it is complex.  This lack of 
understanding is problematic in two ways.  One, the desire to comply with the law 
presents an opportunity for incumbents to constrain challengers.  Two, candidates may 
have to incur higher transaction costs in order to comply.   
The implications of this study are clear.  If it is more difficult for the average 
citizen to understand the campaign finance contribution statutes as they are written today, 
the statutes themselves may be a deterrent to average citizens running for office.   This 
additional cost is an added burden of running and campaigning that average citizens may 
find too difficult to pay.  If this is the case, one of the original goals of campaign finance 
reform – the increased participation of more people in the system - is in jeopardy. 
8.3 Complexity and candidate decisions – the 50 United States 
Plain language tools are also used to measure complexity of campaign finance 
contribution limits in all 50 states.  These statutes are measured using the Flesch-Kincaid 
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grade reading level and word count.  Using the idea that language adds in a transaction 
cost to candidate learning, this dissertation tests the theory that candidates may not 
participate in the electoral process or may withdraw because of the difficulty 
understanding the statutes or the effort required to comply.  The main research question 
of this dissertation is whether the complexity of campaign finance legislation influences 
candidates’ decisions to run for office.  If this is the case, fewer candidates should run for 
office in states that have more complex campaign finance laws, and more candidates 
should withdraw from running in those same type of states.  To determine if there is any 
effect on candidates’ decisions, this paper analyzes two dependent variables created from 
candidate data.  These two variables are the Candidate Participation Rate (CPR) and the 
Candidate Withdrawal Rate (CWR).  It is important to understand the effects of campaign 
finance legislation on potential candidates.  The main independent variables are the 
campaign finance contribution limits, candidacy requirements, and campaign finance 
definition statutes for all 50 states.  All statutes were run through a plain language online 
utility to test for the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Reading level and to test for word count.  
Each of these measures results in a continuous variable that this dissertation uses as a 
measure of complexity.   
The study results are mixed but do indicate some constraining effect of the 
statutes.   Contribution limits appear to reduce the expected number of candidates running 
for office and increase the number of withdrawals.  The relationship between the CPR 
and CWR and candidacy requirements is mixed and will require further research.  As 
candidates faced the contribution statute requirements some candidates may have chosen 
not to run or withdrawn when faced with the difficulty of understanding and complying 
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with the statutes.  Other model results were either not significant or not in the 
hypothesized direction.  These relationships indicate that some constraint may be 
influencing candidates to withdraw from races or not become a candidate at all.   
8.4 Study Limitations 
Future research must include partisanship variables to measure the strength of 
party activity in each state.  Some parties may provide a lot or a little help to candidates 
running which could influence their ability to run a successful campaign.  On several of 
the qualitative candidate interviews, this idea is borne out by the candidates citing party 
organizations as helpful to their campaigns.  Other future variables should include public 
financing variables as this might affect a candidates’ decision.  Separating the analysis 
between each legislative house would also be beneficial to a more robust understanding 
of candidate decisions. 
Another limitation of this analysis is the lack of information on potential 
candidates.  Thus far the data are only available for candidates who actually signed up or 
signup and then withdrew.  It is not clear if there are potential candidates who never get 
to the filing stage who might be deterred by the complexity of the policy.   
A third limitation of this study is that complexity of legislation in this study is a 
static measure.  Future studies of complexity should attempt to measure if complexity 
changes over time.  This could be done by focusing on one state or measuring one policy 
as it changes through time.  Complexity studies should also focus on different policies.  
This is difficult because the data (statutes) are not centrally available.  Regardless, it is 
important to test this theory and these methods on other policies.  It is important to 
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explore the idea of complexity on different types of policies to create a better 
understanding of what it means for a policy to be complex.  
Finally, a measure of population density should be included as a control for this 
study.  It is possible that the population density of the state legislative district may affect 
candidate decisions.  If a candidate resides in a very dense district or state the expected 
campaign process and structure would be different than a less dense district or state.  For 
example, candidates from New Hampshire with many seats would be a very different 
process than Wyoming, with few seats.  Using a measure of population density would 
allow testing of this control.   
8.5 Study Contributions and Policy Recommendations 
Both of these models add a novel way with which to gauge candidate decisions to 
run for office.  Creating a variable to measure the CPR led to the creation of the CWR to 
determine how many candidates actually register and then withdraw from a race.  It is 
important to understand why someone would register and then withdraw because the goal 
of campaign finance and the democratic system in general is to have people participate.   
 The plain language literature generally focuses on end-user understanding.  
Utilizing plain language to measure complexity is an innovative way to apply the idea of 
language complexity to policy studies.  Complexity studies have generally focused on the 
number of words or technical issues.  It is important that those to whom the policies 
apply are able to understand and comply with them.  This study expands the use of 
language in policy studies by using both word count and the Flesch-Kincaid grade 
reading level index to measure how understandable a statute is.  Furthermore, the study 
tests the effect of the statutes on candidates’ decisions to run for office.   
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By using complexity, measured via grade reading level and word count, this study 
is able to add to the literature on campaign finance and candidate decisions.  While 
contribution limits have been studied as they pertain to candidates, this study introduces 
the idea of a learning transaction cost to the literature.  It also adds to institutional theory 
(rules) that candidates might be constrained by campaign finance legislation in their 
desire to comply.   
The future of campaign finance regulations should ensure that the inclusion of 
constraints on candidates is minimized.  However this is done, it is important to make 
sure that candidates are easily able to understand and abide by campaign finance 
regulations.  Some plain language scholars advocate using plain language where it affects 
the user.  Writing statutes in plain language may make candidates’ jobs easier and thus 
might induce more citizens to participate.   
8.6 Conclusions 
This dissertation contends that the institution of campaign finance in the form of 
its rules-in-use and rules-in-form constrain candidates and may lead to candidates 
misunderstanding of the statutes.  That constraint flows from statutes (rules) which are 
complex and add to the cost of learning and effort required for candidates to run for 
office.  Constraint is measured in terms of complexity in this dissertation.  In turn, 
complexity is measured via Flesch-Kincaid grade reading levels and word count 
variables.   
Even though the results are not straightforward, there is support for this 
dissertation’s contention that complexity – as measured by grade reading level and word 
count- do contribute to candidate decisions on average.  With more research, this picture 
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should become clearer.  Clarity on this issue is very important to uphold the goals of 
campaign finance reform and to democracy in general.  One of the goals of campaign 
finance is to increase participation in the electoral system.  Clearly, if the statutes are 
constraining and difficult to understand this goal might be in jeopardy.  It is important 
that campaign finance statutes remain accessible to those candidates they are intended to 
help.   
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APPENDIX A: PLAIN LANGUAGE SURVEY 
This study is being conducted to help determine the level of understanding of campaign finance 
laws.  As a part of the research, we are seeking volunteers to participate in a brief survey on issues 
surrounding campaign finance laws.  On average, completing this survey should only take 15-20 minutes 
of your time.  You will be asked to read a portion of the law and then answer a few questions based on 
what you read.  Your participation is completely voluntary but will help to further research in this 
important area 
Thank you VERY much for your help.  If you have any questions or concerns about the study 
itself, please contact Dr. Martha Kropf at 704-687-2987 or mekropf@uncc.edu. If you have any concerns 
about the conduct of the study, please contact Cat Runden at CatRunden@uncc.edu or 704-687-3309. 
Please answer the following questions on the scantron to the best of your ability.   
As you answer these questions: 
 Remember that this is NOT a test.  You may refer back to the reading. 
 Assume you are a candidate running for a state-level office in North Carolina.   
 Keep in mind that state and federal campaign finance laws are separate. 
 
1. How much money in campaign contributions can a candidate accept from one 
person, political committee or other entity? 
a. $4500 
b. $2000 
c. $4000 
d. $5000 
e. Don’t know 
 
2. You are a candidate running for office.  You accept a contribution from an individual 
that you plan on paying back.  How long do you have to pay it back?  
a. 45 days 
b. 15 days 
c. 4-5 days 
d. 7 days 
e. Don’t know 
 
3. If you are a candidate running for office, can you or your spouse make a loan to 
your campaign? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
 
4. Which of the following family members are NOT allowed to make unlimited 
contributions to your campaign? 
a. Child 
b. Brother 
c. Spouse 
d. Uncle  
e. Don’t know 
 
5. If you are running for judge in North Carolina, do the same limitations apply to you 
as would apply to candidates for other office? 
a. Yes 
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b. No 
c. Don’t know 
 
6. As a candidate, can you use your own money to contribute to your campaign? 
a. Yes, but with a $1000 limit. 
b. No, you may not use your own money to contribute. 
c. Yes, candidates may make contributions to their own campaigns. 
d. No contributions are allowed, but you can make a loan to your campaign. 
e. Don’t know 
 
7. The North Carolina Voter-Owned Elections Act says that you (a candidate) may not 
accept contributions to your campaign for a period of ______ days prior to the election. 
a. 22 
b. 30 
c. 45 
d. 21 
e. Don’t know 
 
8. Not including the exceptions listed in this law, what is the maximum amount any 
person, political committee or other entity may contribute to your campaign? 
a. $4500 
b. $2000 
c. $4000 
d. $5000 
e. Don’t know 
 
9. How closely do you feel you read the reading? 
a. Very closely 
b. Somewhat closely 
c. Not very closely 
d. I didn’t read the reading. 
 
10. How clear did you think the readings were?29 
a. Very clear 
b. Somewhat clear 
c. Somewhat unclear 
d. Very unclear 
e. Neither clear nor unclear 
 
Now I just have a few questions that will help me compare your responses to those of 
your fellow students. 
 
11. Have you ever considered running for political office? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Unsure 
 
                                                             
29 This variable was recoded to Very Clear, Somewhat Clear, Neither, Somewhat unclear, Very unclear. 
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12. Have you ever worked on a candidate’s political campaign? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know. 
 
13. Has anyone in your current or former household ever run for public office? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
 
14. Is anyone in your immediate family a lawyer? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
 
15. While answering this questionnaire, about how many times did you refer back to 
the reading? 
a. Less than 1 times 
b. 1-3 times 
c. 4-6 times 
d. 7-9 times 
e. More than 9 times 
 
16. What is your current age? 
a. 18-21 
b. 22-25 
c. 26-30 
d. 31-40 
e. Over 40 
 
17. What is your current class standing? 
a. Freshman 
b. Sophomore 
c. Junior 
d. Senior 
e. Don’t know 
 
18. What is your gender? 
a. Female 
b. Male 
 
19. Do you consider yourself to be Hispanic or Latino? 
a. No 
b. Yes 
c. Not applicable 
 
20. What race or ethnicity do you consider yourself? 
a. White 
b. Black 
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c. Asian/Pacific Islander 
d. Native American 
e. Other (Please provide) ____________________________________ 
 
21. What is your marital status? 
a. Married or living with someone. 
b. Single (never married) 
c. Divorced/Separated 
d. Widowed 
e. Other 
 
22. What is the highest level of education anyone in your immediate family (parents 
and siblings) has completed? 
a. Some High School, High School Diploma, or GED 
b. Some College or 2-year Associate Degree 
c. 4 year BA/BS undergraduate degree 
d. Master’s  or Ph.D. degree 
e. Don’t know 
 
23. On the bottom of the reading it says “this is reading ____” .  Put the letter of the 
reading on the scantron. 
a. A 30 
b. B  
                                                             
30 A refers to the original statute; B is the plain language version. 
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APPENDIX B: THE STATUTES 
B.1  The Original Version of the Contribution Statute 
163-278.13.  Limitation on contributions. 
(a)        No individual, political committee, or other entity shall contribute to any 
candidate or other political committee any money or make any other contribution in any 
election in excess of four thousand dollars ($4,000) for that election. 
(b)        No candidate or political committee shall accept or solicit any 
contribution from any individual, other political committee, or other entity of any money 
or any other contribution in any election in excess of four thousand dollars ($4,000) for 
that election. 
(c)        Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, it 
shall be lawful for a candidate or a candidate's spouse, parents, brothers and sisters to 
make a contribution to the candidate or to the candidate's treasurer of any amount of 
money or to make any other contribution in any election in excess of four thousand 
dollars ($4,000) for that election. 
(d)       For the purposes of this section, the term "an election" means any primary, 
second primary, or general election in which the candidate or political committee may be 
involved, without regard to whether the candidate is opposed or unopposed in the 
election, except that where a candidate is not on the ballot in a second primary, that 
second primary is not "an election" with respect to that candidate. 
(d1)     Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, a candidate or 
political committee may accept a contribution knowing that the contribution is to be 
reimbursed to the entity making the contribution and knowing the candidate or political 
committee has funds sufficient to reimburse the entity making the contribution if all of 
the following conditions are met: 
(1)        The entity submits sufficient information of the 
contribution to the candidate or political committee for reimbursement 
within 45 days of the contribution. 
(2)        The candidate or political committee makes a 
reimbursement to the entity making the contribution within seven days 
of submission of sufficient information. 
(3)        The candidate or political committee indicates on its 
report under G.S. 163-278.11 that the good, service, or other item 
resulting in the reimbursement is an expenditure of the candidate or 
political committee, and notes if the contribution was by credit card. 
(4)        The contribution does not exceed one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00). 
(d2)     Any contribution, or portion thereof, made under subsection (d1) of this 
section that is not submitted for reimbursement in accordance with subsection (d1) of this 
section shall be treated as a contribution for purposes of this section. Any contribution, or 
portion thereof, made under subsection (d1) of this section that is not reimbursed in 
accordance with subsection (d1) of this section shall be treated as a contribution for 
purposes of this section. 
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(e)        Except as provided in subsections (e2), (e3), and (e4) of this section, this 
section shall not apply to any national, State, district or county executive committee of 
any political party. For the purposes of this section only, the term "political party" means 
only those political parties officially recognized under G.S. 163-96. 
(e1)      No referendum committee which received any contribution from a 
corporation, labor union, insurance company, business entity, or professional association 
may make any contribution to another referendum committee, to a candidate or to a 
political committee. 
(e2)      In order to make meaningful the provisions of Article 22D of this Chapter, 
the following provisions shall apply with respect to candidates for justice of the Supreme 
Court and judge of the Court of Appeals: 
(1)        No candidate shall accept, and no contributor shall 
make to that candidate, a contribution in any election exceeding one 
thousand dollars ($1,000) except as provided for elsewhere in this 
subsection. 
(2)        A candidate may accept, and a family contributor may 
make to that candidate, a contribution not exceeding two thousand 
dollars ($2,000) in an election if the contributor is that candidate's 
parent, child, brother, or sister. 
(3)        Repealed by Session Laws 2008-150, s. 7(a), effective 
August 2, 2008. 
As used in this subsection, "candidate" is also a political committee authorized by 
the candidate for that candidate's election. Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a 
candidate or the spouse of that candidate from making a contribution or loan secured 
entirely by that individual's assets to that candidate's own campaign. 
(e3)      Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, 
no candidate for superior court judge or district court judge shall accept, and no 
contributor shall make to that candidate, a contribution in any election exceeding one 
thousand dollars ($1,000), except as provided in subsection (c) of this section. As used in 
this subsection, "candidate" is also a political committee authorized by the candidate for 
that candidate's election. Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a candidate or the 
spouse of that candidate from making a contribution or loan secured entirely by that 
individual's assets to that candidate's own campaign. 
(e4)      In order to make meaningful the provisions of the North Carolina 
Voter-Owned Elections Act, as set forth in Article 22J of this Chapter, no candidate for 
an office subject to that Article shall accept, and no contributor shall make to that 
candidate, a contribution during the period beginning 21 days before the day of the 
general election and ending the day after the general election if that contribution causes 
the candidate to exceed the "trigger for matching funds" defined in G.S. 163-278.96(17). 
As used in this subsection, the term "candidate" also includes "candidate campaign 
committee" as defined in G.S. 163-278.38Z(3). Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a 
candidate from making a contribution or loan secured entirely by that candidate's assets 
to that candidate's own campaign or to a political committee, the principal purpose of 
which is to support that candidate's campaign. This subsection applies with respect to a 
candidate only if both of the following statements are true regarding that candidate: 
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(1)        That candidate is opposed in the general election by a 
certified candidate as defined in Article 22J of this Chapter. 
(2)        That certified candidate has not received the maximum 
matching funds available under G.S. 163-278.99B(c). 
The recipient of a contribution that apparently violates this subsection has three 
days to return the contribution or file a detailed statement with the State Board of 
Elections explaining why the contribution does not violate this subsection. 
(e5)      The contribution limits of subsections (a) and (b) of this section do not 
apply to contributions made to an independent expenditure political committee. For 
purposes of this section, an "independent expenditure political committee" is a political 
committee whose treasurer makes and abides by a certification to the State Board of 
Elections that the political committee does not and will not make contributions, directly 
or indirectly, to candidates or to political committees that make contributions to 
candidates. The State Board of Elections shall provide forms for implementation of this 
subsection. This subsection shall not apply to a candidate or a political committee 
controlled by a candidate. The exception of this subsection is in addition to any other 
exception provided by law. 
(f)        Any individual, candidate, political committee, referendum committee, or 
other entity that violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.  
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B.2 The Plain Language Version of the Contribution Statute 
 
163-278.13 Contribution Limits for Candidates 
(a) No one (any individual, any type of political committee, or any 
other entity) may contribute more than four thousand ($4000) dollars for your 
election campaign. 
(b) You may not accept more than four thousand dollars ($4000) from 
anyone (any individual, any type of political committee, or any other entity) for 
your election campaign. 
(c) Exceptions to (a) and (b): 
1. You, your spouse, your parents, and your brothers and sisters may 
make and you may accept more than four thousand dollars ($4000) for your 
election campaign. 
a. For the purposes of this section, “election” means any 
primary or second primary (sometimes called a runoff) or the general 
election where your name is on the ballot.  
2. You may accept a contribution (from anyone) if you know that 
your campaign will be reimbursing the donor for the contribution and if you 
know that your campaign has the funds to do so.  In order to do this you must 
follow these conditions: 
(1) Whomever gave the contribution has to inform you about 
the contribution (for the purpose of reimbursement) within 45 days of 
the contribution. 
(2) Once the contributor gives you this information, you have 
seven (7) days to reimburse the contributor. 
(3) You must put in your report (under G.S. 163-278.11) that 
the contribution for which you are reimbursing was for campaign 
spending.  You must also note if this was a credit card transaction. 
(4) The contribution cannot be more than one thousand dollars 
($1000). 
(5)  Any contribution under section (d1) that you do not submit 
for reimbursement or that you do not reimburse is treated like any 
other contribution. 
 
(d) This section does not apply (except where noted) to any national, 
state, district, or county executive committee of any political party.  For the 
purposes here, “political party” means only those political parties recognized 
under G.S. 163-96. 
(e)  Referendum committees, which received any contributions from a 
corporation, labor union, insurance company, business entity, or professional 
association, may not contribute to another referendum committee, to a candidate, or 
to a political committee. 
(e1)  If you are a candidate for justice of the Supreme Court and judge of the 
Court of Appeals the following provisions apply to you: 
(1) You may not accept and no one may contribute any contribution of 
more than one thousand dollars ($1000).  Exceptions to this are below. 
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(2) You may accept and a family contributor may contribute to you up 
to two thousand dollars ($2000) in an election, if the contributor is your 
parent, child, brother, or sister. 
“Candidate” in this subsection also means a political committee authorized by 
the candidate for your election.  No part of this section prevents you or your spouse 
from making a loan or contribution to your campaign secured by your assets. 
(e2)  If you are a candidate for superior court judge or district court judge, you 
may not accept and no one may contribute more than one thousand dollars ($1000) to 
your election.  The family exceptions in subsection part (c) also apply in this 
subsection.  “Candidate” in this section also means a political committee authorized by 
you for your election.  No part of this section prevents you or your spouse from 
making a loan or contribution to your campaign secured by your assets. 
(e3)  The North Carolina Voter-Owned Elections Act uses public funds to 
finance elections.  If you are a candidate subject to this act, you may not accept and no 
one may contribute to your campaign for a period prior to the general election if that 
contribution causes you to exceed the “trigger for matching funds” as defined in G.S. 
163-278.96 (17).  This period begins 21 days before the general election day and ends 
the day after the general election.   
 “Candidate” also includes “candidate campaign committee” as defined in G.S. 
163-278.96(17).  No part of this section prevents you or your spouse from making a 
loan or contribution to your campaign secured by your assets.  This subsection applies 
to you only if both of the following statements are true: 
(1) You are running in an election where you have a certified 
opponent.  A certified opponent is defined in Article 22J of this Chapter. 
(2) Your certified opponent has not received the maximum matching 
funds available under G.S. 163-278.99B(c). 
If you violate this provision by receiving a contribution, you have three days to 
return the contribution or file a detailed statement with the State Board of Elections 
explaining why the contribution does not violate this subsection. 
(e4)  An “independent expenditure political committee” (IEPC) is a political 
committee that does not and will not contribute directly or indirectly to candidates or to 
political committees that contribute to candidates.  The contribution limits in 
subsection (a) and (b) do not apply to contributions made to independent expenditure 
political committees.  The State Board of Elections will give forms to IEPC’s to 
implement this subsection.  This section does not apply to candidates or a political 
committee controlled by a candidate.   
(f) If you violate the provisions of this section, you are guilty of a Class 2 
misdemeanor. 
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APPENDIX C:  ADDTIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
Figure C.1: Variable Definitions Table 
Variables Conceptual-
ization 
Operationaliza-
tion 
Data Source Variable 
Type 
MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Pre-Bank 
Contribution 
Statutes 
Complex 
language can add 
a transaction cost 
akin to a learning 
curve.  It might 
increase the time, 
effort and 
learning required 
to comply with 
the statute.  
These 
components 
include the 
Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade Reading 
level which 
gives us a 
measure of 
what US grade 
level should be 
able to 
comprehend the 
legislation.  
(Online-
Utility.org).   
http://www.online-
utility.org/english/readability_test_and_i
mprove.jsp 
Continuous 
Definition 
Statutes 
Because not all 
states have 
contribution 
statutes, 
definitions were 
also collected to 
test them for 
complexity. 
Same 
components as 
Pre-Bank 
contributions 
were collected. 
http://www.online-
utility.org/english/readability_test_and_i
mprove.jsp 
Continuous 
Candidate Filing 
Statutes 
Requirements for 
candidates to run 
for office 
including what 
they would first 
encounter as a 
candidate.  Does 
not include dollar 
amounts/filing 
fees etc.  
States 
requirements 
for candidates 
to file for office 
such as the 
candidate 
declaration/nom
ination, oath 
affidavit, or 
declaration 
filing. 
http://www.online-
utility.org/english/readability_test_and_i
mprove.jsp 
Continuous 
Flesch Kincaid 
Grade level : 
US Grade Level Index of US 
grade level 
necessary to 
comprehend the 
legislation 
http://www.online-
utility.org/english/readability_test_and_i
mprove.jsp 
Continuous 
Word Count Number of words 
in the statute. 
 http://www.online-
utility.org/english/readability_test_and_i
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mprove.jsp 
CONTROL VARIABLES  
Total Seats Total number of 
legislative seats in 
each state 
legislature.  How 
many contested 
seats there are in 
each election year.  
This is the 
number of seats 
up for 
contestation in 
that state/year.  
It is not the 
number of seats 
in the 
institution. 
www.followthemoney.org Count 
Chamber Type This designates 
whether the 
election was in 
either the Senate or 
House chamber for 
each state 
legislature 
1-Senate, 0-
House 
www.followthemoney.org Dichotomo
us 
Per Capita 
Personal 
Income by 
state 
Indicates how the 
economy was 
faring in a state in 
the election year.  
This should be a 
factor in candidates 
deciding to run or 
not. 
Continuous 
numeric value 
(dollar amount) 
for each year. 
US Dept of Commerce BEA Continuous 
Gross State 
Product 
Indicates how the 
economy was 
faring in a state in 
the election year.  
This should be a 
factor in candidates 
deciding to run or 
not. 
Continuous 
numeric value 
(dollar amount) 
for each year. 
US Dept of Commerce BEA Continuous 
Unemployment The unemployment 
rate may indicate 
whether an 
individual felt 
positive/negative 
about the economy 
and therefore 
may/may not run 
for office.  
Continuous rate 
per year 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics Continuous 
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Legislative 
Professionalis
m - Salary 
Legislative salary 
is theorized to 
incentivize 
individuals to run if 
the leg is more 
professional 
(higher pay).   
Salary base 
amount (not 
including per 
diems or 
vouchers or 
other expenses).  
NCSL Continuous 
Legislative 
Professionalis
m - Number of 
Staffers 
Legislative staffers 
is theorized to 
incentivize 
individuals to run 
for office if they 
legislature is more 
professionalized. 
Number of 
staffers (not for 
every year.  
NCSL Count 
Term Limits  Term Limits Y 
or N; also Term 
limits repealed 
Y or N by year 
NCSL Dichotomo
us 
Strategic 
Factors - 
Incumbents 
Strategic factors 
are the rational 
strategies on which 
candidates make a 
decision on 
whether or not to 
run. 
The Institute 
considers 
anyone 
currently in its 
database as a 
state official an 
incumbent 
www.followthemoney.org Count/Mak
e % 
Candidate 
decisions - 
survey 
In order to 
investigate other 
potential factors 
affecting candidate 
decisions, need to 
talk to people who 
have run or not run 
for office to 
determine whether 
or not anything is 
missing 
Survey 10 
individuals. 
Ask questions 
based on 
Williams 
(2009), Maisel 
et al. (survey of 
judges as to 
why they ran or 
not.  
Qualitative Interviews;  Types of 
questions: http://ces.iga.ucdavis.edu/  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Candidate 
Withdrawals 
The number of 
candidates who 
filed to run, but 
then withdrew 
from the race.   
The number of 
candidates who 
filed to run, but 
then withdrew 
from the race 
(not due to 
death or 
disqualification 
which are 
different 
www.followthemoney.org Count/Mad
e % of total 
candidates, 
total seats 
up for 
grabs, 
permanent 
chamber 
seats 
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categories). 
Total 
Candidates 
Sum of all 
candidates running  
Total number of 
candidates 
running in that 
state's election 
www.followthemoney.org Count/Mad
e % of total 
seats up for 
grabs, 
permanent 
chamber 
seats 
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Table C.1: Tobit Models Compared for Multicollinearity – CPR 
 
 
 
 
 
CPR 
Total Seats 
up for 
Grabs
Robust 
St.Errors
Permanent 
Chamber 
Seats
Robust 
St.Errors
Word Count Contribution 
Statutes per 1000 words -0.0002 0.000 -0.0005 0.000
Word Count Campaign Finance 
Definitions per 1000 words 0.0004 0.001 ** 0.0004 0.000
Word Count Candidacy 
Requirements per 1000 words 0.0003 0.000 0.0006 0.000 *
Fl-Kincaid Contribution 
Statutes -0.0002 0.000 ** -0.0002 0.000 **
Fl-Kincaid Campaign finance 
Definitions -0.0002 0.000 ** -0.0002 0.000 **
Fl-Kincaid Candidacy 
Requirements 0.0003 0.000 ** 0.0002 0.000 **
CPR 
Total Seats 
up for 
Grabs
Robust 
St.Errors
Permanent 
Chamber 
Seats
Robust 
St.Errors
Word Count Contribution 
Statutes per 1000 words -0.0002 0.000 -0.0003 0.000
Word Count Campaign Finance 
Definitions per 1000 words 0.0002 0.000 * -0.0003 0.000 **
Word Count Candidacy 
Requirements per 1000 words 0.0001 0.000 0.0004 0.000
Fl-Kincaid Contribution 
Statutes -0.0002 0.000 * -0.0002 0.000 **
Fl-Kincaid Campaign finance 
Definitions -0.0001 0.000 ** -0.0002 0.000 **
Fl-Kincaid Candidacy 
Requirements 0.0002 0.000 ** 0.0002 0.000 **
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Year
Tobit Model Variables Run Separately to check for Multicollinearity
Tobit Model Variables run together to check for Multicollinearity
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Year
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
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Table C.2: Tobit Models Compared for Multicollinearity – CWR 
 
  
CWR
Total 
Candidates
Robust 
St.Errors
Total 
Seats
Robust 
St.Errors
Permanent 
Chamber 
Seats
Robust 
St.Errors
Word Count Contribution 
Statutes per 1000 words -0.002 0.002 -0.006 0.006 -0.008 0.006
Word Count Campaign Finance 
Definitions per 1000 words -0.005 0.001 ** -0.013 0.003 -0.012 0.003 **
Word Count Candidacy 
Requirements per 1000 words 0.004 0.001 * 0.010 0.004 0.009 0.003 **
Fl-Kincaid Contribution Statutes 0.002 0.000 ** 0.005 0.001 ** 0.004 0.001 **
Fl-Kincaid Campaign finance 
Definitions 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
Fl-Kincaid Candidacy 
Requirements -0.002 0.001 ** -0.004 0.001 ** -0.004 0.001 **
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
CWR
Total 
Candidates
Robust 
St.Errors
Total 
Seats
Robust 
St.Errors
Permanent 
Chamber 
Seats
Robust 
St.Errors
Word Count Contribution 
Statutes per 1000 words -0.003 0.002 -0.008 0.006 -0.011 0.006
Word Count Campaign Finance 
Definitions per 1000 words -0.005 0.001 ** -0.012 0.004 ** -0.011 0.003 **
Word Count Candidacy 
Requirements per 1000 words 0.004 0.002 * 0.011 0.004 * 0.009 0.003 **
Fl-Kincaid Contribution Statutes 0.002 0.001 ** 0.005 0.002 ** 0.004 0.001 **
Fl-Kincaid Campaign finance 
Definitions 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Fl-Kincaid Candidacy 
Requirements -0.002 0.001 ** -0.004 0.001 * -0.003 0.001 *
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Tobit Model Variables Run Separately to check for Multicollinearity
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Year
Tobit Model Variables Run Together to check for Multicollinearity
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Year
158 
 
Table C.3: Descriptive Statistics for all variables 
 
Dependent Variables Observations Mean Std.Dev Min Max Median
CPR Total Seats 731 0.02322 0.00566 0.01 0.06771 0.022
CPR Permanent Chamber 
Seats 768 0.01973 0.00683 0.001 0.06771 0.02
CWR Total Candidates 772 0.0101 0.0199 0 0.13137 0
CWR Total Seats 728 0.02549 0.05099 0 0.34286 0
CWR Permanent 
Chamber Seats 766 0.02145 0.04539 0 0.34286 0
Independent Variables Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Median
Contribution Number of 
Words 880 1653.04 1223.73 184 6247 1214
Definitions Number of 
Words 880 2671.57 1873.39 662 9883 1964
Candidacy Requirement 
Number of Words 880 2242.01 1242.19 483 5908 2130
Contribution Flesch-
Kincaid 880 14.2309 4.99622 6.6 31.8 12.92
Definitions Flesch-Kincaid 880 16.5689 6.48891 5.02 36.15 15.06
Candidacy Requirement 
Flesch-Kincaid 880 11.0387 4.9222 5.37 30.22 9.8
Gross State Product 785 246146 300176 14689 2003479 159203
Per Capita Income 880 33414.5 7985.82 18079 59687 32947
Unemployment Rates 880 5.50421 1.94251 2.3 13.8 5.1
Incumbents 834 57.8873 46.3825 0 327 46
Salary 737 25343.2 22977.2 0 116098 16500
Staff 880 554.47 673.594 18 3461 297.25
CPR Total Seats = (Total Cand/Total Seats)/100
CWR Total Candidates = Withdrawals/Total Candidates
CPR Permanent Chamber Seats = (Total Candidates/Permanent Chamber Seats)/100
